Navigating Identity through Philanthropy: A History of the Islamic Society of North America (1979 - 2008) by Siddiqui, Shariq Ahmed
 
 
 
NAVIGATING IDENTITY THROUGH PHILANTHROPY: A 
HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA 
(1979–2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shariq Ahmed Siddiqui 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 in the Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 
Indiana University 
 
 
November 2014 
  
 ii 
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty of Indiana University, in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
________________________________________________ 
David M. Craig, Ph.D., Committee Chair 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________ 
Dwight L. Burlingame, Ph.D. 
 
 
Doctoral Committee 
 
________________________________________________ 
Edward E. Curtis IV, D.Litt. et Phil. 
 
 
July 30, 2014 
________________________________________________ 
Abdulkader Sinno, Ph.D. 
 
 
  
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 
Shariq Ahmed Siddiqui 
  
 iv 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Sobia Khan, whose love, encouragement, 
support, and patience were instrumental in its completion. 
I also dedicate this dissertation to my children, Fatima, Amal, Safaa, and Zaki; who 
sacrificed a great deal of fatherly time as I completed this dissertation. 
  
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my dissertation chair, David Craig, for his guidance, 
support, mentorship, and friendship in helping me complete this dissertation. Working 
with a Ph.D. student who is not a traditional student, works many jobs, is incredibly 
civically engaged, and is a father of four could not have been easy. At many points 
leading up to the completion of this dissertation, I was willing to throw in the towel. 
David Craig is a huge reason for my staying the course and getting the work done. 
I also would like to thank my dissertation committee: Dwight Burlingame, 
Edward Curtis, and Abdulkader Sinno for their contributions in helping me achieve this 
goal. Since 1998, Dwight Burlingame has played an instrumental role in my identity as a 
philanthropic studies scholar. He has been a constant guide and mentor. Edward Curtis 
provided me the framework to understand my own Muslim-American religious identity. I 
knew I was a Muslim American, and I knew I wanted to study Muslim Americans. 
Edward provide me with the necessary direction, framework, and knowledge to embark 
on this self-discovery. Finally, Abdulkader Sinno was instrumental in ensuring that I did 
not throw in the towel. Every time I came close, he was ready to jump in and guide me 
back to the path. Both David and Abdulkader showed great generosity in reading multiple 
drafts of a huge work in progress. 
I would also like to thank Greg Witkowski and Les Lenkowsky in their roles as 
directors of graduate studies. Helping me navigate Indiana University graduate studies 
was never easy considering my long tenure in the program. I also appreciate the support 
shown to me by Gene Tempel and other members of the Lilly Family School of 
Philanthropy. My cohort and friend Rich Klopp served as a therapist on a regular basis. 
 vi 
I also want to thank the ISNA leaders and staff who generously provided me the 
time to review materials and documents. I particularly want to thank the secretaries 
general who were generous with their time and thoughts before, during, and after our oral 
histories. I want to recognize the leadership, volunteers, and staff of ISNA. While this 
dissertation at times examines their actions with a critical eye, it does not diminish my 
gratitude or admiration of their service as a Muslim American. Being able to call upon 
the research and advice of the best scholars in philanthropic studies and Islam in America 
to answer key questions or analyze key situations was a tremendous asset. These staff, 
leaders, and volunteers have had to make decisions in the hot seat through a very 
turbulent time in Islam in America. Their service to our faith and country has made our 
nation a better place. 
My children (Fatima, Amal, Safaa, and Zaki) sacrificed a great deal as I sought to 
complete the program. The post-dissertation paradigm in the Khan-Siddiqui household is 
anticipated with both great pleasure and a bit of dread. With my work on the dissertation 
having been such a big part of their lives, they do not know what to expect now.  
The encouragement of my parents and siblings helped me believe that I could 
achieve this goal, and I would be lost without their words of support and love. 
I especially want to thank my soul mate and wife, Sobia Khan. Living with me 
and my schedule is not easy even in normal circumstances. However, she made the 
commitment to guide our family through these uncertain and difficult times. Her critique 
grounded me. Her support and encouragement kept me going. Her unwillingness to 
accept anything less than a completed dissertation pushed me on. Her love centered me. 
A dissertation is a unique journey that relies upon many people. I have named a 
 vii 
few in these pages. There are too many that remain not named. I am thankful for the 
generosity that many have shown me in completion of this dissertation. Ultimately, I 
thank Allah (God) who has provided me with all that is good in my life, including this 
dissertation. All that is good in the next few pages come from Him and those companions 
he provided me for this journey. All that is lacking comes from me. 
  
 viii 
Shariq Ahmed Siddiqui 
 
NAVIGATING IDENTITY THROUGH PHILANTHROPY: A HISTORY OF THE 
ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA (1979–2008) 
This dissertation analyzes the development of the Islamic Society of North 
America (ISNA), a Muslim-American religious association, from the Iranian 
Revolution to the inauguration of our nation’s first African-American president. This 
case study of ISNA, the largest Muslim-American organization in North America, 
examines the organization’s institution-building and governance as a way to illustrate 
Muslim-American civic and religious participation. Using nonprofit research and theory 
related to issues of diversity, legitimacy, power, and nonprofit governance and 
management, I challenge misconceptions about ISNA and dispel a number of myths 
about Muslim Americans and their institutions. In addition, I investigate the experiences 
of Muslim-Americans as they attempted to translate faith into practice within the 
framework of the American religious and civic experience. I arrive at three main 
conclusions. First, because of their incredible diversity, Muslim-Americans are largely 
cultural pluralists. They draw from each other and our national culture to develop their 
religious identity and values. Second, a nonprofit association that embraces the values of 
a liberal democracy by establishing itself as an open organization will include members 
that may damage the organization’s reputation. I argue that ISNA’s values should be 
assessed in light of its programs and actions rather than the views of a small portion of its 
membership. Reviewing the organization’s actions and programs helps us discover a 
religious association that is centered on American civic and religious values. Third, 
 ix 
ISNA’s leaders were unable to balance their desire for an open, consensus-based 
organization with a strong nonprofit management power structure. Effective nonprofit 
associations need their boards, volunteers and staff to have well-defined roles and 
authority. ISNA’s leaders failed to adopt such a management and governance structure 
because of their suspicion of an empowered chief executive officer. 
 
David M. Craig, Ph.D., Committee Chair 
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Chapter One — Charting a Course 
On January 20, 2009, President Barack Obama declared, in his inaugural address, 
that the United States was a “nation of Christians and Muslims, Hindus and Jews.”1 This 
was a defining moment in Muslim American history, as well as in the history of the 
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), one of the largest and most influential Muslim 
American organizations. Seated next to Governor Howard Dean, the chair of the 
Democratic National Committee, was ISNA’s president, Dr. Ingrid Mattson.2 Mattson’s 
proximity to the center of power on that day demonstrated ISNA’s emergence as the 
preeminent Muslim organization in America. 
ISNA’s story is that of a newly established Muslim American identity, one that 
both “establishment”3 Muslim Americans and the United States government embraced. 
The latter's support came after September 11, 2001, when American national security 
interests required a Muslim American identity that could be a mediating force with 
Muslim Americans and the Muslim world. America’s acceptance of ISNA as the single 
Muslim American identity over others came at a heavy price — racial, ethnic, and 
ideological segregation.4 
                                                          
1 “Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address” New York Times, January 20, 2009. 
2 ISNA National Office of Interfaith and Community Alliances. 
3 The argument of who is “mainstream” is the source of argument within Muslim Americans. I choose to 
use the term “establishment” Muslim Americans. In my definition “establishment” Muslim Americans are 
sunni who embrace Islamic institutions as central to an Islamic identity. They also adhere to a more 
traditional form of Islam. The Nation of Islam, secular Muslim groups and Shiite groups are not included in 
this term. Organizations like ISNA, Islamic Circle of North America, Council of American Islamic 
Relations, Muslim American Society, Muslim Public Affairs Council, Muslim Alliance of North America, 
Islamic schools and centers are a few examples that would be included in this group. 
4 Even ISNA understands this heavy price. On the weekend of January 14, 2011, ISNA launched its Annual 
Diversity Forum to deal with issues of race, ethnicity and religious differences. Over 500 Muslim 
Americans attended this conference. 
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This dissertation seeks to accomplish two broad goals. First, it aims to broaden 
our understanding of American religious history by exploring ISNA in a case study. By 
looking at how ISNA developed as a Muslim American institution and how it formed a 
strong identity, we can better understand how Muslim Americans translated faith into 
practice. It also helps dispel myths about Muslim Americans and ISNA. Second, ISNA 
used the nonprofit form to establish a representative presence of Islam in America; 
therefore, this dissertation also examines how ISNA, as a membership-based religious 
nonprofit organization, was able to balance issues of diversity, legitimacy, and power 
with its core values during times of crisis and stability. These issues are important in 
understanding both the progress and failures the organization made on issues of diversity 
and legitimacy. 
This chapter charts a course through ISNA’s journey from 1979 through 2008. 
First, I outline the central argument and identify important trends and events in ISNA 
development. Second, I introduce the three founding groups and development of identity 
within ISNA. Third, I detail my research methods. Fourth, I provide a literature review of 
nonprofit studies and Islam in America. In the conclusion, I chart the next three 
substantive chapters of this dissertation. 
Central Argument 
As a religious nonprofit organization, ISNA acts within an American context. 
Issues of diversity, legitimacy, and power influenced its evolution as an American 
nonprofit organization. These issues helped define the final, widely accepted identity 
embraced by ISNA. 
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In this dissertation, I assert that ISNA consistently pursued the role of serving as 
the representative of Muslim Americans. This role required both internal and external 
legitimacy. Because of the incredible diversity within the Muslim American community, 
ISNA needed to embrace a broad identity for internal legitimacy. This internal legitimacy 
was vital in order to counter the Islamophobia that impeded external legitimacy. 
In creating ISNA as a religious nonprofit organization, the founders sought to 
express their shared commitment to making Islamic piety central to the organization's 
reason for being. This choice to be a religious nonprofit reflected their frustrations with 
other Muslim organizations, notably the FIA. This shared religious commitment helped 
bridge the founding members' different group identities. At the same time, becoming a 
religious nonprofit in the United States shaped ISNA's core values, too. By adopting the 
nonprofit form and increasingly adapting their operations and priorities to the democratic, 
voluntaristic, and pluralistic values of the American nonprofit sector, ISNA strengthened 
its commitment to those values. This dissertation examines this organizational tension 
between being a religious nonprofit and being a religious nonprofit as a way to 
understand ISNA's history and its relationship to Muslim Americans. To this end, David 
Craig suggests a helpful approach to identifying and evaluating a nonprofit organization's 
values: 
Values are not the morals of stories, nor are they aspirational ideals. To 
have any meaning, they must be made explicit through ongoing debate 
within an organization combined with action to build structures that 
articulate these values anew. I do not mean simply speaking these values. I 
use the term articulate in the sense of an articulated limb that has a specific 
structure related to its operations and purposes. This structure enables 
certain movements but not others. This range of motion comes with limits, 
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too, some of which are inherent in the structure itself and some of which 
are due to external forces and constraints.5 
 
ISNA’s leaders adopted bylaws, budgets, programs, and staff to express and 
articulate their core values for the organization. ISNA publications expressed points of 
views or allowed debate to illustrate its adherence to pluralistic values. ISNA’s values 
were strengthened and weakened by the internal and external forces. 
ISNA's efforts were hindered by a highly centralized, bureaucratic framework, as 
well as internal factions that undermined each other. The distribution of power and the 
distrust in a central chief executive made it difficult for ISNA to build upon its successes. 
Traditionally, nonprofit boards hire and empower chief executives to execute the mission 
of their organizations. In ISNA's case, however, the distrust of a central chief executive 
blurred the boundaries between the role of the board and the role of the chief executive. 
The rise of Islamophobia coupled with the revival of Islamic identity and activism 
are two important trends that affected ISNA’s development as a nonprofit organization. 
In addition, the Iranian Revolution, the First Gulf War, and terror attacks on September 
11, 2001, are key events in the analysis of ISNA. Externally, these events generated a 
rising level of Islamophobia and resulted in greater scrutiny of Muslim Americans. 
Internally, these events created a greater sense of unity and identity among Muslim 
Americans. 
Each of these events required ISNA to make important decisions about its core 
values. Issues of diversity, legitimacy, and power influenced these decisions. This 
dissertation outlines those decisions in an attempt to understand how ISNA became one 
                                                          
5 Craig, David M., “Religious Values in the Healthcare Market: Stories and Structures from Catholic and 
Jewish Hospitals” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics, (2008) p. 225  
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of the most influential Muslim American organizations by 2002. Central to this story are 
the three founding groups or factions of ISNA, which I describe, in the next section, as 
the activists, HSAAMs (historically Sunni African-American Muslims), and cultural 
pluralists. Their internal struggle and search for common ground fueled ISNA's quest for 
internal and external legitimacy. 
These founding groups were represented by the eight chief executive officers who 
led ISNA between 1981 and 2012. These officers, who held the title of secretary general, 
were responsible for managing the organization and greatly influenced its direction. Each 
individual’s particular approach to nonprofit management and leadership influenced the 
organization's journey. Of these eight men, three were activists (Rabie Hasan Ahmed, 
Amer Haleem, and Ahmed ElHattab), one was a HSAAM (Dr. Ihsan Bagby), and four 
were cultural pluralists (Dr. Iqbal Unus, Dr. Sayyid Syeed, Dr. Muneer Fareed, and Safaa 
Zarzour). 
Founding Groups of ISNA 
Three different groups came together and established ISNA. I refer to them as 
activist internationalists (activists), historically Sunni African-American Muslims 
(HSAAM), and cultural pluralists. The activists were American Muslims who were 
influenced by or who supported global Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Jamaat-e-Islami. They saw their efforts on behalf of Islam in America as part of a 
global network of Islamic work. HSAAMs were African-American Muslims who came to 
Islam from outside the Nation of Islam. The HSAAM movement started in the 1920’s. Its 
members accepted traditional orthodox Islam and rejected the version of Islam being 
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propagated by the Nation of Islam. Finally, the cultural pluralists were devout Muslims 
who sought to engage in building Muslim American institutions to sustain their religious 
identity while integrating (but not assimilating) into the structures of American society. 
Although these groups have many similarities, they differ primarily in where their 
religious identity is centered. The activists' identity was centered in a global Islamic 
movement, whereas HSAAMs centered their identity in Blackamerican religion. Cultural 
pluralists' identity was centered in the American religious experience. I consider the 
American religious experience to be voluntary, relative and pluralistic. Religion and 
theology are broadly interpreted and practiced. I will examine this further in the next 
section. 
ISNA’s Founders and Their Struggle for Identity 
ISNA’s journey through Islam in America and its quest to become the 
representative Muslim American organization were affected by the diversity of Muslim 
Americans, the power structures that existed within the organization, and forces external 
to the organization. From its inception, ISNA included a diverse group of leaders seeking 
to define, articulate, and implement their vision of a Muslim American nonprofit 
organization. 
We can compare the three founding groups to divergent religious identities being 
established in the United States in the early twentieth century. Three distinct models of 
American Jewish identity being formulated at that time: assimilation, Zionism, and 
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cultural pluralism.6 It may seem odd to claim similarities between Zionists and American 
Muslims but internationalist commitment on behalf of coreligionists was the same. 
Similarly there is a comparable cultural pluralist identity. Only assimilation is missing 
within the founding groups of ISNA. Although all three of these models existed among 
Muslim Americans broadly by the mid-twentieth century, only variations of the last two 
models existed among the groups that founded ISNA. These variations were Zionism and 
cultural pluralism. At ISNA’s inception, no one in the leadership was calling for 
assimilation. The establishment of the Muslim Student Association of US & Canada 
(MSA) and ISNA was part of a plan to counter the assimilation of Muslim American 
identity into the larger melting pot. 
ISNA emerged as these groups united in an effort to form an institution. Although 
these three groups differed in their goals, they were willing to share resources and come 
under the banner of one organization. The history of ISNA involves the internal struggle 
of three competing, but at times, complementary groups. 
The first group was inspired by Muslim activist movements like the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami.7 This group concentrated on developing activist 
Muslims who would help propagate Islam while developing institutions that would serve 
pious, activist Muslims. Their vision of mosque building focused on developing 
                                                          
6 Whitfield, Stephen J., “In Defense of Diversity: Jewish Thought from Assimilationism to Cultural 
Pluralism” in Charity, Philanthropy and Civility in American History Ed. Lawrence Friedman and Mark 
McGarvie. New York: Cambridge University Press 2002. 302 
7 Activist is a term that refers to Muslims who seek to further Islamic goals by propagating Islam by 
teaching those within how to practice the faith accurately while also adding to the Islamic ummah by 
propagating and converting non-Muslims to Islam. Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami are examples 
of activist movements that have gone further and attempted to engage in the political process. 
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institutions that would fulfill this mission.8 They were in America to propagate Islam but 
were tied to their homelands and a perceived global Islamic movement. America was a 
resource that could promote work in the Muslim world. 
The development of international relief funds was another central feature of their 
work. This group thinks of itself as transnational and diasporic. I am designating this 
group as “internationalist activists” for the purposes of this dissertation. Their position on 
these movements is best articulated in the Islamic Horizons magazine in 1978: 
The MSA[ISNA] doesn’t claim to be an Islamic movement in the sense 
Ikhwanual Muslemoon was, or Jammat e Islami Pakistan projects itself. 
These two great exponents of Islam in today’s world are comprehensive in 
their scope and sweeping in the formulation of their critique on the current 
systems of the world. Conceptually, we find ourselves in agreement with 
them. We do subscribe to their view that the present-day ideologies are 
outmoded, that the crisis in human spirit is deepening and any solution 
short of a total Islam will only accelerate the fall of humanity down the 
precipice. That’s why we consider the leaders of Ikhwan and Jamaat as 
benefactors of our ummah.9 
 
The activists did not seek to “take over America” as many critics argue; instead, 
they sought to spread Islam, educate Muslims about correct Islamic practice, and leverage 
Muslim American presence as an important political force. These Muslims had a specific 
vision of what Islamic practice required: abhorrence to interest-based loans, 
establishment of Islamic educational institutions, development of Islamic literature, 
teaching “American people” about Islam, and training Islamic workers and other 
elements about the practice of the Islamic faith. This group also saw itself as an important 
pressure group to change U.S. foreign policy toward the Muslim world. This group 
                                                          
8 See Poston, Larry A., “Da’wa in the West” in The Muslims of America, ed. Yvonne Haddad. Oxford 
University Press (1991) p. 125-135 
9 “MSA–Goals and Strategy” Islamic Horizons April 1978 pg 1. 
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probably was the strongest at the time of ISNA’s inception. This strength was due to its 
ties to the global Islamic world and the funds that it was able to leverage when this group 
began to organize. 
This group had much in common with Louis Brandeis’s vision of religious (in his 
case, Jewish) nationalism. As described by Stephen Whitfield, Brandeis argued that 
Jewish activism 
far from contradicting American political values (including forming a 
more perfect union) . . . would make Jewish Americans into better 
Americans precisely because their commitment to democracy would be 
solidified. Instead of suffering from the anguish [of] dual loyalty, Jewish 
Americans would find reinforcement, since the goal of supporting the 
Jewish community globally would help fulfill the historic American 
mission of serving as a city upon a hill.10 
 
These global activists understood the necessity of Islamic international activism 
for Muslim Americans. They, like Brandeis, saw no contradiction or tension between 
global activism and the American identity. The difference between these individuals and 
Brandeis was that Brandeis had little knowledge of his faith and had little interest in 
promoting Jewish values through institutional practice.11 These leaders not only had an 
interest in promoting Islam through institutional practice, but also possessed a strong 
grounding in the faith. Many of these leaders later broke away and established the 
Muslim American Society (MAS — predominantly an Arab American group) or joined 
the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA — predominantly a South Asian group).12 
                                                          
10 Whitfield, p. 305 
11 Ibid 
12 Other major organizations like the Council on American Islamic Relations, Muslim Public Affairs 
Council, American Muslim Alliance and American Muslim Council were established by ISNA leaders. 
These organizations continued to be a part of ISNA’s informal umbrella. They were active in ISNA 
10 
 
The second group included the growing number of new Muslim Americans called 
HSAAMs (Historically Sunni African-American Muslims) who had been involved in 
American Islam for nearly half a century.13 These Muslims came to Islam not through a 
mediating structure like the Nation of Islam, but directly through immigrant and 
indigenous missionaries. HSAAMs sought a connection to “universal” Islam but also 
struggled with the development of a Muslim American identity.14 HSAAMs embraced 
Sunni Islam through interaction with immigrants and saw themselves as distinctly 
different from the Nation of Islam and its descendants. They embraced “immigrant” 
Islam in an effort to embrace “mainstream Islam” and also to embrace Islam’s message of 
unity and diversity. They probably considered the Nation of Islam as neither “correct 
Muslims” nor followers of “true Islam.” As Edward Curtis suggests, HSAAMs also 
interacted with the Nation of Islam and Imam W. D. Muhammad’s movements, among 
other African-American Muslim groups. In fact, the current leader of the Muslim 
Alliance in North America, a predominantly HSAAM organization, is Imam Siraj 
Wahhaj, who is a former Nation of Islam leader.15 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conventions, publications and event. All of these organizations were formed after 1990 when ISNA nearly 
ceased to function and had all but shut down. 
13 The term “historically sunni African American’s was coined by Dr. Ihsan Bagby in creating a typology 
of mosques by ethnic identity. Dr. Ihsan Bagby is a professor at the University of Kentucky, serves as 
secretary general of the Muslim Alliance of North America and is an elected board member of the Islamic 
Society of North America.  
14 Leonard, Karen Isaksen, Muslims in the United States: The State of Research (New York: Russel Sage 
Foundation 2003) p 78. 
15 Yuskaev, Timur. “Siraj Wahhaj” in Encyclopedia of Muslim American History, ed. Edward E. Curtis IV. 
New York: Facts on File, Inc., (2010) p. 573. 
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Their Islamic faith has to be seen in the context of a “Blackamerican”16religion 
that frames African-American faith in terms of slavery, justice, and African-American 
experience in America.17 HSAAM saw fellow immigrants as kindred spirits in their 
Islamic journey — because they also faced discrimination and opposed American foreign 
policy while seeking to establish a purist form of Islam. As this group struggled to 
distinguish itself from the “heretical” Nation of Islam, it embraced immigrant Muslims 
and, for a period, racial tensions and differences were put aside. 
In the 1990s, this group broke away from ISNA and formed the Muslim Alliance 
in North America (MANA).18 The group sought to “unite and formulate a ‘more 
authentic, normative form’ that does not give up the critical stance toward American 
society.” Although ISNA leaders sought to include HSAAMs as part of the leadership, 
they failed to pay attention to the issues that were uniquely important to HSAAMs.19 
ISNA leaders recognized and expressed in meeting minutes the need to include 
indigenous American Muslims as equals in the organization — for example, through 
inclusive leadership and by paying attention to their needs and priorities.20 
However, this official recognition in the minutes of an ISNA board meeting did 
not necessarily make its way into successful policy. HSAAMs who were part of ISNA 
leadership felt that they had been used by their immigrant brethren and that their funding 
                                                          
16 Blackamerican is spelled in this way on purpose. This term was originally coined by Gayraud Wilmore. 
17 Jackson, Sherman A., Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Thurd Resurrection (Oxford 
University Press 2005). 
18 Leonard, Karen Isaksen, Muslims in the United States: The State of Research (New York: Russell sage 
Foundation Press 2003) p. 78. 
19 Interview with Dr. Iqbal Unus. May 2, 2011. 
20 Meeting Minutes, ISNA Majlis Ashura, July 30-31, 1983 
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priorities were largely ignored.21 The group sought to establish their own institution that 
would serve their priorities and vision. They sought not to disengage from their 
immigrant brethren, but to engage them as institutional equals.22 
The third group included Muslim immigrants who had experienced the failure of 
the post-colonial Muslim world.23 They found American ideas of pluralism, diversity, 
and democracy as the right mix to develop a Muslim American identity. Their vision of 
mosque building was to develop institutions that could establish a permanent local 
presence of American Islam, while also helping to develop a Muslim American identity 
steeped in American ideas and Islamic theology. They were practicing Muslims who saw 
America as being compatible with Islamic ideals. For these Muslims, America was more 
“Islamic” than the Muslim world.24 Just as they allowed culture to influence the practice 
of faith in their country of origin, they allowed American culture to influence it in their 
new homeland. They saw America as fertile ground on which to live their lives, raise 
their families, and practice their faith. They acknowledged the need for Muslims to come 
together to preserve cultural and religious practices. They also saw the need to follow in 
the footsteps of other immigrant and faith groups who found strength in unity. I am 
calling this group the “cultural pluralists.” 
                                                          
21 Dannin, Robert. Understanding the Multi-Ethnic Dilemma of African-American Muslims in Muslims on 
the Americanization Path?.ed. Haddad Yvonne and John L. Esposito (Oxford University Press 2000) p. 
264. 
22 Interview with Dr. Ihsan Bagby, April 2011. 
23 See Khan, Muqtedar, American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom (Maryland: Amana Publications 
2002) p. 12 
24 Khan, Muqtedar, American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom (Maryland: Amana Publications 
2002) p. 12. 
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Cultural pluralists did not come to ISNA and the Muslim Student Association as 
graduates of Islamic activist work in the Muslim world. In fact, they saw distinct 
problems with those movements, which they articulated on the editorial page of Islamic 
Horizons. 
But, we don’t follow some aspects of their [Ikhwan and Jamaat] 
methodology for certain reasons. An organization without goals is at best a 
fossilized structure. Yet when it comes to means, goals alone are not the 
determinant. . . . The MSA [ISNA] is not led by a Prophet. . . . It’s led by a 
group of ordinary Muslims and its membership is also of humble people. . 
. . MSA[ISNA] doesn’t aspire to be a political party; it doesn’t want to be 
another Ikhwan or Jamaat or, for that matter, their extension. Our 
immediate concern is the future of Muslims as a cultural entity in North 
America.25  
 
Their vision of ISNA was an organization that would help establish an Islamic 
presence in America, thus making it easier for Muslims to live a fruitful life in this 
country while enjoying American institutions of freedom, democracy, pluralism, and 
capitalism. As one letter to Islamic Horizons states, “Islam has adapted itself formally to 
local customs and traditions throughout the world and has been thus far successful to 
maintain itself without abandoning its essence.”26 
This vision of a Muslim American identity was different from Brandeis’s Zionism 
or the activist Islamist global movement. The cultural pluralists' vision was closer to 
Stephen Whitfield’s description of Horace Meyer Kallen for Judaism. Kallen was a 
proponent for Jewish American cultural pluralism. Kallen believed that a liberal 
democracy could sustain and reinforce Jewish communal identity. The son of an 
                                                          
25 “MSA–Goals and Strategy” Islamic Horizons April 1978 pg 1. 
26 Readers Comment, ”A need for Looking at Islam in the American context” Islamic Horizons (May 
1981), p2 
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Orthodox rabbi, Kallen was uncomfortable with both the orthodox tradition and the 
reform movement. Similarly, he disagreed with Brandeis on Zionism without a 
connection to the Jewish tradition, as well as the idea of Americanization or 
assimilation.27 Kallen was important in helping to show the compatibility of Jewishness 
with citizenship; he was also instrumental in reconciling ethnicity with democracy.28 
However, Muslim American cultural pluralists not only believed in the important role of 
Islamic faith and tradition, but also practiced the faith, which was unlike Kallen, who was 
a secularist. 
Muslim American cultural pluralists did not see the need to change all of 
American society to the faith of Islam to help a Muslim American community thrive. The 
American nonprofit sector combined with American civil liberties was fertile ground for 
these new Americans to start a new life. This group became the primary leadership within 
ISNA and has become the emergent Muslim American identity embraced by both the 
Obama and Bush administrations. 
Each one of these groups (HSAAMs, activists and cultural pluralists) helped 
contribute toward a Muslim American identity within ISNA. However, the cultural 
pluralists have emerged as a dominant and more acceptable public identity. Although 
ISNA was not exclusively composed of just these three groups, they are the major focus 
of this dissertation. 
                                                          
27 Whitfield, p. 307 
28 Ibid, p. 308 
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Establishing a Muslim American Identity: Tensions and Transition 
ISNA leaders like Dr. Muneer Fareed, Dr. Sayyid Syeed, Dr. Iqbal Unus, and 
Safaa Zarzour, mentioned earlier, have embraced the cultural pluralist identity. This 
identity fits the pluralistic, non-collectivist American ethos. That same ethos gives rise to 
numerous voluntary organizations in the American nonprofit sector. Today, ISNA, like 
many other American nonprofits, uses the voluntary sector to promote a shared identity, a 
representative voice, and a set of common purposes. 
The pluralistic, non-collectivist American ethos is at odds with the two groups 
that, for different reasons, question the idea of being "Americans" along with being 
"Muslims." The activist immigrant Muslims who split away from ISNA and established 
the Muslim American Society remain opposed to the nation's capitalist doctrines and 
other western values until recently. The HSAAMs also criticize the American society for 
injustices rooted in African-American experiences with slavery and discrimination. Both 
groups fit uncomfortably with today's ISNA and with each other. 
The selection of ISNA as a partner was a strategic choice for the United States 
government. However, this choice exposed the division among Muslim Americans. That 
is, many African-Americans and other immigrants do not feel included in the ISNA 
identity. The American government has not embraced a number of major national 
organizations (Council on American Islamic Relations, Muslim American Society, 
Muslim Alliance in North America) in the same way it embraced ISNA and its cultural 
pluralist identity. 
ISNA has worked to include African-American Muslims in the “identity” that it 
established. In fact, ISNA’s vision of a Muslim American identity is theoretically rooted 
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in the long history of Muslims in America. ISNA adopted the Civil Rights narrative and 
the African-American struggle against oppression as key components of its vision of a 
Muslim American identity. However, because immigrants and other American Muslims 
did not experience the struggles that African-Americans faced, these ISNA leaders have 
found it difficult to understand the struggles in a meaningful way. 
The organization has sought, some would argue unsuccessfully, to bridge the non-
immigrant-versus-immigrant divide. The organization has consistently struggled with a 
"calculus of rights" for those who came here as immigrants and for those who are 
indigenous to America. ISNA has sought to define Muslim American rights as a group in 
terms of both non-immigrants and immigrants. 
This Muslim American identity has also exposed a division among immigrant 
Muslim Americans. This rift exists between those who are more activist and align their 
beliefs with Jamaat-e-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood and cultural pluralists who are 
not aligned with international and transnational diasporic movements. This activist group 
is suspicious of the United States government and considers it an unreliable partner. 
International activists are at odds with ISNA’s core belief — that it is vital to work with 
every administration of the US government rather than be left out in the cold.29 
Furthermore, activists have been suspicious of interfaith relationships until 
recently.30 They, like many HSAAMs, would disagree with the goal of ISNA to become, 
in Dr. Sayyid Syeed’s words, “the Muslim Rev. Billy Graham. ISNA should serve as the 
                                                          
29 Nimer, Mohamed, “Muslims in American Public Life” in Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to 
Citizens. Ed Yvonne Tazbeck Haddad ( Oxford University Press 2002) p. 171. 
30 Haddad, Yvonne and Robert Ricks. “Claiming Space in America’s Pluralism: Muslims Enter the Political 
Maelstrom” in Muslims in Western Politics. ed. Abdulkader Sinno ( Indiana University Press (2009) p. 21. 
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conscience of our government and provide the government a partner to dialogue with 
rather than one to fight with.”31 
As an organization, ISNA does not define religious requirements for membership 
and is open to a diverse group of Muslims. In contrast, the activists ought to define what 
they saw as authentic Islam. For example, in their initial years, they opposed interest-
based mortgages32and had requirements for separation by gender at their events. Their 
suspicion of government, their focus on justice, and their strategic vision to work with the 
poor created a natural alignment of thinking between HSAAM and this group. However, 
three decades of tension between these two groups continues to keep them apart. 
Establishing Muslim American Unity: Institutional Cooperation and Collaboration 
In 1981, a few major Muslim American organizations, that included the three 
groups (HSAAM’s, activists and cultural pluralists), came together to establish the 
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). The new organization's purpose was to serve 
as an umbrella organization, one that would provide a “platform of expression” for 
Muslims and Islam in America.33 
This was not the first Muslim American organization seeking to serve Islam in 
Americas. Indeed, an Islamic presence has existed in America since the 1400s. Muslim 
organizations in the United States were focused on certain ethnic or ideological 
communities. However, major institutional building in the early twentieth century took 
                                                          
31 Quote from Dr. Sayyid M Syeed, former Secretary General of ISNA. But dialogue does not suggest not 
articulating disagreements. ISNA opposed both Iraq Wars despite while maintaining a relationship with the 
government. 
32 Smith, Jane I. Islam in America (Columbia University Press 1999) p. 134 
33 ISNA Annual Report (1983) 
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place at the grassroots level, largely by the establishment of Islamic centers or 
organizations.34 These institutions included ethnic and sectarian participation. In addition, 
organizations such as the Federation of Islamic Associations of the United States and 
Canada (FIA) was established in 1954 by World War II veterans but became less 
successful by the 1980s.35 Each of these organizations sought to meet the needs of the 
Muslim community in the United States at that time. 
The addition of a large number of Muslims from the Muslim world after 1965 
dramatically changed the number and nature of Muslim Americans.36 A new organization 
was needed to mediate the transition of this changing Muslim American population. 
Initially, the Muslim Student Association of the U.S. & Canada (MSA) addressed this 
need. Later, this task was taken on by other organizations (for example, ISNA). The MSA 
initially tried to become a part of FIA, and the MSA gained sufficient memberships to 
secure a seat on the FIA board for many years.37 However, by 1978, it was clear that the 
MSA leaders and many of its members were not comfortable with the FIA’s role as a 
national leader.38 It would be a mistake to assume that MSA members were completely 
                                                          
34 For institutional building also see Muslim Communities in America ed. Yvonne Haddad and Jane Smith 
(SUNY Press 1994) & Arab Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream. Ed. Nabeel Abraham and Andrew 
Shyrock & Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience by Alixa Naff (Southern Illinois 
University Press 1985) & The Arab Moslems in the United States: Religion and Assimilation by Abdo 
Elkholy (Connecticut: College & University Press 1966) 
35 Howell, Sally. “Federation of Islamic Associations of United States and Canada” in Encyclopedia of 
Muslim American History, ed. Edward E. Curtis IV. New York: Facts on File, Inc., (2010) p. 193. 
36 Leonard, Karen Isaksen, Muslims in the United States: The State of Research (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation 2003) p. 10. 
37 “Letter to the Editor” Islamic Horizons (October 1978) p. 4 
38 “FIA Convention” Embarrasing and Disappointing” (sic) Islamic Horizons (October 1978) p. 4 
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opposed to the FIA, and Islamic Horizons continued to publish discussions both for and 
against FIA. 
A compromise among three distinctly pious, conservative Muslim American 
groups (HSAAMs, activists and cultural pluralists) resulted in ISNA’s founders 
designating it as an umbrella organization that would serve as a platform for Muslim 
Americans. Through ISNA, these three groups sought to develop a visible, powerful, and 
representative national presence for Islam in America. 
History had taught all three groups that it would be difficult to achieve their goals 
unless they embraced diversity. But utility alone did not bring these three groups 
together. As pious Muslims, they sought to embrace the unity that Islam called for, while 
simultaneously embracing the diversity it taught. 
However, distinguishing these Muslim Americans as conservative, progressive, 
liberal, or moderate would be a mistake. They had some fundamental unifying elements: 
All of them were religious and pious, they all embraced American ideals of democracy 
and pluralism, they all saw the great opportunity America presented to Islam and 
Muslims, and they all believed that the Islamic world was dysfunctional. 
What separated them were their histories, their motivation to be a part of Islamic 
work, and their vision for Islam in America. For example, in 1986 the ISNA Majlis Ash-
Shura (majlis) or board of directors voted to encourage Muslim Americans to engage in 
political and civic activities, including voting in elections. This was a historic position, 
but the organization’s minutes noted dissenting voices within the board.39 The fact that 
                                                          
39 Meeting Minutes, ISNA Majlis Ashura, June 5, 1986. 
20 
 
the final board minutes include both favorable votes and the voices of dissent suggests 
the compromising nature of the deliberations. 
These tensions and collaborations help explain ISNA today. They also shaped 
immigrant and HSAAM Muslim American identity. However, we should not exaggerate 
the differences between these groups. After all, they were able to come together, form an 
organization, and help it become an influential Muslim American institution, despite the 
fact that they recognized their diversity. As this Islamic Horizons editorial suggests, they 
probably did not realize the depth of diversity or the intricacies of their differences: 
A quick look at . . . Muslims . . . in North America would reveal that there 
are three main streams:40 
(1) Immigrants from the Muslim countries and mainly from the 
Middle East and Eastern Europe who came to North America due to 
political and economic reasons.41 
 
(2) Students who are here for higher studies and many of whom stay 
permanently after graduation. Even for those who return home after 
graduation, the average length of stay is about five (5) years.42 
(3) Native Muslims who have accepted Islam in increasing numbers in 
the more recent years, most of whom are Afro-Americans.43 
 
Despite not fully comprehending their diversity, leaders of ISNA understood that 
differences existed among them and that some groups weren't represented under their 
umbrella. 
The eventual success of the cultural pluralists pushed forward an ethnic-religious 
group that is on the journey of integration (not assimilation) with which America is 
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41 International activists, cultural pluralists and FIA 
42 International activists and cultural pluralists 
43 HSAAM’s and other African American Muslim groups 
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historically familiar. However, it's vital that we know the historical journey this Muslim 
American identity has taken in order to understand how Muslim Americans and ISNA 
have evolved.  
ISNA’s history helps us understand not only the development of a Muslim 
American identity, but also gives us a window into how the transitions and confrontations 
related to race and ideology affected Muslim America over the past three decades. 
Understanding this history helps us recognize that there is no homogenous Muslim 
American identity. 
Research Methods and Sources 
This dissertation required the analysis of primary source materials, including 
ISNA Annual Reports, Islamic Horizons magazines, ISNA board minutes44 and articles 
in the mainstream American press. One unique source was the oral histories I conducted 
with six of eight secretaries general. I analyzed all these sources from the perspective of 
the scholarly literature on Islam in America and the American nonprofit sector. 
Oral histories are vital in studying the history of the Islamic Society of North 
America (ISNA). Available documents such as annual reports, issues of Islamic 
Horizons, press accounts, and academic studies provide only one perspective into this 
organization’s history. If numbers and graphs could sum up its history, these tools would 
work well by themselves. However, the forces that helped mold its identity and the 
identity of its supporters were affected not only by global events, but also by the 
                                                          
44 In 2010, I was appointed to the ISNA Narrative Committee formed by the ISNA Majlis Shura (Board) to 
look at ISNA’s history and help craft a narrative for public dissemination. Membership in this committee 
provided me limited yet unprecedented access to ISNA records that were helpful in my research 
22 
 
personalities of its leaders. ISNA has developed during a period when Islam and Muslims 
have been under constant attack. Its publications and public statements are designed to 
emphasize a public persona that is open to little attack. That public ISNA is only one 
aspect of the organization I seek to examine. 
ISNA has been influenced the most by its secretaries general. As the chief 
executive officers of the organization, these individuals have the greatest insight into the 
organization’s day-to-day operations and long-term direction. Unlike elected board 
members, these secretaries general faced no mandatory term limits. None of the 
secretaries general have written memoirs, and because of their advancing age, their 
perspectives as eye-witnesses to Muslim American institutional history may soon be lost. 
Including their perspectives was vital in writing this history of the Islamic Society of 
North America. 
These secretaries general faced firsthand the three competing visions of the 
leadership of ISNA. They were responsible for managing the organization while 
mediating among three founding groups (international activists, cultural pluralists, and 
HSAAM’s). While each secretary general’s religious identity may have aligned with a 
specific group, their role as the chief executive officer required working with all three 
groups. Many of the programs that they oversaw resulted from seeking common ground. 
Leaders who sought to sway ISNA in one direction or another found that dissension 
stymied their vision. 
During this twenty-eight-year history, only one secretary general served for more 
than a decade. The second highest tenure was by acting secretaries general leaders who 
were trusted by all groups and were placed in the position until a new chief executive 
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could be hired. Only three of them left the position by their own choice. In the appendix, 
I include a detailed discussion about the six men I interviewed for this dissertation. 
Literature Review 
ISNA translated faith into practice using the nonprofit form. Therefore, it is 
important that we review the research related to Islam in America and philanthropic 
studies. This literature review consists of two sections. The first is an analysis of Islam in 
America research that is important to our examination of ISNA. The second section 
provides an overview of the philanthropic studies literature and frameworks necessary in 
order to understand ISNA. 
Literature Review — Islam in America 
This dissertation also seeks to place itself within the broader context of Islam in 
America scholarship. Until recently, this material focused on examining Muslims in 
America from the Islam versus West methodology. The seminal works in this area are 
focused on showing how Islam is compatible with American values. In doing so, they 
examine Muslims in America as external entities. These studies seek to examine how 
Muslim Americans are able to fare in America, rather than how they actually participate 
in America.45 The focus of these studies is to see how Muslim Americans are able to 
mediate “foreign” values within an American context.46 They either look at the ability of 
                                                          
45 GhaneaBassiri, Kambiz. A History of Islam in America (Cambridge University Press 2010) p. 4. 
46 See Yvonne Haddad, Jane Smith and Kathleen Moore Muslim Women in America: The Challenge of 
Islamic Identity Today (Oxford University Press 2006) and Jane Smith Islam in America (Columbia 
University Press 1999) & Yvonne Haddad and John Esposito Muslims on the Americanization Path? 
(Oxford University Press 1998). The last title of the last book even tends to suggest that Muslims may be 
on an “American path” which may be seen as distinctly non-Muslim.  
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Muslim Americans to take distinct Islamic values and translate them into a distinct 
American practice or they examine whether American society is open to these values. 
These books focus on convincing their audience that Islam is compatible with American 
society. 
The second set of important works focuses on specific ethnic groups of Muslims 
in America.47 With the exception of Curtis, each of these describes each ethnic group as 
though they stand in isolation in American society. Curtis examines how Black Muslims 
in the Nation of Islam sought to define themselves not only by how they saw themselves 
within their movement but also in conjunction with the larger Muslim community. 
The third set of scholarship includes collections of works of Muslim Americans 
essays that aid in illustrating a range of issues related to Muslims in America. These 
collections are invaluable for the study of Islam in America, yet do not provide a 
comprehensive analysis or connect the dots for the reader.48 Furthermore, this self-
articulation by Muslim Americans, while vital, does not provide a global historical 
context. 
                                                          
47 See Edward Curtis Black Muslim Religion in the Nation of Islam (UNC Press 2006) & Adil Najam’s 
Portrait of a Giving Community: Philanthropy by the Pakistani-American Diaspora (Harvard 2006) & 
Karen Leonard’s Locating Home; India’s Hyderabadis Abroad (Stanford University Press 2007) & The 
South Asian American’s (Greenwood Press 1997) & Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shyrock Arab Detroit: 
From Margin to Mainstream & Alixa Naff Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience 
(Southern Illinois University Press 1985) & The Arab Moslems in the United States: Religion and 
Assimilation by Abdo Elkholy (Connecticut: College & University Press 1966). 
48 See Yvonne Haddad Muslim Community in North America (SUNY Press 1994) & Yvonne Haddad’s 
Muslim in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford University Press 2002) & Yvonne Haddad and 
John Esposito Muslims on the Americanization Path? (Oxford University Press 1998) & see Muslim 
Communities in America ed. Yvonne Haddad and Jane Smith (SUNY Press 1994) & Edward Curtis’ The 
Columbia Sourcebook of Muslims in the United States (Columbia University Press 2008) & Edward Curtis’ 
Encyclopedia of Muslim American History (Facts on File 2010). The first Curtis book is an invaluable 
primary source tool while the second is the first encyclopedia on Muslim Americans. 
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These major works tend to examine Muslim Americans within the context of 
separate ethnic groups: African-Americans and immigrants. Those seeking to expand 
upon these groups see Islam in America through singular lenses of African-Americans, 
Arabs, Asians, and others. 
ISNA has also been the focus of four important scholars. Steve Johnson examines 
ISNA in Yvonne Haddad and Jane Smith’s important book Muslim Communities in North 
America.49 Johnson’s work is based on available research and personal interviews of 
Muslims in Indianapolis prior to 1994. His work looks at ISNA from its inception to 
1990. In 1990, he finds that “Islam at an institutional level in Indianapolis is in flux.”50 
His study confirms that during that period around Gulf War I, the alliances and 
relationships had changed in nature. His work confirms my assertion that initial founders 
of ISNA included HSAAMs such as Dr. Ihsan Bagby and Umar Khattab. 
Johnson also confirms the division between HSAAM and African-American 
Muslims such as the community of Imam W. D Muhammad. His chapter also shows the 
constant struggles among activist, indigenous, and cultural pluralist Muslim Americans. 
However, in his chapter, Johnson fails to comprehend the divisions between the two 
immigrant groups that were a part of ISNA. He understands the divisions to be either 
ethnic or religious. He argues that the divisions are generally along “conservative-liberal, 
socioeconomic, and immigrant-indigenous lines.”51 However, my dissertation will show 
that divisions exist among immigrants and within the non-immigrant Muslim American 
                                                          
49 Johnson, Steve, “The Muslims of Indianapolis” in see Muslim Communities in America ed. Yvonne 
Haddad and Jane Smith (SUNY Press 1994) p 259. 
50 Ibid, p. 274. 
51 Ibid, p. 274. 
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communities that cannot be placed simply within a socioeconomic or conservative-liberal 
framework. Muslim Americans who were similarly situated economically, religiously, 
and ethnically had different visions for Islam in America. Johnson’s chapter is important 
in confirming the tensions between the groups that existed, but it fails to explain the 
nature of the disagreement.52 
Gutbi Mahdi Ahmed attempts to study Muslim organizations in the United States 
around the same period as Johnson.53 Ahmed helps confirm the initial development of 
ISNA as a continuation of the work by Federation of Islamic Associations (FIA) and the 
Muslim Student Association (MSA). He also shows how ISNA adopted the conference 
and publication format of the FIA. However, he fails to understand the important role that 
the FIA plays in the development of ISNA. He also fails to demonstrate that ISNA, like 
FIA, was meeting the needs of its constituent Muslim Americans at the time. FIA was 
formed by Muslim American World War II veterans who were placing their work and 
emphasis on the needs of a population that was largely born in the United States. ISNA 
was formed after the massive influx of immigrants from all over the Muslim world. He 
confirms my dissertation’s assertion that in the early part of ISNA’s history, its 
conventions generally featured international Muslim speakers. 
Ahmed sees ISNA as a branch of the larger transnational, international, and 
diasporic Muslim movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.54 He fails to understand 
                                                          
52 Johnson, Steve, “The Muslims of Indianapolis” in see Muslim Communities in America ed. Yvonne 
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53 Ahmed, Gtubi Mahdi, “Muslim Organizations in the United States” in in The Muslims of America, ed. 
Yvonne Haddad. Oxford University Press (1991) p. 11 - 24 
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that these internationalist activists represent only one of the founding groups of ISNA. He 
argues that ISNA is considered to be “the national Muslim organization and generally 
represents the Islamic mainstream.” However, he fails to define “mainstream,” and by 
virtue of his description of ISNA, he assumes that it excludes non-immigrants, non-
activists, and American-born Muslims. His chapter also fails to illustrate the rich 
interaction between ISNA and Imam W. D Muhammad and other groups that existed in 
the United States. While his work provides a good overview of the organization, it does 
not probe the deeper interactions of its founders, the role of American history in ISNA’s 
development, or how ISNA is placed within the development of Muslim American 
institution building. He views ISNA’s role as an organization that came to America, 
reformed Islamic work, embedded it in a “firm ideological structure,” and then 
incorporated enough American-born Muslims to become a national organization. This 
analysis fails to show that, in fact, ISNA was the result of Muslim American participation 
in institution building that was shaped by the changing landscape in the United States and 
American religious history. 
Karen Leonard helps us understand the important role of ISNA within the broader 
context of Muslim American institution building.55 Leonard also outlines the important 
role that the changing Muslim American population played in the establishment of ISNA. 
However, her analysis of ISNA supposes that a largely Arabic-speaking immigrant 
community established ISNA. The role of HSAAMs and non-Arabs in ISNA is missing 
from her analysis. Leonard also marks important changes in ISNA’s positions but does 
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not identify the tensions and transitions between the three founding groups within ISNA 
as a source of these changes. 
Leonard tends to examine Muslim Americans within the context of separate 
ethnic groups: African-Americans and immigrants. She further separates immigrants 
based on their national or regional identities. Leonard specifically argues that in this post-
1990 environment, South Asians had control of major Muslim American organizations.56 
In this analysis, I seek to show that, although this may seem true on the surface, an 
analysis based on ethnic or national identity does injustice to the deeper ideological 
tensions within those groups. Some of the ideological tensions were common across 
those national and ethnic identities. South Asians had become major funders of ISNA but 
still continued to elect a diverse group of Muslim American leaders who reflected the 
South Asians' ideology, not their ethnic identity. Had ethnic identity been the most 
important aspect in the calculus of these South Asian Muslims, ICNA would have served 
as a better host as an Indian and Pakistani organization. However, what we will see is 
that, although ISNA thrived with diversity, ICNA and MAS (an Arab organization) were 
either on a course of decline or stagnant growth until they changed their approach to 
diversity. However, Leonard’s analysis provides us with insight on how different the 
leadership of Muslim American organizations appeared. 
Finally, Kambiz GhaneaBassiri provides us with the most important framework of 
Muslim American history within which to place ISNA. GhaneaBassiri’s work helps us 
move away from the historical perception of Islam as foreign to America. He argues that 
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Muslim American history should be seen as a relational history of a distinct people of 
faith over a period of time.57 GhaneaBassirri suggests that rather than studying Muslim 
Americans as being distinct from America and its history, they should be studied through 
their participation in American society. American Muslims stand at the intersection of 
American religious history and modern Islamic history. 
GhaneaBassirri provides us with the most comprehensive analysis of the history 
of Islam in America. His book shows how Muslim Americans have “defined themselves 
in relation to the changing conceptions of race, religious pluralism, and national identity 
in the Unites States.”58 GhaneaBassirri helps us place ISNA within the larger history of 
Muslim American institution building, specifically its relationship with grassroots 
institution building and institutions.59 He argues, as I do, that American history played an 
important role in shaping Muslim American institution building. He also shows the 
diversity of Muslim American institutions such as Islamic Circle of North America, 
Nation of Islam, and Imam W. D. Muhammad’s community that operated successfully at 
the same time as ISNA.60 
Finally, he demonstrates that they all sought to reach out to a much broader 
audience than those who founded the organization. They had similar delivery methods: 
They all held conventions, published magazines, and provided speakers and materials to 
the grassroots organizations. They all delivered their programs and materials in English 
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59 Ibid, p 274 
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to reach out to a diverse Muslim American population. However, they did not act in a 
vacuum, and there was a great deal of interaction between these national organizations 
and ISNA. 
GhaneaBassirri also shows the important role that movements like the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Jamaat-i-Islami played in the development of these organizations. 
However, this fact does not mean that these organizations were simply branches of those 
movements.61 His work fails to show that ISNA was a partnership among different 
groups. In fact, GhaneaBassirri incorrectly attributes its establishment to Islamic 
activists.62 Although he correctly suggests that ISNA members represented a small part 
of the larger Muslim America, he incorrectly suggests that these people were mostly 
Islamic activists.63 
His analysis also explores the debate within ISNA over the role of Muslim 
Americans in society.64 ISNA’s decision to urge Muslim Americans to become involved 
in politics created controversy. The debate within ISNA mirrored the debate among 
Muslim Americans at large. His work shows the establishment of important organizations 
such as the Muslim Public Affairs Council, the Council on American Islamic Relations, 
and the Muslim American Society65. However, his analysis does not show the reason 
why former leaders of ISNA established these organizations instead of implementing 
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those programs within ISNA. Furthermore, his analysis fails to show that the interaction 
between these groups may have helped change minds. People who were former activists 
later joined the cultural pluralists, and vice versa. Muslim American ideological positions 
did not remain static and did not move in a singular direction. 
The history of ISNA is an important chapter in the long history of Muslims in 
America. My dissertation will show how Muslims in America, rather than being a distinct 
and foreign element, are in fact shaped by the larger American society, as well as the 
inter-religious relationships within Muslim America. ISNA illustrates the need for a 
complex and deep analysis of Muslims in America. 
Literature Review — Philanthropic Studies 
ISNA mediated faith and practice using the nonprofit form. Therefore, ISNA's 
experience as an American religious nonprofit organization played an important role in 
the religious identity it helped develop and move into the mainstream. Its place among 
American nonprofit organizations influenced the way it translated faith into practice. As 
an American religious nonprofit organization, it sought to be the representative and 
leading Muslim American organization. Its quest for legitimacy was fueled by its vision 
of being the representative of Islam in America. Fundamental to that quest for legitimacy 
was its intent to be an effective and innovative religious nonprofit organization. However, 
issues of legitimacy, diversity, and power hindered its ability to be an effective nonprofit 
organization. 
An analysis of ISNA would be incomplete without first reviewing the general 
literature relating to religious nonprofit organizations. Second, it is important to 
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understand how nonprofit organizations gain and sustain legitimacy. Third, the role of 
power in nonprofit innovation will provide a framework that we can use to review the 
related challenges that ISNA faced. Fourth, we will introduce a framework and literature 
on innovation and continuous learning that can guide our analysis of ISNA. Finally, we 
will review the literature on diversity in nonprofit organizations to analyze ISNA’s quest 
for diversity. 
Nonprofit Organizations in the United States 
This dissertation seeks to add to the existing literature not only on Islam in 
America, but also on philanthropy in America. The existing literature in the study of 
religion and philanthropy lacks material on the role of Muslims in American 
philanthropy. Existing works on philanthropy and Islam can be divided into two 
categories: definition of the theory of Islamic philanthropy66 and history of Islamic 
philanthropy in the Muslim world.67 Works on civil society in general and American civil 
society also do not have sections that specifically pertain to Muslim Americans.68 What is 
missing is a study of Muslim Americans and philanthropy. Research on Muslim 
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Americans has focused largely on data gathering or on specific groups.69 The bulk of 
Muslim American philanthropy can be understood through studies on Muslim institution 
building in the United States.70 Therefore, what is lacking is an analysis of this institution 
building and Muslim American philanthropy within the context of faith and giving. Also 
missing is an analysis of Muslim American civic engagement within the context of 
philanthropic studies. 
In 1981, at the time of ISNA’s inception, the nonprofit sector in the United States 
was fertile ground for the establishment of a new Muslim American organization. Walter 
Powell and Richard Steinberg’s collection outlines the historical, religious, political, 
social, and cultural influences that went into developing this sector.71 Peter Hall’s 
overview of the history of the nonprofit and voluntary sector in the United States helps us 
overlay the Muslim engagement in this sector.72 Muslim American civic engagement in 
general and ISNA’s development in particular mirror the trends among nonprofits in 
America during the same period. 
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Economic theories like the “three-failures theory” have long been used to justify 
the existence of a nonprofit sector. However, as Richard Steinberg admits, these 
economic theories are incomplete.73 Economic theories articulate why consumers want to 
donate to nonprofits but fail to explain why nonprofits exist in the first place.74 In fact, 
organizations like ISNA were not established just to offer missing services; they also 
sought to shape the way Muslim Americans and non-Muslims think about Islam and 
Muslims. This perspective is missing from the economic theories, but Steinberg helps to 
integrate some of these questions in his chapter. ISNA fits within the framework of 
nonprofit theory within the United States. ISNA can be understood using the same lens 
that we use to study other American nonprofits. Far too often, scholars make the mistake 
of focusing on the increasingly foreign-looking nature of the organization’s membership 
and leadership and then seek answers through a foreign lens. This dissertation seeks to 
frame ISNA within the American nonprofit sector’s theoretical framework.75 
However, as Wuthnow and Cadge point out, it would be a mistake to look at 
ISNA from the general prism of a nonprofit organization.76 The role of religion is not 
understood as well in earlier philanthropic studies, despite the strong role it has played in 
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American civic life. “Long before social scientists and policy makers identified 
‘nonprofits’ as composing a distinct social sector, religion offered ways of carrying out 
social activities that differed from those of either the marketplace or government.”77 
ISNA understood the important role that grassroots Muslim organizations played in the 
congregational, spiritual, and social lives of Muslim Americans and sought to harness 
that important resource by using the tools that the nonprofit sector used. ISNA, like many 
religious organizations, had to find a way to balance the special role of the nonprofit 
sector with its religious practices. Not all decisions that a religious nonprofit organization 
makes are based on nonprofit best practices. Organizations like ISNA rely on their 
religious values, which at times are in tension with the current political landscape. 
ISNA established itself as a membership-based organization. This choice has 
traditionally been attributed to the fact that many of the founding leaders came from 
Muslim countries that were ruled by dictatorships. It is true that ISNA leaders 
consistently argued against dictatorships and monarchies in the Muslim world and that 
this was an important factor in selecting an open, democratic system, as embodied by a 
voting membership system. However, it would be a mistake to think this was the only 
factor. Many Muslim American organizations at the national, regional, and local level 
chose different models. These other Muslim American organizations have founding 
leaders who came from the same countries as the ISNA leadership. 
It is important to consider the vision of these founding leaders and the role of the 
religious nonprofit sector in the United States. “. . . [R]eligious organizations generally fit 
the profile of voluntary associations that involve membership and support from members 
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…”78 In fact, membership-based organizations represent thirty-three percent of the 
nonprofit sector; when religious congregations are included, this number reaches sixty 
percent.79 Therefore, to attribute ISNA’s membership structure simply to the ethnicity of 
its founders would be a mistake; it is important to look at the complex structure of 
membership-based nonprofits and help situate ISNA within that subsector. ISNA’s 
selection of a membership-based structure was largely influenced by its need for 
legitimacy to fulfill its vision of being the representative of the Muslim American 
community. 
Nonprofit Legitimacy 
Neo-institutional theory explores how nonprofit organizations seek to establish, 
build, and maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of the public or the eyes of particular 
constituencies. The three types of legitimacy — pragmatic, moral, and cognitive –– are 
relevant for this study. Specifically, we can understand ISNA’s initial deliberations and 
decisions about funding, programming, and advocacy in terms of the efforts to satisfy its 
three founding constituent groups (pragmatic legitimacy). Over time, we see a growing 
concern for the organization’s public standing in the United States as a whole (moral 
legitimacy). The quest for moral legitimacy elevated the cultural pluralist conception of 
ISNA over the other two founding identities. Ultimately, ISNA is seen externally and 
internally as a leading Muslim American organization and its key programs — Islamic 
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Horizons and the Annual Convention — as predictable features of Muslim American life 
(cognitive legitimacy). 
The nonprofit sector is heavily institutionalized where organizations have various, 
interdependent relationships. The essence of institutional theory is that organizational 
legitimacy depends not only on how it performs but also on how it is perceived. 
Therefore, organizational practices are influenced by what their leaders perceive as 
signals of legitimacy.80 However, this sociological framework is incomplete when we try 
to understand legitimacy within the nonprofit sector. Mark Suchman provides us with a 
helpfully more expansive review of the scholarship of institutional theories and 
organizational legitimacy.81 
For the purpose of this dissertation, I adopt the definition of legitimacy provided 
by Suchman. “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within certain socially constructed systems of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”82 ISNA’s legitimacy did not depend on specific 
events alone. Rather, its long-term legitimacy depended on a collection of events or 
history. Nevertheless, we will see that ISNA’s legitimacy was at times influenced by 
singular events. Legitimacy does not always reflect reality. It is the perception of the 
organization or reputation of the organization. It is “possessed objectively, yet created 
subjectively.”83 Legitimacy is a social construct and can vary based on the audience. Any 
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nonprofit organization, including ISNA, can be both legitimate and illegitimate, 
depending on the person or group making that judgment. 
As I have stated, there are three broad types of legitimacy: pragmatic legitimacy, 
moral legitimacy, and cognitive legitimacy.84 Pragmatic legitimacy is based on the self-
interest of the organization’s stakeholders. Support for ISNA depends on what value the 
constituent expects to receive from ISNA. This expectation can include direct personal 
benefit to the constituent or because the constituent believes that ISNA furthers the 
constituent’s overall beliefs. This support also stems from the belief that ISNA cares 
about the constituent. 
Moral legitimacy depends on whether ISNA’s actions are the right thing to do, 
rather than whether they merely benefit the audience. ISNA achieved moral legitimacy 
by operating in socially acceptable ways. ISNA’s structure and the charisma of its 
organizational leaders also influence its moral legitimacy. Nonprofit organizations’ 
claims to resources are based on the demonstration of their moral commitments.85 
Cognitive legitimacy is the most powerful form of legitimacy. ISNA attained 
cognitive legitimacy when people or institutions came to believe that ISNA is necessary 
or inevitable based on a taken-for-granted cultural framework.86 
Organizations can affect their legitimacy through their structure, mission 
statement, programs, and outcomes.87 Legitimacy can be a huge organizational asset 
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when it encounters short- or long-term declines in its organizational outcomes.88 
Religious organizations demonstrate a stronger ability to survive and retain legitimacy.89 
Jeavons suggests that religious organizations’ behaviors are influenced by their 
commitment to integrity, concern for the public good, and concern for the personal 
welfare of employees and volunteers.90 Integrity requires organizations like ISNA to be 
transparent and accountable. Religious organizations’ concern for the public good is 
broader than just their immediate stakeholders and donors. Religious nonprofits seek to 
serve all within their faith and provide services to humanity at large. Finally, these 
organizations seek to treat those who help make the organizational work possible with 
genuine respect. ISNA, as a religious organization, relies upon both nonprofit and 
religious forms of legitimacy. Therefore, both Suchman’s and Jeavons’ frameworks are 
essential in understanding ISNA’s quest for legitimacy. 
Power and Innovation 
Nonprofits like ISNA struggle with the tension between systems and individuals. 
However, for ISNA to be a high-impact and innovative nonprofit, it had to find the right 
balance between individuals and systems and between ideas and actions. ISNA’s 
innovations translated into its programs, its policies, and its course of action. 
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The distribution of power within organizations like ISNA has both a positive and 
a negative effect on innovation.91 ISNA faced both episodic and systemic forms of power 
as it sought to mediate among the priorities of the three founding groups. ISNA leaders 
and secretaries general employed four strategies (influence, force, domination, and 
discipline) in trying to implement their vision for the organization. They embraced four 
processes (interpretation, integration, institutionalization, and intuition) to implement 
innovation in the organization. Different leaders have served as champions for ISNA, and 
each one has exhibited different abilities (evangelists, autocrats, architects, and 
educators) but none of them have been able to create the kind of harmony that would 
achieve a balance of power in the organization. In order for ISNA to achieve sustainable 
legitimacy through innovative practices, it needed to hit the sweet spot that allowed 
strategy, process, and leaders to intersect. ISNA’s successes and failures can be attributed 
to whether or not it achieved an alignment in these three areas. 
Management theory and research define power narrowly.92 Research suggests that 
power and politics play a vital role in the way organizations identify, incorporate, 
implement, and continue innovation.93 For the purpose of our analysis of ISNA, I use the 
broader definition of power proposed by Thomas Lawrence et al. Power operates in two 
modes — systemic and episodic.94 Episodic power refers to discrete, strategic acts of 
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self-interested actors. Examples of episodic power within ISNA include setting agendas 
for meetings, appointment of board members and committee chairs, editorial power over 
Islamic Horizons, and similar activities. Systemic power is employed through the routine 
and ongoing acts of an organization. Systemic power does not depend on individuals and 
is diffused throughout the organization. Examples of systemic power within ISNA 
include its by-laws, its system of communication, the location of its headquarters in 
Indiana, its policies, and its manuals. 
To effectively use the two forms of power, individuals need to employ four 
strategies: influence, force, domination, and discipline.95 Influence affects the costs and 
benefits that people attribute to specific ideas. Influence is an episodic form of power and 
is achieved through persuasion, negotiation, or ingratiation. ISNA’s leaders used 
influence through their standing in the community and board members. Force is the 
restriction of available choices. Force is considered an episodic form of power and is 
achieved through agenda setting, limiting alternatives, and removing opponents. ISNA’s 
leaders used force through their power to call board meetings and set the agenda. As we 
will see in chapter two, the budget was not brought to the ISNA board of directors for 
years. Domination also includes restricting available choices. Domination is a systemic 
form of power and can be achieved through information systems, material technologies, 
and the physical layout of the organization. As we will see, Dr. Iqbal Unus was relieved 
of his position as secretary general without any discussion with him or the board at large. 
The president of ISNA took advantage of the fact that the board was dispersed across the 
continent and the lack of effective means of communication. Discipline affects the costs 
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and benefits of behavior. It is a systemic form of power and can be achieved through 
socialization, training, and team-based work. ISNA sought to achieve discipline through 
its committee structure and by Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed’s abandoning the traditional policy 
of hiring religious workers and, instead, hiring professional managers. 
Lawrence et al. add power to the 4I framework that was developed by Mary M. 
Crossan, Henry W. Lane, and Roderick E. White, helping us further understand the effect 
of power on innovation.96 Crossan, Lane, and White synthesized existing knowledge in 
strategic renewal and organizational learning to develop the 4I framework of 
organizational learning.97 The 4I framework of organizational learning consists of four 
related processes (intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing) that occur at 
the individual, group, and organizational level.98 These practices come together to drive 
an organization’s quest for knowledge and best practices. 
Intuiting is the process through which ISNA staff and leaders recognized new 
ideas. Interpreting is the process through which they explained the idea to others. 
Integrating is the process of developing a shared understanding of the idea among ISNA 
board members, staff, and volunteers for the purpose of embarking on a course of action. 
Institutionalizing is the process of ensuring that these actions continue to take place. 
Again, ISNA’s success as a nonprofit organization depended on it following this process 
to establish and sustain innovative programs. As we will see in the next few chapters, 
ISNA either found difficulty in establishing a system that encouraged the recognition of 
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new ideas or failed to institutionalize them. The three major exceptions were its 
convention and conferences, Islamic Horizons, and its governance structure. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, Lawrence and Crossan frameworks are 
incomplete. Dover and Lawrence present additional tools that help us understand the 
organization form's effect on power and innovation.99 They provide us with four 
characteristics associated with the nonprofit form that can influence the role of power and 
the innovation process. 
They argue that where a nonprofit organization has an ambiguous goal or mission, 
the ambiguous mission or goal gives organizational leaders greater flexibility; however, 
this potential strength could also lead to inaction. In the case of ISNA, when influence 
was underdeveloped, Zarzour reported that ideas remained untapped. However, when 
influence was overdeveloped, ISNA became an idea factory but with little 
implementation of those ideas. When ISNA's secretary general and directors were 
uncertain of their legitimacy, force played an important role in the integration of ideas. 
When force was underdeveloped in ISNA, there was incomplete and inconsistent 
integration of new ideas. Whereas, when force was overdeveloped, ideas were put into 
practice but disagreements and resistance were artificially suppressed, leading to 
alienation, and eventually many of Hammad’s and Syeed's programs were not sustained. 
Because of ISNA’s complex structure and its diverse stakeholder base, the 
organization used domination when it tried to institutionalize innovation. When systems 
of domination were underdeveloped, ISNA leaders or secretaries general were able to 
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ignore innovation, adopt it selectively, or actively seek to undermine it. When the system 
of domination was overdeveloped, short-term successes masked long-term problems, 
limiting the ability to sustain innovative ideas. 
Because of the conflicts within ISNA over the values of the organization, 
especially over their prioritization, the organization was also affected by discipline. When 
discipline was underdeveloped, ISNA members considered their work disconnected from 
the broader aims and mission of the organization. When discipline was overdeveloped, 
the organization acted on new ideas but only in a limited fashion. ISNA was, therefore, 
constrained from divergent thinking, resulting in a very limited form of innovation, 
especially in the areas of diversity, interfaith relations, and community engagement. 
This use of power within ISNA did not occur in a vacuum. Power requires people 
to adopt, incorporate, and implement these forms of power and strategy. I, therefore, also 
draw on later research by Lawrence on the kinds of people who can influence power and 
innovation. Lawrence et al. argue, in a different study, that in order for organizations to 
succeed, they need to provide conditions that allow four types of champions: evangelists, 
autocrats, architects, and educators.100 Evangelists helped sell ideas, autocrats dictated 
practices, architects developed systems, and educators shaped an environment that helped 
the organization learn from its past. However, ISNA was unable to effectively distribute 
power to help each of these champions flourish. 
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When specific champions (such as Syeed, Hammad, and Matson) had too much 
power, the organization was unable to sustain innovation or stability.101 When there was 
an overreliance on systems within ISNA (architects and educators over evangelists and 
autocrats), the result was institutionalization without action. When the emphasis was on 
thinking (evangelists and educators over autocrats and architects), ISNA saw great ideas 
without implementation. Finally, when ISNA leaders emphasized doing (autocrats and 
architects over evangelists and educators), the result was change without strategy or 
sustainability. 
Nonprofit Innovation 
ISNA’s quest for legitimacy fueled its desire to be an innovative organization. 
ISNA’s leaders sought to employ best practices in implementing the organization's 
competing visions. ISNA’s internal power structure influenced which competing vision 
was implemented. However, ISNA was seeking internal and external legitimacy. This 
required the organization to act both internally and externally. Heather Grant and Leslie 
R. Crutchfield (see below) provide us with a framework that helps us analyze ISNA’s 
success or failure in its quest to be an innovative nonprofit organization.102 Nonprofit 
organizations are often innovators.103 Nonprofits have been effective leaders in “doing 
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good.”104 Nonprofit innovation is the process through which ISNA transformed ideas into 
services that fulfilled its mission.105 
Grant and Cructhfield have researched innovation in nonprofit organizations and 
have found that nonprofits are either focused on maintaining the status quo and lack 
innovation or are able to intuit and interpret but are unable to capitalize on those ideas.106 
Grant and Crutchfield argue that “greatness has more to do with how nonprofits work 
outside the boundaries of their organizations than how they manage their own internal 
operations.”107 
They help explain how ISNA became a high-impact organization by eventually 
taking the mantle of being the most preeminent Muslim American organization. When 
ISNA was able to advocate and serve; make markets work by designing programs that 
were self-sufficient and strong revenue generators; inspire new evangelists like the 
Founders Committee discussed in chapter three; nurture nonprofit networks and 
partnerships with Muslim and interfaith groups; master the art of adapting to global 
situations at key moments; and recruit its leadership from other Muslim American 
organizations it became a high-impact organization.108 
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ISNA programs sought to advocate core values when it opposed the Iranian 
government and also Gulf War I. However, these public positions were influenced by 
what ISNA’s leaders learned from their stakeholders through their individual work at the 
grassroots and regional levels. Under Syeed, ISNA sought to hire professionals and 
recruit leaders outside of the three factions that established the organization.  
Crutchfield and Grant illustrate how organizations like ISNA need to adopt 
practices that are both external and internal. These practices require that these 
organizations and their leaders develop a balance between doing good and using and 
sharing power effectively. Although ISNA was committed to doing good, it had great 
difficulty sharing power among factions and with its chief executives. 
Nonprofit Diversity 
Nonprofit organizations like ISNA seek to work with diverse audiences. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, I apply a two-pronged representation-identity model of 
diversity theory109 to ISNA’s quest for diversity. This theory suggests that nonprofit 
organizations should first rely on a bonding type of social capital to increase the number 
of underrepresented members — simply to bring diverse groups of people together. The 
second prong suggests that the organization should structure mission-relevant activities 
that help to create bridging social capital and sustain diversity. 
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I adopt Cox’s definition of diversity. Diversity is “the representation, in one social 
system, of people with distinctly different group affiliations of cultural significance.”110 
For example, affiliations can include race, gender, religion, culture, sexual preference, 
personality type, or political identity. Diversity management is the conscious 
commitment to and implementation of a practice to recruit, reward, retain, and foster 
diverse members and workers to help develop an effective organization.111 
In support of this goal, Putnam argues that associations bridge social capital.112 
“Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to 
properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals — social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.”113 
Social capital consists of bonds of trust and norms of reciprocity.114 However, religious 
organizations reflect the bonding form of social capital.115 This form of social capital 
relies on strong ties that work against the weaker ties that bridge across racial lines.116 
Therefore, ISNA as a religious nonprofit organization had a harder time bridging issues 
of diversity along racial and ethnic lines. This echoes research suggesting that diverse 
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communities result in less altruistic behavior than homogenous communities.117 Diversity 
has been associated with individuals giving less to education118, becoming less 
philanthropic, and having lower rates of participation and volunteerism.119 Diversity 
brings forth challenges to greater creativity and innovation,120 while also creating conflict 
and delaying decision-making.121 As we shall see, ISNA faced these challenges in its 
quest for legitimacy and becoming a representative organization. One study suggests that, 
although the diversity of board members does not significantly affect performance, it 
does ensure that the board remains committed to the organization’s mission.122 
Diversity has been an important goal for nonprofits like ISNA. Three aspects of 
social capital influence diversity: opportunity, motivation, and ability.123 Nonprofits 
typically take three different paths toward managing diversity: (i) a discrimination and 
fairness approach that equates diversity to equal opportunity and affirmative action; (ii) 
an access and legitimacy approach focused on using diverse individuals to access new 
markets; and (iii) a learning and effectiveness approach in which diverse views challenge 
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institutional assumptions, creating change in the organization.124 The first two approaches 
are quota-driven exercises, whereas the third approach is more likely to attract an 
organization that is on a quest for continuous learning and innovation. ISNA adopted the 
first two methods but was unable to achieve the third path. 
Conclusion 
There are three remaining substantive chapters in this dissertation. Chapter two 
traces ISNA’s story from the Iranian Revolution until 1990. ISNA’s quest for diversity 
and legitimacy influenced its ability to be a successful organization. However, its leaders’ 
focus on the organization’s core values allowed it to emerge from this period as a 
legitimate organization. This quest for legitimacy took a heavy toll on resources, almost 
resulting in the death of the organization. During this period, the organization sought to 
bridge the challenges of diversity by focusing on the HSAAMs. Chapter three begins 
with Gulf War I and takes us to the election of the first female, Caucasian Muslim 
American vice president in 2001. During this period, the organization sought to establish 
an independent identity. It was no longer interested in global legitimacy and fought for 
legitimacy among Muslim Americans. A powerful secretary general helped establish it as 
a successful nonprofit. This success sometimes overlooked consensus and collaboration. 
Chapter four begins with the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and ends in 2008 with 
the election of Barack Obama as president of the United States. The organization sought 
legitimacy in the interfaith community and with the United States government. It also 
sought to broaden its definition of diversity to include gender and second-generation 
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immigrants, along both ideological and racial lines. Chapter five serves as the concluding 
chapter. 
ISNA benefitted from the pluralistic, voluntaristic, noncollectivist ethos of the 
American nonprofit sector. Muslim Americans who were crucial for ISNA’s 
development lived out the sector’s “voluntary action for the public good” slogan. The 
group that finally emerged was helped by the fact that they fully accepted the idea of 
American individualism. They understood that if ISNA adhered to a narrow set of 
theological ideas, it would wind up representing a narrow niche of individuals. ISNA 
sought to promote itself as a collection of individual Muslim American identities, rather 
than as a homogenous identity. 
American freedom and the nonprofit structure provided these leaders with 
advantages that were probably not available to their fellow Muslims in the Muslim world. 
Nonprofits in America face challenges in advocating, embracing, and sustaining 
diversity. ISNA faced this challenge in its own unique way. Religion and philanthropy 
came together to provide ISNA’s leaders with challenges that helped shape its journey. 
ISNA's quest to establish a Muslim American identity depended upon its journey 
as an American religious nonprofit organization. This journey is aided and abetted by 
issues related to diversity, legitimacy, power, and innovation that other American 
religious nonprofit organization face. ISNA’s secretaries general helped navigate the 
organization through the challenges caused by current events, internal battles, and a 
rapidly growing community presence. 
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Chapter Two — Balancing Legitimacy and Idealism — Identity through Patchwork 
and Consensus (1979–1991) 
On January 16, 1979, the Shah of Iran left his country for exile. By the end of 
1979, Iranians, by a democratic election, adopted a theocratic constitution, and as a result, 
Ayatollah Khomeini became the Supreme Leader of the country. In November 1979, the 
United States government allowed the Shah to come to the country for medical treatment. 
In response, Iranian students invaded the American embassy in Tehran. They took fifty-
two American citizens hostage for four hundred and four days. 
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the subsequent hostage crisis had a 
profound effect on the growing Muslim American community. Within this community, 
the Iranian revolution created a greater sense of Islamic identity and activism. Yet the 
hostage crisis spurred greater Islamophobia in the United States. During this same period, 
three distinct groups of Muslim American activists established a national Muslim 
American organization known as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) seeking 
to channel this energy in establishing an Islamic American identity and to combat 
Islamophobia. ISNA sought to play an internal and external role as the representative 
organization for all Muslim Americans. This establishment was a transition from a 
student led movement to a community-based organization. 
This chapter focuses on the period beginning with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 
and ending in 1991. As at least one former secretary general argues, ISNA was in a 
period of transition during this time.125 While there was broad acceptance amongst the 
three groups that ISNA should serve as the national organization for Muslim Americans, 
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they had competing ideas about the nature of its work. Moreover, Dr. Bagby argues that 
ISNA might have collapsed at this early stage if not for a broad consensus among its 
leaders.126 The establishment of ISNA was a rejection of organizations like the 
Federation of Islamic Associations of North America (FIA), which I discuss later in this 
chapter — that sought to embrace culture, theology, and politics. Instead, ISNA aimed to 
become an Islamic polity in a nonprofit form. If ISNA leaders had a choice they would 
seek to establish the ideal Islamic state. However, they did not have such a choice in 
America and therefore chose the nonprofit form to establish their vision of an Islamic 
identity. 
Many of ISNA's central organizing figures were scholars and academics whose 
idealism shaped the organization during its first decade. In establishing an organization 
seeking the mantle of national leadership and striving to be an international example, they 
placed idealism above pragmatism, values above self-interest, and diversity above unity. 
The search for consensus and idealism drove its quest for legitimacy and diversity. 
To understand ISNA's quest to become the representative of Muslim Americans 
during this period (1979–1992), we must first understand the historical landscape that 
ISNA had to navigate. Second, examine how ISNA operated as a religious nonprofit 
organization. Third, take into account how it navigated the challenges of the immense 
diversity among Muslim Americans. Fourth, analyze its quest for legitimacy using 
international and then domestic resources. Fifth, we need to compare two different 
models of power (as demonstrated by Dr. Iqbal Unus and Dr. Ahmad Zaki Hammad) 
within the organization. Finally, we need to consider the implications of ISNA’s failure 
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to deal with issues of diversity, legitimacy, and power by reviewing its budgetary crisis 
by the end of this period. 
Setting the Stage 
The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Muslim Communities 
Association of the U.S. & Canada (MCA) were incorporated in the state of Indiana as 
nonprofit organizations on July 14, 1981127 as the result of a consensus among the 
Council of Presidents.128 Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed, a future secretary general of ISNA, led 
the Council. 
ISNA’s incorporation came during a shift in American discourse on the Middle 
East that was propelled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution. 
The latter, in particular, resulted in the rebranding of “Arab terrorism or fundamentalism” 
to “Islamic terrorism or fundamentalism” by the American media and public 
perception.129 However, the need to engage with the Muslim community and the 
importance of distinguishing between Muslim terrorists and Muslim American citizens 
prompted the Carter administration to reach out to U.S.-based Muslim organizations. The 
United States Congress even adopted a resolution recognizing the fourteen-hundred-year 
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anniversary of Prophet Muhammad’s mission.130 Nonetheless, these national initiatives 
did not translate into a reduction of Islamophobia in the country.  
Beginning in the 1960s, global Islamic organizations funded by Saudi petrodollars 
and the Muslim World League sought to engage with organizations like the Muslim 
Students Association of US & Canada (MSA).131 This engagement signified heightened 
activity amongst Islamic organizations globally as well as in the United States.  
I mention MSA specifically because it was the precursor or foundation upon 
which ISNA was established. MSA’s leaders sought a national community-based 
organization to transition their work from a student-led movement. In fact, ISNA’s 
establishment marked a departure from an earlier MSA strategy in which it tried without 
success to integrate with the Federation of Islamic Associations of North America and 
Canada (FIA). However, before examining this lack of success, I need to provide some 
background on FIA's development. 
Muslim American veterans founded FIA in the aftermath of World War II. These 
founders were largely Arab-Americans born in the United States. They sought to engage 
a more diverse Muslim American population in order to unify this populace. During this 
time, FIA became an effective and politically engaged entity.132 In its attempt to bridge 
the divide between those who were religious and secular Muslims, it needed to balance 
its activities. For instance, it annually hosted formal banquets featuring live entertainment 
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and less formal sock hops and other youth dances.133 At the same time, FIA hosted events 
that focused on religious education. 
By the 1970s, FIA became increasingly divided between those who valued the 
organization's ethnic roots and social agenda and those who thought it should become a 
strictly religious organization.134 The founders of MSA saw FIA as too liberal and too 
focused on socialization and cultural identity rather than on the need for Islamic work in 
America. MSA’s leaders considered educating Muslim Americans about Islam an 
important first step. The next step in their view was to translate this educational mission 
into an Islamic identity rather than a cultural one. In addition, MSA sought to build upon 
the revival of Islam in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution. In their view, these 
religious values needed to inform Muslim American political advocacy. These leaders 
were opposed to a compromise that would allow the inclusion of more secular Muslim 
Americans as they made the transition from students to community. 
With a clearer understanding of the dynamics of the time — that is between MSA 
and FIA and, in general, how national and international events affected America and the 
Muslim American Community — we can move on to how these organizations and key 
historical events played into ISNA's story. 
ISNA was being established at the same time that the fall-out from the Iranian 
revolution was affecting the United States. ISNA leaders initially had hoped that the 
revolution in Iran was a “true Islamic revolution” that would rise above sectarianism and 
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hold dear the values of Islam, particularly because both activist and non-activist Muslims 
were energized by the revolution.135 GhaneaBassiri argues that the Iranian revolution 
briefly helped invigorate the American-Muslim community. This invigorated spirit 
helped the push to establishing ISNA. 
In November 1981, soon after ISNA's establishment, the organizations 
publication, Islamic Horizons countered arguments against the revolution: 
[T]hey presume that Islamic fundamentalism is tied … to a set of social, 
political, and economic conditions in whose presence there will be no 
upsurge of Islamic sentiments in a Muslim people. . . . On the contrary, the 
Islamic movement has an element of permanence in which it stems from 
its world view. . . . [E]ven if the Muslims are living under the best non-
Islamic system, their lives will still be affected by the momentous call of 
Islam. . . . [I]t is the transcendental, all embracing Islamic movement 
which determines the Muslim destiny.136 
As a result of the Iranian Revolution, Muslim Americans became more religious 
and felt a greater sense of Islamic solidarity with the struggles in the Muslim world.137 
This solidarity and the energy arising from it, offered ISNA great potential, provided it 
could harness and direct them. 
ISNA Becomes a Religious Nonprofit 
Having made the transition from being a student organization (MSA) to a 
community organization, ISNA's next step was to fashion itself as a religious nonprofit 
organization. As I alluded to earlier, the institutional launch of ISNA came from the 
combined efforts of Muslim American grassroots and national leaders, who consulted 
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over a six-year period (1976 - 1981). More specifically, ISNA came about as a 
consequence of a task force established by the MSA Planning Committee in 1977138 and, 
ultimately, was the product of negotiations among more than one hundred and fifty 
community activists and organizations. 
The structure initially proposed for ISNA included a somewhat complicated 
constitution and set of by-laws that allowed for extensive representation of the various 
factions included in the task force. In the task force's view, this distribution of power 
enabled consultation and collaboration. Dr. Iqbal Unus states that this dispersal of power 
was also fueled by cultural distrust for a powerful central authority.139 Research suggests 
that an organization with a dispersed power structure can create either a highly innovative 
organization or paralyzed one.140 
The board of directors of the new organization was named Majlis Ash-Shura (majlis). 
When translated to English, the term means a "consultative assembly." Islamic leaders 
have historically brought together trusted individuals to give opinions on important 
issues. Although leaders make the final decisions, such consultations can provide 
invaluable advice. However, unlike boards of directors in American organizations like 
ISNA, these traditional Majlis Ash-Shuras lacked fiduciary responsibilities and oversight. 
ISNA’s Majlis Ash-Shura consisted of forty-eight members, as follows: 
• Four chairman of the boards for each service organizations of the MSA 
• Five presidents of affiliated organizations 
• Four additional executive committee members of affiliated organizations 
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• One president 
• Two vice presidents 
• Six executive council members of the ISNA 
• Thirteen elected at-large members 
• One member elected from each of the thirteen regions established in the 
United States and Canada141 
 
The formal inauguration of ISNA occurred at its first annual convention, which 
took place at its 1982 Annual Convention in Bloomington, Indiana, during the Labor Day 
weekend in the presence of more than 5,000 Muslim Americans. It took ISNA an 
additional two years to become fully independent from MSA. A diverse group of 
immigrant- and African-American Muslims was elected to the majlis in 1983. These 
elections have occurred regularly ever since.142 
ISNA inherited MSA's assets and much of its operating structure, staff, and 
accomplished work. ISNA also continued MSA’s community and national activities. The 
executive council consisted of a president and two vice presidents (U.S. and Canada) 
elected by the membership of ISNA, the past-president of ISNA, and five members 
appointed by the ISNA president with the approval of the Majlis Ash-Shura.143 
ISNA's comprehensive board sought to balance the needs of the general 
membership and the constituent and affiliated organizations that would embrace ISNA as 
their umbrella organization. The Majlis Ash-Shura was required to meet twice a year and 
was responsible for establishing the organization's policies. The executive council was 
made responsible for the oversight of the secretary general and the secretary general for 
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the day-to-day management of operations and ultimately for implementing the 
organization's mission. 
The Secretariat of ISNA was located in Plainfield, Indiana. The 134-acre campus, 
built at a cost of more than $3.4 million, was situated near the Indianapolis International 
Airport where they remain to this day.144 The steering committee stated in its 
announcement: 
There is no longer any doubt, if there ever was, that Islam has come to 
North America to stay for good. . . . Islamic presence here must, therefore 
pervade all spheres of a Muslim’s life in this societal environment and 
must exert a positive influence on the non-Muslim segments of society. To 
do so, Islamic work must continually grow and come to grips with new 
challenges and opportunities. This requires evolution and adaptation of the 
organizational structure of Islamic organizations so that they may provide 
the right type of leadership to an increasingly sophisticated and 
comprehensive economic order among Muslims in North America.145 
The founders had ambitious goals for the new organization that went beyond just 
serving as the national Muslim American organization with representation and advocacy 
as its key purposes. The founders of ISNA believed that Islam was not just a religion of 
rituals.146 They believed it was a way of life that could be incorporated into every aspect 
of an individual’s daily life. They believed that ISNA could play that religious role for 
the Muslim American community as well. In effect, they envisioned a combination of a 
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Jewish Public Affairs Council, Union of Reformed Jews, American Israeli Political 
Action Committee, and Jewish Federation relief organizations as one entity. 
The steering committee’s announcement also reflected an understanding of the 
long history of Muslims in America. GhaneaBassiri documents how Islam was not able to 
survive more than a generation of each time it was introduced to the United State because 
of the hostility to the faith and the economic need to assimilate in America. ISNA’s 
founders took the view that “authentic” Islam had not survived in America because of the 
lack of theologically grounded Islamic institutions. They wanted to ensure the 
establishment and sustenance of mainstream Islam — one developed through education 
and learning, rather than through compromise. 
The stated goals of ISNA were to do the following:147 
• Represent Muslim interests in North America. 
• Present Islam to Muslims and non-Muslims and promote and solidify friendly 
relations. 
• Procure and develop the necessary resources to achieve the stated aims. 
• Develop Islamic institutions. 
• Establish appropriate policies and priorities for Islamic work. 
• Cultivate brotherly relations and foster unity among Muslims in North 
America and in other parts of the world. 
 
These goals were ambitious and intentionally vague. The broad organizational 
goals reflected many points of view. The ambition reflected the need for a comprehensive 
strategy to further the cause of Islam in America.  
The challenges the organization faced in its first two years surprised its leaders 
and staff.148 Dr. Iqbal Unus, who served as both the assistant secretary general and 
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secretary general from 1981 until 1990, stated that in those first years, ISNA's focus was 
survival and dealing with administrative headaches related to establishing a new office 
and organization. 
In addition, local challenges from groups such as the Concerned Citizens of 
Hendricks County (CCHC) consumed much of ISNA's attention during its first few 
years. 149 The CCHC's opposition was an early indication of what Muslim Americans 
would face nationally.150 The sign at the ISNA’s entrance was knocked down and a sign 
with the words “KKK” was erected in its place. Although ISNA ultimately prevailed, 
these kinds of activities distracted it from its mission. 
ISNA's founders sought to strengthen its constitutional unity by striving for 
diversity and shura or consultation151. In their second annual report, they stated, “[T]he 
Majlis ash Shura is poised to translate the Qur’annic injunction of shura into a practical 
course of organizational action for ISNA.”152 The founders selected the Majlis ash-Shura 
to serve as its board of directors as its governing board. The selection of the term Majlis 
ash-Shura, rather than board of directors, provided both opportunity and risk. 
The opportunity was to define American nonprofit practice through Islamic faith. 
They sought to explain how an important governing principle from the Islamic tradition, 
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the majlis, could be incorporated within an American legal entity — that is, a nonprofit 
organization. However, American nonprofit law requires a fiduciary duty of a board of 
directors that goes beyond a majlis' role as consultant. The selection of this term echoes 
an idealistic worldview that those selected to serve are held accountable to a higher 
Islamic law. Failure to grasp the need to understand religious and legal consequences by 
selected leaders would have serious consequences, as I discuss later in this chapter. 
In establishing ISNA, its founder’s decisions followed the best practices and 
models available within the nonprofit sector in the United States, including ISNA's early 
adoption of a democratic structure. Research shows 
Where associations are permitted and even encouraged, their capacity to 
generate political socialization appropriate for a democratic polity depends 
upon a series of organizational features. As the legal framework for 
association developed in the United States, organizational constitutions 
required democratic practices such as the election of officers.153 
 
However, as is evident by the state of national and local politics, democracy 
depends upon the regulations that govern it and the engagement of its citizens. In ISNA, 
the membership was not engaged with ISNA beyond its elections, and the leadership 
seemed largely disengaged from the grassroots.154 Unfortunately, the regulations 
governing elections depended on the committee chairs who supervised elections and a 
disengaged membership base.155 
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ISNA leaders adopted the ideas that would enable it to be a strong representative 
of Muslim Americans while also engaging them in activities important to citizenship. 
Religious organizations have been incubators of political activism.156 The leaders I 
interviewed for this project were clear that the founders made a conscious choice to take 
this approach. In fact, ISNA’s establishment was in keeping with other trends that 
allowed nonprofits to provide “arenas for political socialization that could then be 
expressed. . . . [T]hese associations . . . served as vehicles for political mobilization 
outside of the parties themselves.”157 
Political socialization is the idea that nonprofit organizations or associations help 
socialize citizens for democratic participation. Elizabeth Clemens proposes that 
associations play a role in political socialization.158 She argues that through nonprofit 
voluntary associations, citizens can put into practice skills such as letter-writing, planning 
meetings, and making speeches that can prepare them to become politically effective. 
ISNA's founders understood the concept of political socialization and realized that 
advocacy would be an important aspect of its contribution to the Muslim community. 
Some of ISNA’s leaders felt that the organization's purpose was to be representative and 
a political advocate for Muslim Americans. Others identified with the community's 
general disagreement about being politically active and sought to define advocacy in 
terms of educational efforts designed to encourage community and political education. 
ISNA needed to adopt a broad definition of advocacy in order to bridge the differences 
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between those who were opposed to and those who were supportive of political 
engagement, which they did by seeking to educate the community about political issues 
rather than actively participating in them.  
J. Craig Jenkins defines advocacy as the act of pleading for or against a cause.159 
Since the 1960s, the United States has experienced an explosion of advocacy in both 
national and state politics.160 Advocacy, more broadly, also includes civic engagement. 
Jenkins suggests that this broader view provides a strong rationale for nonprofit 
advocacy.161 Therefore, a compromise by some of ISNA's founders may have created a 
stronger foundation for its long-term advocacy. 
An illustration of this form of advocacy is the leadership’s engagement with the 
Carter administration. In 1979, the Muslim Student Association of USA & Canada 
(MSA) was part of a twelve-member group of Muslim leaders who met with President 
James (Jimmy) Carter and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to discuss the 
Iranian hostage crisis.162 The group consisted of at least four organizations that would be 
a formal part of ISNA’s establishment. In the meeting, the group's members expressed 
their disagreement with military intervention and their support for the release of the 
hostages and the normalization of relations with Iran, and they described attacks being 
made on Muslim Americans. They agreed to assist the government in any way 
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possible. 163 Therefore, although there may have been a larger disagreement about 
engagement through American elections, there was unity around the idea that Muslim 
Americans needed to be “at the table” to ensure a channel of communication. 
In terms of its hiring practices, ISNA focused its attention on people who were 
passionate about the organization rather than on people with specific managerial 
experience.164 For example, Iqbal Unus had a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Emory 
University, yet he was given the responsibility of leading the administrative aspects at the 
organization's headquarters.165 According to research, this hiring practice matched those 
of fellow faith-based organizations, but differed from secular nonprofits.166 
In terms of selecting its leaders, however, ISNA's method was unique among 
religious nonprofits in that its members elected the leaders, which is more common 
among labor organizations, social clubs, and business leagues.167 Moreover, members of 
national charities usually were affiliates rather than individuals.168 Nevertheless, it's not 
uncommon for religious organizations —in our case, ISNA — to model themselves after 
other nonprofit organizations and conform to the same tax codes and managerial 
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styles.169 According to Sayyid M. Syeed, ISNA founders looked to congregational 
religious organizations such as the Indianapolis-based Christian Church (Disciples of 
Christ) and the National Council of Churches as potential models.170 
ISNA’s founders sought to define the organization in terms of best practices of 
the nonprofit sector. They tried to fit it into the American fabric in such a way that it 
would permanently blend with and benefit from both Islamic values and American laws 
that incorporated freedom. In my view, if ISNA’s founders had their ideal, they would 
have established a country. A nation would allow them to implement their vision of a 
“complete” Islamic system. However, such an alternative did not exist and they had seem 
through experience how little impact MSA leaders had when they returned to their home 
countries. Therefore, a faith-based nonprofit organization within the American context 
gave them the best substitute for implementing their vision of a Muslim polity. 
ISNA and the Challenges of Diversity 
ISNA leaders sought to bring three broad, diverse identities under the ISNA 
umbrella. These efforts were marked by three divides: the immigrant-Blackamerican 
Muslim divide, the ethnic divide that existed among immigrants based on national 
identities, and the ideological divide among cultural pluralists, activists, and HSAAMs. 
ISNA's leaders saw this great diversity among Muslim Americans as the biggest 
challenge to Muslim American unity. 
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Embracing the Challenges of Diversity-Immigrant-Blackamerican 
ISNA had both an external and an internal narrative. The external narrative came 
from the leaders of ISNA seeing their relationship with African-American Muslims as 
pivotal to the organization's unification of the diverse Muslim American community. 
That is to say, they needed to connect Muslim America with the African-American 
diaspora through Muslim American slaves. Scholar Sherman Jackson noted that “it is 
almost uniquely through Blackamerican conversion that Islam enjoys whatever status it 
does as a bona fide American religion.”171 
The internal narrative was that of the muhajireen and ansar of Medina.172 When 
Muslims migrated from Mecca to Medina with the Prophet Muhammad in 622 AD, those 
traveling with him were known as muhajireen (or emigrants), and those Muslims who 
received them from Medina were known as ansar (or helpers).173 The ansar and 
muhajireen distinction became less important in Medina within a generation through 
intermarriage and other close relationships. 
This history became part of ISNA's internal narrative when its leaders sought to 
recruit and elect African-American Muslims to its shura and committees. In fact, they 
recruited the African-American scholar Dr. Ihsan Bagby to initially lead this effort and 
later serve as interim secretary general. 
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When dealing with the immigrant-Blackamerican Muslim divide during this 
period, ISNA’s leaders used both the discrimination and fairness approach and the access 
and legitimacy approach. As we discussed in the previous chapter these approaches are 
quota-driven. Organizations seek to address diversity by being inclusive. But these 
approaches fail to address the challenges of diversity at the programmatic level and are 
therefore less likely to result in greater diversity within an organization.174 
Probably ISNA’s only programmatic effort in bridging the immigrant-
Blackamerican divide was a “forum on the future of the African-American Muslim 
Community” in 1989.175 The president of ISNA at that time, Ahmad Zaki Hammad, 
invited four leading members of the African-American Muslim community to meet with 
the editors of Islamic Horizons. The forum, which was moderated by Dr. Ihsan Bagby as 
the director of the Islamic Teaching Center (ITC)176, included Al-Amin Abdul Latif, 
imam of a masjid in Brooklyn, New York; Ishaq Abdul-Hafiz, a federal Muslim chaplain 
from California; and Jamil Abdullah al-Amin, formerly known as H. Rap Brown, imam 
of a masjid in Atlanta.177  
The forum was designed to help the organization’s diverse constituents 
understand the importance of engagement at the local level. Specifically, the forum 
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articulated how, at a national level, the ISNA leadership was attempting to remove the 
ethnic barriers created by local communities. For example, Al-Amin Abdul Latif states 
I think it [the relationship between immigrants and African Americans] is 
getting better. We still have some obstacles to overcome. A lot of 
prejudices from different people. From both sides really. There’s an 
attitude from African-Americans, “O ain’t gonna take nothing from no 
foreigner.” We have experienced that with brothers coming from overseas 
to disrupt our communities. And there are some brothers who are very 
bitter. On the other hand, we’ve had situations where brothers have come 
with a more humble approach and wanted to listen to what you say. And I 
think that is important. But overall the relationship is getting much better. 
We are able to operate on a level that we have today with the brothers. 
And that’s a lot of progress. Shaikh Ahmad Zaki came to Brooklyn and 
stayed at my house. We can sit down with the immigrant brothers. I don’t 
even like to use that term.178 
 
It was vital for the community to unify under the umbrella of its faith, and it could 
do so simply by way of mutual respect. Ishaq Abdul-Hafiz had another suggestion to 
bring the communities together: 
We are having difficulties. But we can see that we are on course. Yes it is 
difficult to blend with the many Muslims who come here. Many of the 
immigrants who come here — we do have to look at this aspect — have 
been persecuted. Many never practiced Islam until they came here and saw 
there was another flow of the spirit of Islam. So now . . . to blend this . . . 
we have to implement the Quran and the hadith and see how the 
muhajireen . . . and the ansar . . . came together. Intermarriages, what role 
did that play when Islam spread to new lands? What was the effect of the 
immigrant Muslims marrying the indigenous? We have to start marrying 
each others’ children.179 
These African-American Muslim leaders resisted integration into American 
“white” society but proposed a “blending” of Muslim Americans based on faith rather 
than ethnicity. In building a coalition, they needed to find things that they had in 
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common. Beyond their faith, they had the common experience of persecution by 
colonialists, so the state of Islam in the Muslim world and America was attributed to the 
legacy of colonialism. To truly build a united Muslim community, these leaders and 
ISNA advocated intermarriages to create a new ethnic and religious identity. 
Just as important was building legitimacy with these African-American Muslims. 
Al-Amin Abdul Latif stated, “In time . . ., the relationship will get better. Through these 
types of meetings and on a national level different organizations coming together 
interacting mutually, not one over the other, because I am immigrant and I studied here, 
and you are indigenous and you own this. We need to recognize each other.” This 
recognition builds greater relationships and greater legitimacy. The most important 
admonition from ISNA’s perspective at the time came from Jamil Al-Amin during this 
forum: 
We have to be careful in the usage of terms. Allah said that surely all 
believers are a single brotherhood. The general use of any of those words 
is not accurate because we’re grouping everybody together. There have 
been brothers from abroad who have consistently benefitted the cause of 
Islam . . . here. And there have been brothers who become Muslims in 
America who have also benefitted the cause, and the contrary. There is no 
monolithic definition whereby when you say ‘immigrant’ that it should 
conjure up any negativity, no more than Muslims from this country 
should. We have to stay away from stereotypes and consciously stay away 
from falling into that kind of classification.180 
Al-Amin, an African-American leader, was recognizing the important role MSA 
and ISNA had played in America. He was also rejecting the broad generalizations that 
stereotype Muslim Americans. 
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Ihsan Bagby summarized the conversation for the readers: “Actually the point that 
I was making is that there is no African-American agenda that is somehow completely 
different from the immigrant-Muslim agenda in this country, or whatever Muslim 
agenda.”181 In addition, the issue featured an article on the history of African-American 
Muslims going back in time to slavery.182 It also featured an article about the first 
Conference on Political Awareness with speakers that included Imam Siraj Wahhaj and 
other African-American Muslim leaders.183 It was not coincidental that the issue on 
African-American Muslims coincided with ISNA’s push toward greater political 
involvement signified by the conference. 
Through this forum, ISNA’s leaders were attempting to use social capital to 
address diversity based upon ethnicity. They attempted to bridge this diversity by relying 
on a "bonding" type of social capital by bringing people from diverse groups together. 
However as we have noted in the previous chapter, bonding capital is only a first step in 
addressing diversity. The second step requires structuring activities across the 
organization to bring these diverse groups together towards a common cause. However, 
ISNA’s leaders failed to take this second step. Had they taken this step, they may have 
been better able to achieve and sustain diversity.184 
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Former secretary general Ahmed ElHattab notes that the failure of ISNA to bridge 
the divide between immigrants and African-Americans was due to the lack of a strong 
grassroots operation and outreach program. He argues that, although the existing 
programs were useful, they failed to permeate at the grassroots level.185 According to 
ElHattab, the ISNA leaders’ failure to bridge this relationship was due to two major 
problems. 
First, African-American Muslims are not a monolithic group, and key people, 
including immigrant leaders, were missing from the conversation. Second, simply 
engaging with another group was not enough. These dialogues, to be effective, required 
sustained follow-through. To these observations, Iqbal Unus adds that the dialogues 
failed in part because ISNAs leaders did not pay attention to the economic agenda of 
HSAAMs.186 However, in addition to having an economic agenda in the dialogue, 
African-American Muslims leaders wanted a voice in the larger set of issues that arose 
from the Blackamerican experience. In fact, this attempt to reduce the African-American 
Muslim issues to simply economic terms may have deepened the divide. The end result is 
that despite the best intentions of leaders like Unus, today there remains a fundamental 
misunderstanding of Blackamerican religion among Muslim American leaders. I need to 
note that this issue is not a uniquely Muslim American one. Michael Emerson and 
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Christian Smith detail in their research similar results in the evangelical Christian 
community despite sustained efforts to reach across ethnic lines.187 
Challenges of Diversity — Ideology and National Identity 
ISNA was more successful in dealing with the ethnic (immigrant) and ideological 
divides during this period (1979–1991). It sought to incorporate three methods aimed at 
managing diversity: a discrimination and fairness approach that equates diversity to equal 
opportunity and affirmative action, an access and legitimacy approach focused on using 
diverse individuals to access new markets, and a learning and effectiveness approach in 
which diverse views challenge institutional assumptions, thereby creating change in the 
organization.188 As we saw in chapter one, the first two are quota-driven approaches, 
whereas the third approach is more likely to be attractive to an organization focusing on 
continuous learning and innovation. 
During this period, ISNA also successfully implemented the two-pronged 
representation-identity model of diversity for the ethnic and ideological divide.189 As we 
noted in the previous chapter, this theory suggests that nonprofit organizations should 
first rely on a bonding type of social capital to increase the number of underrepresented 
members — simply to bring diverse groups of people together. The second prong 
suggests that the organization should structure mission-relevant activities that help to 
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create bridging social capital and sustain diversity. As we shall see, they succeeded in 
creating a consensus among some but drove away others. 
Research suggests that diverse organizations face greater conflict, delayed 
decision-making,190 and lower rates of participation.191 ISNA leaders expressed these 
concerns to their membership: “Muslims in North America are truly at the crossroads. 
The most sincere and persistent effort of every Muslim is needed to forestall 
fragmentation and forge a united and enlightened front of Muslims to serve in the Cause 
of Allah.”192 
A look at ISNA's board and its staff suggests an even more diverse organization 
than scholars assume. In keeping with the affirmative action approach, its staff and 
leadership consisted of people of both immigrant and non-immigrant descent. Its leaders 
and employees came from all spectrums of the Muslim world resulting in a unique 
religious identity.193 
However, as the public documents of the organizations illustrate, ISNA's leaders 
were opposed to being identified through ethnicity or ideology. Neither its annual reports, 
Islamic Horizons, nor other publications identified its members, leaders, and staff by their 
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national identity. Instead, the organization sought to identify membership by gender, 
location, profession, and education.  
The only time ISNA publicly identified national origin was when it introduced 
international visitors.194 Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed offers reasons for this departure from 
policy.195 Dr. Syeed explains that at a time when ISNA did not have recognized Islamic 
scholars, such visitors gave the organization its religious legitimacy. Syeed suggests that 
ISNA leaders sought to teach Muslim Americans a new way of thinking of Islam in 
America. He calls this method “patchwork Islam,” where you take "patches" or sections 
of a recognized international Islamic scholar or leader's ideas. In other words, ISNA took 
patches from the fabric of recognized scholars’ work and stitched them into a non-ethnic, 
nonracial Muslim American identity. For example, they drew political engagement, 
democracy, and the need to build scientific organizations from the works of Hasan Al-
Banna.196 From Dr. Hassan Turabi, they drew on gender equality. These two scholars, 
among others, helped ISNA address a challenge that Muslim American institutions faced. 
Syeed suggests that “patchwork Islam” helped the cause of institution building 
and thereby the rapid growth in mosque building. Syeed acknowledges that, in hindsight, 
this patchwork method created a problem: what to do about ideas that caused 
disagreements — for example, Al-Banna’s opposition to the West and Turabi’s 
compromises as a political leader. The larger population of Muslims lacked the ability to 
distinguish between the patches. 
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ISNA’s Quest for Legitimacy 
ISNA's mixed results on navigating the diversity of Muslim Americans influenced 
its quest for legitimacy. Legitimacy was vital for being recognized as the representative 
for Muslim Americans. ISNA had three possible means to seek legitimacy: through 
external (international) recognition, through recognition by the U.S. government, and 
through internal recognition by Muslim Americans. ISNA embraced the first, debated the 
second, and tried to determine how to achieve the third step. ISNA sought to influence 
these interdependent institutional relationships not only by its performance and programs 
but also by how it was perceived. 
Neo-institutional theory suggests that organizations like ISNA achieve their 
legitimacy through their structure, mission statement, programs, and outcomes.197 We 
have already examined how ISNA’s founders developed a democratic, inclusive structure 
and a mission statement intended to further legitimacy. The following sections illustrate 
how ISNA’s leaders sought to develop programs and outcomes internationally and in 
North America to further the organization's legitimacy as the leader of Muslim 
Americans. 
The Quest for Legitimacy: International 
As I discussed earlier, ISNA embraced internationally recognized leaders to 
establish a “patchwork Islam.” Another reason was to further its recognition as the 
premier Muslim organization in North America. Seeking international approval for 
internal legitimacy is not unique to ISNA. Curtis provides insight on how the Nation of 
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Islam sought similar external sources as a way to seek internal legitimacy.198 In fact, 
nonprofits routinely show the testimonials and partnerships that best communicate 
organizational legitimacy to constituents. 
National origin and ethnic identity tied many of ISNA’s members to the larger 
Muslim world. However, not all of ISNA leaders embraced a Muslim American identity. 
In reality, one of ISNA’s stated priorities was to educate “the American people” about 
Islam. This was due in part to the propagation aspect of ISNA’s mission, but it was also 
because some of ISNA’s leaders did not accept that Muslim Americans were in fact a 
part of the “American people.”199 
During this period (1979–1991), roughly half the speakers at ISNA conventions 
were from outside North America. Many of these international speakers were 
representatives of the Islamic movement in the Muslim world — people like Dr. Hassan 
Turabi of Sudan, the leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami or India and Pakistan, and ministers of 
Muslim states. The majority of ISNA’s charitable contributions came from the Muslim 
world, including the donation of land and funding for building ISNA’s continental 
headquarters in Plainfield, Indiana. 
Despite this outreach, ISNA remained committed to its values of pluralism, 
democracy, volunteerism and Islamic activism. ISNA’s actions were consistent with 
Jeavons' argument that religious organizations' behavior is influenced by their integrity 
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and concern for the public good.200 Despite self-interest, ISNA refused to compromise on 
its core values. For instance, when the Libyan government wanted to help disseminate 
Gaddafi's Green Book, the organization refused to accept funding with any strings 
attached.201 ISNA was quick to raise concerns when they did not agree with international 
leaders regardless of the consequences, as we see in the next chapter. 
ISNA mirrored its constituencies’ dissatisfaction with certain leaders that 
governed the Muslim world. Islamic Horizons spoke out against “King Husain and the 
other so-called leaders.” ISNA criticized the Saudi government despite receiving funding 
from the country.202 
As I have noted, ISNA’s leaders had high hopes for the Islamic revolution in Iran. 
However, within a few years, they determined that these hopes were unfounded and that 
Iran was developing alliances with Syria, Turkey, India, and Russia, all of which 
oppressed Muslims. In the February 1982 issue of Islamic Horizons, the organization 
took a critical stance against the Islamic Republic of Iran in its leading story. 
Three years are not a short duration for a revolution to set its policies, 
though one may say that in the post-revolutionary chaos its takes time for 
policies to evolve. . . . That is why we waited for some coherent 
expression of Iran’s relation with other Muslim countries. . . . At the same 
time, we also wanted to give the Islamic Iran the benefit of the doubt, 
especially where motives are concerned. After all, the Iranian revolution 
was not an ordinary event. It appealed to the deepest urges of the Muslim 
world: it vindicated Islam as an instrument of change; it dignified 
Muslims. . . . For the last three years, Islamic Republic of Iran has been 
harboring close links with Syria . . . a country ruled . . . by a group . . . that 
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is neither Islamic nor democratic . . . which has unleashed a reign of terror 
against its people. . . . The past three years of Iranian foreign policy raises 
[sic] too many questions and offers too little comfort.203 
 
In the minds of ISNA’s leaders, if Iran were an Islamic state with a true Islamic 
revolution it would oppose tyrannical dictatorships like Syria rather than be its ally. 
Within a few years, ISNA’s leaders determined that, by aligning itself with countries they 
perceived as opposed to Islamic values, Iran had abandoned the ideals of its revolution. 
ISNA aggressively attacked these regimes.204 
Just as ISNA was critical of the Muslim governments, it also sought to correct the 
misuse of Islam by violent groups. In the May/June 1987 issue, Islamic Horizons 
published an article entitled "Islam Forbids Terrorism" to counter the misuse of the term 
jihad by violent Muslim groups. 
Many Islamic terms like “Jihad” and “Islam” have been abused by violent 
groups. Nobody has power over such groups to force them to stop abusing 
such names. . . . Not only in peace but also in war Islam prohibits 
terrorism, kidnapping, and hijacking, when carried against civilians, and 
whoever commits that is a murderer in Islam and it be punished.205 
 
ISNA’s international outreach also stemmed from the direct needs of its members. 
Almsgiving, or charity, is enshrined in one of the five pillars of Islam — Zakah. All 
Muslims are required to donate a percentage of their wealth to one or more of nine 
prescribed causes.206 Many immigrant Muslim Americans during this period stressed the 
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importance of maintaining a connection with their homelands. Again, this was not unique 
to Muslim American immigrants and studies of immigrant populations suggest a 
connection between charitable giving and countries of origin.207 For example, as I noted 
in chapter one, Jewish identity was able to mediate international activism and American 
citizenship. 
During the 1980s, there were few, if any, reliable Islamic American relief 
organizations serving the Muslim world. ISNA sought to fill this vacuum and established 
various relief funds to serve Muslim American needs to donate to relief work in the 
Muslim world. ISNA articulated the need: 
In reflecting its faith and conviction, the Islamic Society of North America 
extends humanitarian aid to Muslims worldwide. A great practical 
manifestation of this is the work of the relief and development funds of the 
organization. Through these channels, the Muslim community in North 
America is offered a viable opportunity to alleviate hunger and suffering 
of Muslims wherever they be through humanitarian aid. This duty is a 
historic one for ISNA, and has provided a good example and challenge for 
other Muslims and organizations around the world.208 
 
In service to the community, ISNA was willing to continue this historic duty, 
which it carried over from its MSA days. The scope of ISNA’s relief efforts in those 
early days was extensive. The largest proportion of the ISNA’s budget was designated to 
relief efforts in the Muslim world. For example, in 1991, ISNA oversaw over forty-five 
relief funds with a distribution total of $937,427. ISNA’s total budget outside of relief 
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work was just $615,354.209 In 1988, twenty-six relief funds raised $1,357,000 compared 
to an overall organizational budget of $1,088,548.210 In 1984, relief work in eighteen 
Muslim countries resulted in the disbursement of more than one-half million dollars 
compared to an organizational budget of $343,951.211 In ISNA’s first year of existence, it 
had eight relief funds totaling over $1.9 million compared to an administrative budget of 
$1.3 million. The amount of relief funds raised nearly doubled what was raised through 
donations, grants, and program fees for the organization's objectives.212 
ISNA's programs, mission statement, and adherence to its values at the 
international level helped the organization establish legitimacy both internally and 
externally. Its international relief funds helped establish greater pragmatic legitimacy. Its 
positions against international regimes strengthened moral legitimacy. 
The Quest for Legitimacy: Internal 
ISNA’s quest for legitimacy in America had two audiences during this period 
(1979–1991) — internal and external. Internally, the Muslim American community 
seeking the establishment of institutional Islam in America was the primary audience. 
External audiences included the American government and media. ISNA’s programs 
were aimed at meeting the needs and expectations of the Muslim American community. 
Its public relation efforts focused on both the internal and the external audiences. Here 
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again, ISNA’s leaders centered its programs on its core values and priorities — Muslim 
Americans. 
ISNA sought legitimacy internally from Muslim Americans through 
implementing key values of democracy and transparency. Its programs were designed to 
further the establishment of Muslim American institutions that would benefit the 
community. It also illustrated its deep roots through the continuation of MSA’s work. It 
sought to attract internal legitimacy by highlighting international legitimacy and the 
support of constituent organizations. Finally, its public statements and public relations 
efforts reflected the consensus views of many of ISNA’s Muslim American constituents. 
As I discussed earlier, ISNA sought greater engagement from its members 
through a democratic, consultative, and disbursed power structure. Democracy remained 
an important value. ISNA was not a closed organization. Anyone claiming to be Muslim, 
over the age of eighteen and willing to pay the annual membership dues could become an 
individual member.  
ISNA’s membership's embrace of diversity is reflected by the people it elected to 
lead. The leadership has included African-Americans, Caucasian-Americans, and 
immigrants from across the Muslim world with different ideologies. 
From the time of its incorporation in 1981, ISNA has published annual reports. It 
has consistently had independent audits done by certified public accounts (CPAs) and has 
published those audits in its annual reports. It has consistently held elections and enforced 
term limits set in the ISNA constitution.  
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ISNA continued many of MSA's programs. The three major programs that I 
highlight in this chapter are the annual convention, Islamic Horizons magazine, and the 
Islamic Teaching Center. 
The annual convention was an important gathering. As a consequence, the 
leadership moved the convention from a cost-effective campus setting to city facilities 
such as convention centers and hotels. The first convention was held at the Louisville 
Convention Center.213 The leadership explained this change in venue: 
The change to a non-campus site was an attempt at charting out an 
uncharted course. With the ISNA decision to emphasize the presence of 
Islam in North America, it was important to make Islam more visible in 
cities and other centers of urban population. The opportunity to foster 
understanding of Islam among non-Muslims, it was felt, would be a 
greater in predominantly urban areas where a larger cross section of life 
styles and backgrounds exists.214 
 
Invitations to political leaders and the press were also important changes. As the 
organization reported to its membership: 
ISNA’s public relations efforts took a new turn with the holding of the 
Annual Convention in downtown Louisville, instead of a college campus. 
The Public Relations Office arranged newspaper, radio and TV exposure 
for Islam and ISNA through pre-conference interviews and on-site press 
conference. For the first time, the Convention featured specific sessions 
open to non-Muslims.215 
 
The next annual conventions were held in Dayton, Columbus, Kansas City, and 
Chicago. ISNA conventions remained in the Midwest until 2002 when they ventured to 
                                                          
213 The ISNA Annual Report, Islam and You (1984) p. 6 
214 “ISNA Convention Held in Louisville” Islamic Horizons (Sept–October 1983) p. 4 
215 The ISNA Annual Report, Islam and You (1984) p. 6 
85 
 
Washington, D.C. The annual conventions began to play a different role. For example, 
the bazaar, or exhibits, in the convention moved away from wives of students selling 
personal items, as it did under MSA, to commercial vendors marketing to the Muslim 
American population.216 
In addition, convention themes reflected the main thrust of the organization's 
focus — the needs and values of Muslims in North America.217 These themes sought to 
reflect the dual priorities of establishing a Muslim identity in America and achieving 
consensus between cultural pluralists and activists. They also reflected Muslim 
Americans' views on specific human rights issues in American foreign policy. 
Finally, the convention helped ISNA achieve an important objective — gender 
equity. The MSA Women’s Committee was very effective in advocating and pushing for 
greater rights for women in both the organization and the annual convention. These 
battles had been waged and progress was made by the time ISNA was established. 
During the times of MSA, women served only in secretarial positions. This was not the 
case in ISNA. 
Although ISNA needed to improve on issues of gender, it did not have formal 
policies against women speakers, women workshops, or leadership roles for women. In 
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fact, the role of women in building ISNA went far beyond secretarial help.218 Most 
importantly, ISNA was an early advocate of gender equity. Its embrace of international 
scholars such as Dr. Turabi of Sudan helped to provide an international basis for the 
organization's support of women. Dr. Gamal Badawi, a Muslim American scholar and 
long-standing ISNA leader, consistently spoke and wrote about this issue. 
The annual convention was not the only MSA tradition that ISNA wanted to 
continue. ISNA leadership also sought to continue the two publications of MSA: Islamic 
Horizons and Al-Ittehad. Islamic Horizons was a monthly magazine that fostered 
dialogue among readers through letters to the editors, news about organizational 
activities, and articles on international and national matters of importance; it also served 
as the organization's internal mouthpiece (at least in this initial period). To Muslim 
Americans, it was a mix between an organizational newsletter and Time magazine.  
Al-Ittehad was the organization’s biannual journal that sought to discuss the ideas 
of prominent Muslim intellectuals such as Abu al-Alal Mawdudi of Pakistan and Sayyid 
Qutb of Egypt.219 While Islamic Horizons continued because it was seen as being 
important in trying to increase membership and donors, Al-Ittehad was eventually 
discontinued. ISNA's annual reports during this initial period (1981–1990) frequently 
cited financial reasons for not publishing At-Ittehad. The Islamic Horizons magazine 
eventually was reduced from monthly to six issues a year and remains at this level. 
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Islamic Horizons became an important tool for ISNA. For the most part, its 
format remained the same in its initial years. The “Letters to the Editor” section remained 
an important place to foster dialogue among the magazine’s diverse audience. Its 
readership continued to include both immigrant and non-immigrant Muslims.  
Islamic Horizons continued to focus on international issues but added an “Around 
and About Washington D.C.” section. “The Muslimah Section” also became an important 
feature of the magazine. The first section sought to engage the Muslim American 
community with American politics. The second section was to further highlight issues 
faced by Muslim American women.  
From 1981 through 1984, Islamic Horizons was published in a simple newsletter 
format before being launched in the more sophisticated Times magazine layout that 
included a cover bearing an overarching theme. The magazine's themes reflected a 
broader tension within the organization. Themes reflected international, national, and 
spiritual issues. Some examples of these themes included A New dawn; Our Muslim 
Youth; al-Faruqi’s Assassination — What does it mean for Muslim America?; Muslims 
“Under Siege” — Will the Media Shape Our Future?; Fasting is for Me, and it is I who 
give rewards for it; Terrorism: Lebanon to Libya; and Shaping Strategies for the Future. 
Most issues focused on topics that were important to the diverse population of Muslim 
Americans in an attempt to gain internal legitimacy. 
The Islamic Teaching Center (ITC) was another project that the ISNA leaders 
sought to continue from the MSA days. ITC was helpful in MSA’s outreach to the 
African-American community. When Imam W. D. Muhammad became a sunni Muslim, 
he reached out to MSA to help the transition of his community. ITC provided training 
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about Islam to these new members of the Muslim community. ITC’s primary audience 
was African-Americans, but during its MSA period, was led by directors from the 
immigrant community. 
After ISNA was established, Dr. Ihsan Bagby served as the director for this 
project.220 Adding a scholar and African-American like Bagby demonstrated a major shift 
within the organization. Bagby credits the Society's leaders for always trying to reach out 
to diverse groups, especially African-American Muslims.221 Bagby also credits the 
leadership for recruiting people like him to help design projects such as the ITC and for 
enabling them to serve in the larger organizational structure. As the only African-
American Muslim to serve in the secretary general position, he had the opportunity to 
make an even greater impact outside of his work at the ITC. His complaint was that he 
was appointed only as “Acting Secretary General” or interim role despite his years of 
service; he eventually left ISNA to pursue an academic career.  
A majority of Islamic centers, mosques, and Islamic schools in America today 
were built after ISNA’s incorporation. It assisted in fundraising for those institutions by 
means of its speakers bureau, constitution, and by-laws; by extending ISNA’s group tax 
exemption to local masjids; by issuing letters of support to overseas funders such as the 
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Islamic Development Bank; and through its financial-service institution, the North 
American Islamic Trust (NAIT), which provided loans and investment opportunities and 
allowed communities to place their newly acquired centers in trust. 
ISNA also developed an Islamic education curriculum, the establishment of two 
model full-time Islamic schools in Chicago and Toronto (Canada), and teacher and 
administrator trainings. The two full-time Islamic schools were an important achievement 
for ISNA.222 The Universal School in Chicago and the ISNA School in Toronto were 
models for other Muslim communities wanting to create private schools in suburbia. 
ISNA was again seeking to take an idea already rooted in North America, that is Sister 
Clara Muhammad Schools, and develop a model that it could disseminate.223 In its 1988 
Annual Report, it not only announced the establishment of the new schools but also 
stressed the importance of an open and engaged process in achieving this milestone.224 
ISNA explained 
How did they do it [establish an Islamic School]? From the beginning they 
made it very clear to people who was behind their effort. First they 
established a shura council for ISNA in Toronto, which has about a 
100,000-strong Muslim community. Then they organized the youth, the 
women, and the children under the umbrella of ISNA in order to inspire 
confidence in the community and gain credibility, a critical factor for 
anyone petitioning a community to entrust their children’s education to 
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them. Now open a school? Not yet. Next came an extensive survey of the 
community in 1982-83. . . . Finally, they recruited people who were truly 
leading figures in the community. In this way, parental trust was earned.225 
(emphasis added) 
 
ISNA’s leadership wanted to urge its community to follow a course of building 
sustainable institutions. However, at the same time, they were concerned about external 
influences and worried that external funders could hijack grassroots institutions.226 
The ISNA School in Toronto was established in 1984. An office was established 
in Chicago in 1983, but it took longer for this school to come into its own.227 It was 
eventually established through the efforts of the local Muslim community with ISNA 
playing a supportive role. The school was officially established in 1990 and was named 
Universal School: The Islamic Society of North America’s Model Learning Center.228 
ISNA assisted in raising funds for this $2 million project by reaching out to local, 
national, and international funders. 
In addition to these model Islamic schools, ISNA’s education department 
conducted extensive workshops for Muslim parents and teachers on establishing part-
time Islamic education programs. Specifically, these workshops were designed to meet 
the need for educating Muslim children about Islam.229 ISNA’s leaders also sought to 
establish these part-time and full-time schools within an American context. For example, 
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they publicly partnered with organizations like the National Council for Religion in 
Public Education (NCPRE).230 Organizations like the NCPRE helped ISNA deliver 
effective programming, enhanced the organization's legitimacy, and validated the 
organization’s ability to serve in a national role. 
To create a stronger connection between grassroots community and ISNA, its 
leaders established the Muslim Community Association (MCA).231 This connection 
between ISNA and the grassroots community (through MCA) also furthered institutional 
legitimacy. However, by 1984, ISNA was reporting that the MCA was struggling “with 
the task of organizing itself into a broad-based federation of local community 
organizations.”232 The original vision was that MCA's membership would consist of local 
Islamic centers and mosques and that members would come together in a house of 
delegates. This house of delegates would be responsible for directing the MCA’s future 
and also for electing a number of people to serve on the Society's Majlis Ash-Shura. 
Unfortunately, ISNA and the MCA’s founders did not foresee the amount of effort 
required to establish one new organization, let alone two. As a result, MCA ceased to 
exist. 
In 1986, ISNA held a consultative public meeting to determine its priorities for 
the next decade. “The aims and purposes of ISNA shall be to advance the cause of Islam 
and serve Muslims in North America so as to enable them to adopt Islam as a complete 
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way of life.”233 Toward this aim, ISNA reaffirmed its six priorities referred to earlier 
while abandoning the idea of the “American people” being separate entities from Muslim 
Americans. The idea of community development was further defined as the involvement 
in politics and public relations. The organization was now ready to embrace a more 
specific definition of advocacy. “In order to exert influence on the political decision-
making and legislation in North America, ISNA should launch a campaign to educate 
Muslim citizens about their voting rights and mobilize them on issues affecting Islam and 
Muslims.”234 Nonetheless, opposition to political engagement had not ended and not 
everyone supported the idea of engaging in politics. There was a fear that engaging in the 
political process would “co-opt and adulterate the Islamic agenda.”235 An ISNA leader 
stated 
Those people who insist on entering U.S. politics say it on the 
presumption as if they are some kind of Jews who have to work for some 
state of Israel. . . . Some people think that one can distance himself or 
herself from the process. But philosophically speaking it is not possible. 
The process will assimilate you, and then adopt you, and then change you 
to its own objective. . . . Even if you are ideologically very well 
indoctrinated, you will have to make compromises here and there.236 
 
Those opposed to engaging in the American political process argued that the 
process was corrupt. To be effective, the process would require ISNA to make 
compromises that opposed the idealistic vision they had conceived. ISNA leaders had 
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initially sought to resolve this by broadly defining advocacy. However, by 1986 it was 
clear that ISNA needed to reflect community needs and follow in the footsteps of FIA in 
the area of political advocacy.  
Seeking external legitimacy, ISNA developed relief funds that showed selective 
approval of American foreign policy. Two important funds during this period of time, the 
Afghan Relief Fund and the Indo-Chinese Resettlement Program, help illustrate how 
these programs fit within broader American foreign policy interests. For instance, the 
United States backed the mujahideen against the Soviets. There was implicit support 
from the Reagan administration to raise funds for Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. 
In addition, the American withdrawal from Vietnam opened up the opportunity for many 
Muslims in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to receive refugee status in the United 
States.237 Because of their geographic location and their minority status, it is very likely 
that these Muslim Vietnamese and Cambodians cooperated with the United States and 
earned refugee status. ISNA assisted the resettlement process through direct grants, 
religious materials, and preparation of materials in the Cham language.  
During this period, ISNA successfully established its brand as a Muslim 
American organization. The legitimacy it developed through its programs, quest for 
diversity, public statements and positions, and adherence to its values helped in 
establishing this brand. However, as I note in the next section, its financial crisis and the 
inability of its leaders to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities as board members 
hampered the organization's ability to move beyond pragmatic and moral legitimacy. 
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Dynamics of Power — Transformation, Tensions, and Crisis 
Two key styles of leadership defined this period (1979–1991): The first leadership 
style emphasized consultation, consensus building, and collaboration. I consider this the 
Iqbal Unus era. This period relied on influence as the key form of power. Influence is an 
episodic power that works by affecting costs and benefits of behavior. Examples of 
influence include moral suasion, negotiation, and ingratiation.238 ISNA was not able to 
achieve rapid growth through this style. 
This leadership style ended when Ahmad Zaki Hammad became president of ISNA. 
The secretaries general’s I interviewed all stated that Hammad was dictatorial, top-down, 
and selective in his collaborations. Force and domination were the key forms of power at 
this time. Force is an episodic power that works by restricting available choices.239 
Domination is a systemic form of power that also works through restricting available 
choices.240 The result of both selective forms of power resulted in unbridled creativity, 
uneven or forced adoption of ideas, and open and repressive resistance.  
In 1987, Ahmad Zaki Hammad, as ISNA’s new president, addressed the Majlis.241 
The continuing financial difficulties and the organization’s lack of direction concerned 
him. Consequently, in this initial address, he proposed the following solutions:242 
                                                          
238 Lawrence (2005), p. 185 
239 Ibid 
240 Ibid 
241 Dr. Ahmad Zaki Hammad is a scholar of Qurannic and Islamic Studies. He teaches Islamic Civilization 
and the Primary Disciplines of Quran Commentary, the Prophetic Traditions, and the Principles of Islamic 
Law at the foremost center of Islamic and Arabic learning in the Muslim world, AL-Azhar University 
(Faculty of Languages and Translations, Department of English). He is also a member of the Faculty of 
Shariah, Department of Juristic Studies. He received his early Islamic and Arabic training at Al-Azhar 
University, Cairo, and was awarded the graduate degree of Alamiyyah from the Faculty of Theology. He 
95 
 
• To focus on raising funds in the United States. He argued “that communities 
that have provided the needy in Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, and India, can 
also support serious, striving, Islamic work here.”243 
• To focus on the education of the youth and adults on Islam. 
• To help empower women and youth to become part of the leadership of the 
ISNA and other Muslim organizations 
• To focus on developing fiqh of Islam that is “pure from sectarianism, 
distinguished from prevailing norms and cultural practices. . . . This should 
open a way for a living fiqh, that invites support from precedent, but is 
conscious of not being trapped into it.”244 
• To introduce Islam in North America and countering “the abused, 
stereotypical images projected by the media and Hollywood.”245 
 
This list of priorities was a signal by the new president to depart from the past and 
move forward in a new direction. At the same time, ISNA would maintain the important 
values on which the organization was founded. “To be fair, many among those who 
initiated the Islamic work in North America did not want to see the Islamic experience 
here as an extension of the bitter shura that has prevailed in recent centuries. . . . We find 
in the constitutions and charters of our organizations . . . statements that give the Muslim 
public . . . the right to select leadership.” However, he continued, “[what] concerns me . . 
. is to remind that there is a genuine desire to reject all forms of monopoly or 
manipulation that keep the affairs of Muslims in the hand of a few. The door is open for 
every Muslim to assume a role based on his or her efforts — an investment that will 
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enhance Islam, and Muslim life, on this continent.”246 He was signaling to the 
organization’s leaders and members that although its values were important, it needed to 
come to grips with the reality that, in America, Islam comprised numerous groups, some 
of which did not want to come under one umbrella. Bagby states that whether ISNA 
should be a platform or an umbrella organization was the subject of a major debate within 
the organization.247 
Hammad served two terms as president from 1987 to 1990. His tenure during this 
period is the subject of controversy. Bagby takes a less favorable view of Hammad’s 
leadership. He notes that Hammad nearly ruined the organization. None of the former 
secretaries general interviewed for this project had a positive opinion of him.248 However, 
Bagby and ElHattab both felt that he was a transformative figure. ElHattab argued that 
Hammad pushed for a very focused action plan and one designed to help ISNA think of a 
new reality. Bagby stated that despite Hammad’s authoritative nature, he helped the 
organization move forward. Bagby credits Hammad for expelling members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood from the organization's leadership. ElHattab also concurs that 
Hammad helped ISNA think of itself as an independent Muslim American organization 
rather than an extension of the Islamist movements in the Muslim world.  
When Hammad became president, he engaged some important people, such as 
Ihsan Bagby, the African-American Muslims invited to the forum, and Dawood Zwink 
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who was ISNA's first Caucasian-American vice president. In addition, he argued through 
his writings in Islamic Horizons for a greater role for Muslim women within the 
organization and Muslim American leadership. However, the interviewees suggest his 
forceful and authoritative nature changed the organization's culture of consensus. Zarzour 
argues that such a style helps make short-term change within an organization but does not 
sustain such changes.249 ElHattab also suggests that, although fundraising initially 
increased under Hammad, it started to decline as he drove more and more people away.  
Syeed argues that Hammad made the cardinal false step — he used the 
organization to further his personal initiative, the Quranic Literacy Institute.250 Hammad 
wanted to publish the first-ever Muslim American tafsir (explanation) and translation of 
the Muslim holy book, the Quran. It is clear how this would fit within Hammad’s 
trajectory of distancing ISNA and American Muslims from the Muslim world and 
patchwork Islam. This project became important to him and was initially supported by 
leaders of ISNA.251  
Syeed argues that to further consolidate power, Hammad retired Iqbal Unus as 
secretary general, who was in the hospital at the time. Perhaps because of the inefficient 
communication at the time (“snail mail”) and the health of Unus, no one questioned his 
retirement. Hammad then started to move aspects of the organization away from Indiana 
to his basement in Illinois.252 
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Unus disagrees with Bagby that Hammad was transformative and stating that no 
one thinks of that period of time positively. He goes further to argue that very few think 
of Hammad as an effective president of ISNA.253 Zarzour dismisses Hammad as a 
visionary leader.254 In Zarzour’s opinion, Hammad’s greatest failing was to place his own 
success over the success of the organization. The product of Hammad’s efforts during his 
time at ISNA and later at QLI was published in 2007. The Gracious Qur'an : A Modern 
Phrased Interpretation in English was released at ISNA's 2007 Annual Convention. 
Despite Hammad's failings as a leader, he took important steps to help ISNA chart 
a clearer course that included moving ISNA away from international partners, making 
difficult choices despite continuing debates, embracing ISNA’s role as an American 
institution rather than an extension of international movements, bringing clarity to the 
organizational mission, and clearly departing from its MSA past. He aggressively sought 
to bring new people into the fold, such as Ihsan Bagby, Amer Haleem, and Daud Zwink. 
However, the costs of these unilateral actions were nearly catastrophic. By 1991, the 
organization had laid off most of its employees, was unable to raise funds, and had fallen 
behind in its programs and activities. ISNA’s CPAs questioned whether it could remain a 
viable organization. 
Failure of Idealism and Fiduciary Governance — Budgetary Crisis 
Despite the legitimacy gained through its work, direct services, structure, and 
values, ISNA suffered from a lack of permanent leadership at its headquarters that 
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resulted in successive ‘acting secretaries general.’ More damaging were Majlis Ash-
Shura members who did not fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities.  
Starting in 1990, ISNA’s CPA, Ebrahim Lunat, raised two major concerns in 
ISNA's annual reports. First, the board (Majlis Ash-Shura) did not approve the 
organization's budgets between 1989 and 1991 as required by the constitution and the 
board's fiduciary responsibility. The expenditures during these years were made on the 
“implied authority” of the senior officers (presumably, Ahmad Zaki Hammad). Second, 
Lunat also raised the following concern for the future: 
The accompanying financial statements have been prepared assuming that 
ISNA will continue as a going concern. As discussed in note # 8 to 
financial statements, ISNA has suffered recurring operating deficits and 
has a net equity deficiency that would generally raise substantial doubt 
about its ability to continue as a going concern.255 
 
As the chart below indicates, ISNA’s expenses consistently exceeded its revenue. 
ISNA inherited this trend from its MSA past. In 1983, ISNA’s auditors discovered that 
$657,294 of designated funds were mistakenly used to support general expenses. The 
organization was forced to return the funds to the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). 
This resulted in a major financial hole in ISNA’s first few years of operation.256 
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Year Overseas Donations 
Donations 
USA 
Total 
Revenues Expenses 
Accumulated 
Deficit 
Endowment 
Fund 
# of 
staff 
1982 561839.18 112808 1153039 1431019.23 277980 0 10 
1983 507849.17 252825.18 912013 1658280.06 1183798 0 10 
1984 854852 147861 1081120 974954 1006200 0 NR 
1985 
Not 
Available 
      1986 472220 278769 1101902 928639 1264471 0 NR 
1987 204120 351784 867967 852506 1115379 0 NR 
1988 288672 465938 1088073 1088548 1115854 0 18 
1989 712910 495300 1517759 1594403 1192498 0 NR 
1990 669455 232163 1215872 1350141 1326767 0 NR 
1991 414886 401595 1027175 1150123 1464889 0 18 
1992 268682 524597 1031799 1430397 1816505 0 9 
 
The organization sought to undertake cost-cutting measures to reduce expenses, 
including closing offices in Los Angeles and Chicago.257 The staffs were downsized and 
reorganized. ElHattab also reports that during these critical times, some staff members 
with dual incomes agreed to forego salaries or received reduced salaries while remaining 
committed to moving the organization forward.258 These drastic measures made it more 
difficult for the organization to attract additional membership or donor revenue. 
Moreover, many Muslim Americans were receiving benefits from ISNA’s work as free-
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riders without contributing to the organization. Research suggests that free riding in 
membership associations is only diminished when it is easy to monitor this behavior.259 
The membership benefits to ISNA were not the kind that one can monitor to eliminate 
free-riders. One did not have to be a member to benefit from ISNA’s work. 
The failure of the Majlis to meet and approve budgets, the lingering damage from 
Ahmad Zaki Hammad’s leadership, an accumulated deficit, and a major decline in 
activities and staff gave doubt to the organization's continued existence. The staff was so 
deeply frustrated that they publicly criticized the members’ selection of ineffective 
leaders in Islamic Horizons.260 
Muslims regularly complain about the inefficiency and lack of 
productivity they see in large Islamic organizations. . . . [O]ne reason for 
the lack of productivity is the conflict that exists between some elected 
leaders who sit on the Executive Council and Majlis ash-Shura; a lot of 
time gets wasted in fighting. Another problem is that some elected leaders 
aren’t as serious as they should be about ISNA’s projects; they skip 
meetings (which are infrequent) and ignore other responsibilities. There 
are certainly some dedicated elected leaders on these bodies, but with so 
much weakness at these levels, ISNA cannot be expected to adequately 
serve the community.261 
 
The scathing article was a clear indication that the organization was near failure. The 
issue also featured an article entitled “Islamic Obligations of Leaders and Followers.”262 
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The budgetary crisis left ISNA very weak and at the brink of collapsing. 
However, just as devastating was its failure to deal with the divisions among its factions 
or to come to grips with the legacy of “patchwork Islam.” Disappointed with ISNA’s 
failure, HSAAM leaders such as Sherman Jackson and Dr. Ihsan Bagby established the 
American Learning Institute for Muslims (ALIM) in 1997.263 Bagby and Jackson ran 
similar programs through ITC and ISNA, which were discontinued after 1991. The 
founders of ALIM 
made some critical observations regarding the Muslim communities 
around the nation. They observed that these communities, while rich and 
diverse, were fragmented and separated by artificial dams because of what 
were actually minor ideological streams of thought flowing into the same 
river of belief. They discerned a dogmatic trend towards self-righteousness 
and a scarcity of meaningful discourse and willingness to learn from 
others’ point of view. These dams and scarcity of discourse are ailments 
that were not in the spirit of Islam as these scholars and students 
understood it. They believed these ailments to be early symptoms of a 
greater disease and possible future epidemics of extremism, religious 
voyeurism and self-destruction. The solution, at its root was the cultivation 
of critical thinking anchored by true belief. This communal aspiration was 
dubbed “Islamic Literacy” and ALIM was born. The American Learning 
Institute for Muslims was formally founded in 1998 in order to meet the 
need for Islamic Literacy and the empowerment of Muslims. It was the 
result of many detailed discussions between the core scholars and several 
of their students.264 
 
The founding of ALIM was an indictment of ISNA’s failure to live up to its goals. 
ISNA had failed to bridge diversity, move beyond "patchwork Islam," and realize a 
program that sought to educate its community about Islam. 
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ISNA’s financial troubles killed any chance for the Muslim Community 
Association (MCA) to become a reality. ElHattab argues that without MCA, there was no 
connection with the grassroots. Without structured grassroots community involvement 
with ISNA, the organization was unable to take advantage of the grassroots momentum. 
As a result, the grassroots and ISNA continued to grow further apart. 
ISNA leaders started establishing independent organizations to fill the vacuum. 
The 1990’s saw the establishment of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the 
Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), and the American Muslim Council 
(AMC). The Muslim Brotherhood and activist members eventually left the organization 
and established their own organization called the Muslim American Society (MAS). 
ElHattab argues that the MAS members were not asked to leave; instead, they chose to 
leave ISNA. He suggests that MAS seeks to duplicate the work of ISNA.265 The members 
of ISNA and the MSA affiliated with the Jamaat-e-Islami in India and Pakistan separated 
from the ISNA to form the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA). 
Conclusion 
Budgetary crisis left ISNA very weak and at the brink of collapse. However, as 
we learn in chapter three, external events gave ISNA some important opportunities. 
ISNA’s leaders failed to capture the energy that arose after the Iranian Revolution and to 
provide the appropriate direction for that time, thereby losing an important opportunity. 
They set out to establish organizational systems and embarked upon some innovative 
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programs to build upon their diversity. However, because of the inconsistent distribution 
of power and lack of continuity, ISNA was unable to sustain these innovative programs.  
Moreover, many of those who helped establish the organization had left. Some 
departed because they thought ISNA did not fit their vision of Islam in America. These 
people were primarily activists and HSAAMs. Some left the organization because of 
what was perceived as the dictatorial style of leadership of Ahmad Zaki Hammad. Most 
left the organization because they thought ISNA was a sinking ship. Sayyid M. Syeed 
was surprised when he reached out to ISNAs leaders for advice about serving as the next 
secretary general. He was advised not to take the step because “ISNA was an experiment 
that had failed.”266 Some leaders sought other specialized national efforts that could 
fulfill their vision of Muslim American needs. 
Compromise helped establish ISNA. It stitched together a patchwork of ideas. By 
the end of its first decade, these patches had started to fray. It would take external events 
to help revive the organization. For all these negatives, the organization started its second 
decade with many advantages that were not there at its inception. Most importantly, the 
debate about its identity was temporarily put to rest. Not due to consensus but because 
few considered ISNA to be viable. Why argue passionately over something that had little 
chance of success? 
However, some ideas succeeded. First, Muslim Americans needed to be engaged 
with the political process, and ISNA could help facilitate that process. Second, ISNA’s 
leaders realized that Islam was here to stay, independently — that is, not simply as an 
                                                          
266 Interview with Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed , May 1, 2012 
105 
 
extension of the Muslim world.267 Third, the grassroots Muslim American community 
among ISNA’s core constituents had matured. Muslim American religious scholars and 
motivational speakers had become household names. During this decade, these Muslim 
American scholars and speakers became equivalent to rock stars in the community 
displacing the need for international patchwork Islam. Fourth, legitimacy through an 
international stamp of approval became less important in North America. ISNA’s role 
internationally had two dimensions in this decade: to serve as a bridge between the 
Muslim world and the West. ISNA’s leaders sought to convey to the West that not 
everything in the Muslim world was bad. These leaders also believed that Muslim 
Americans had developed a model that needed to be shared with the Muslim world.268 
Finally, ISNA’s leaders realized that nothing could be achieved without the organization 
being a viable entity. 
If ISNA could survive its fiscal problems, it could move forward with a more 
cohesive identity and a national brand. As we will see in the next chapter, ISNA’s refusal 
to abandon its values at times of crisis and strong centralized leadership provide it with 
the impetus to move forward. 
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Chapter Three — Centralizing Innovation: Legitimacy through Effectiveness 
(1990–2001) 
In August 1990, Iraqi troops invaded and occupied Kuwait. This troop movement 
followed a breakdown in negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait that were brokered by the 
United States. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states immediately requested military assistance 
from the United States to Saudi Arabia. This request placed ISNA leaders in a difficult 
position. Saudi and Gulf donors of ISNA pressured the organization and other Muslim 
Americans to support American involvement in fighting Iraq. At a time when ISNA 
desperately needed funding, it had to choose between endorsing American intervention in 
the war, as supported by its Gulf donors, and siding with Muslim Americans’ opposition 
to such intervention. In so doing, ISNA had to choose between pragmatism and idealism. 
ISNA stayed true to its values and its Muslim American constituents by opposing 
American military involvement in this conflict. In the short run, this decision further 
devastated the organization's financial situation. 
The possibility that ISNA might cease to exist was not just a hypothetical one, as 
we saw in the previous chapter. The gravity of the threat explains why, from 1990 
through 2001, ISNA leaders focused on building a viable and sustainable institution. 
ISNA’s imminent demise had caused many of its leaders to leave the organization, which 
created both competition and opportunity. The competition arose when many of these 
leaders went on to establish independent organizations that assumed various roles 
previously associated with ISNA. The opportunity came from a chance for ISNA’s 
remaining leaders to move forward in greater unity. ISNA leaders hired the trusted 
Islamic leader, Sayyid Syeed, to serve as a powerful, centralized leader. Ceding greater 
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control to the chief executive officer or secretary general was about necessity rather than 
a change of heart. The organization's pursuit of effectiveness and sustainability drove its 
quest for legitimacy and diversity. Establishing itself as an effective and sustainable 
nonprofit organization, ISNA ensured its role as the nation's preeminent Muslim 
American organization by 2001. 
ISNA’s programs during this period were designed to further Syeed’s goal that 
ISNA become the Muslim American version of Billy Graham - an influential Muslim 
American organization that could be in dialogue and partner with government and 
interfaith partners. To be recognized as an influential organization, ISNA first had to 
become an effective nonprofit organization. 
ISNA’s programs during this period were organized by staff. Volunteers 
participated in the organization's programs, but their roles were redefined. Now, control 
remained with ISNA's staff. This centralization, however, produced mixed results in 
ISNA’s quest for diversity. Engaging with grassroots volunteers allowed new blood into 
the organization. Nonetheless, because no African-American Muslims were on the staff 
and because programs were held largely in partnership with suburban mosques, 
centralization hampered ISNA’s relationship with African-American Muslims. 
In this chapter, I explain how ISNA’s programs branded, transformed, and 
expanded its influence from 1991to 2001. ISNA’s programs, especially its convention 
and magazine, resulted in greater internal and external legitimacy. The success of its 
programs allowed ISNA to attain cognitive legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy is the most 
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powerful form of legitimacy and is attained when individuals and institutions consider the 
organization inevitable.269 
I begin charting ISNA’s journey from 1991 to 2001 by examining key events and 
trends. Next, we examine how ISNA's centralization of power and its embrace of a 
nonprofit identity helped the organization implement a cohesive vision as the Muslim 
American Billy Graham. Its centralized power structure enabled the organization to 
deliver effective programs and a disciplined communications strategy that, together, 
helped ISNA attain cognitive legitimacy both internally and externally. However, to 
attain this effectiveness, the organization had to be selective in its quest for diversity. 
Homogeneity may deliver programmatic success and legitimacy, but it limits the scope of 
diversity. 
Setting the Stage 
Major national events that directly or indirectly included Muslim Americans 
helped to define the period from 1990 through 2001. The first World Trade Center 
bombing in 1993 jolted the United States and caused it to associate the terrorist attack 
with the Muslim world,270 which increased Islamophobia. In this situation, ISNA's 
Muslim American leaders reflected the views of their communities. Some pointed to 
American foreign policy as the underlying cause for this violence. Others, including 
ISNA, argued that it was a case of entrapment. In fact, the cover story of the December 
1993 issue of Islamic Horizons magazine was “World Trade Center Bombing: Justice or 
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Entrapment.”271 The story was based upon an interview with Michael Warren who served 
as the legal advisor of Sheikh Abdur-Rahman (also known as the blind sheikh). The 
World Trade Center bombing and Muslim American reactions increased prejudice and 
hate crimes against Muslims. 
During this period, interactions between the Muslim community and the United 
States government were confusing. On November 16, 1993, President Bill Clinton invited 
ISNA leaders to witness the signing of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act at the 
White House.272 The United States military inducted the first Muslim chaplain as well.273 
Clinton also met with Salman Rushdie, creating disappointment among ISNA leaders.274 
Moreover, when the Oslo Agreement was made between the PLO and Israel and brokered 
by President Clinton in 1993, the U.S. government saw the agreement as a major political 
accomplishment, but ISNA saw it as a political farce.275 As a final point, the Oklahoma 
City bombing in 1995 and the Centennial Olympic Park bombing during the Summer 
Olympics in Atlanta were falsely attributed to Muslims.276 These events profoundly 
affected the narrative of a community under fire, and the newly formed Council on 
American Islamic Relations (CAIR) published A Rush to Judgment to document over two 
hundred hate crimes that occurred as a result of the bombing in Oklahoma City.277 On the 
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other hand, American foreign policy in Bosnia and Kosovo met with Muslim American 
approval. A community that traditionally opposed military involvement in the Muslim 
world found itself allied with American foreign policy. This period was capped by the 
USS Cole bombing in 2000 followed by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.278 
Events like these spurred the need for active engagement of Muslim Americans in 
the public sphere.279 Whereas in the past, American foreign policy in the Muslim world 
was the motivation for Muslim engagement in politics,280 Muslim Americans were now a 
community under siege. As victims of religious hatred Muslim Americans were on the 
frontlines of America’s Civil Rights Movement. Their religious identity was 
misunderstood and demonized because of the American media, public and political 
leaders’ lack of understanding of the faith. As a result, self-preservation required political 
engagement, and ISNA was expected to be at the frontlines of this engagement. 
However, the organization's revival was sparked by its position against American 
intervention in Gulf War I and the underlying value behind that position. Across the 
Muslim world, public sentiment seemed to support Iraq rather than the United States and 
its allies in the Gulf.281 A long-time Baathist and secularist, Saddam Hussein suddenly 
sought to adopt an Islamic posture. However, American Muslims were not fooled by his 
rhetoric or his invasion of Kuwait.282 “Disingenuous sloganeering that uses Islamic 
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terminology in an attempt to legitimize personal ambition, regional power, and national 
economic interests is hollow rhetoric that should deceive no one, least of all world 
Muslims.”283 
American Muslims did not approve of Saddam, but they also thought that 
American military involvement in the Gulf exposed a hypocritical U.S. foreign policy, 
given its support of the regime during the Iran-Iraq War. ISNA and various Muslim 
American leaders, including Imam Warith Deen (WD) Mohammed, were invited by 
Saudi Arabia to a conference in Mecca to seek their endorsement of the U.S.-led war 
against Iraq. The Saudis believed that their financial support for their Muslim American 
brethren in the past would grant them influence in this matter. W.D. Mohammed 
endorsed the war in a strong statement: 
We have Islamic interest first, and then other interests come second, not 
before Islamic interests. . . . I am comfortable with the decision which 
Saudi Arabia has taken to defend its borders and to accept the support of 
its friends — not only America but other friends, Muslim nations and non-
Muslim friendly nations. As an American, I compliment my government 
for protecting its interest, the interest of the American people, the global 
interest, for being friendly to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and for 
respecting the religion of Al-Islam. I am convinced, for I have met with 
presidents myself; I met with two presidents in my life as a representative 
of the religion of Al-Islam in America, and I am convinced that President 
Bush has great respect for the major religions of the world, Al-Islam 
included. Also I am told that many Muslims are believing that the military 
of the United States, the American or US army is occupying the Sacred 
Places. This is not true. We arrived in Jeddah, and I haven’t seen the 
military yet. We are now in Mecca, and I haven’t seen the military.284 
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ISNA and the other Muslim American organizations refused to support the war 
and issued an opposing statement. 
Worldwide Muslim sentiment rejects in principle the presence of foreign 
military forces in the birthplace of Islam. It is a dangerous precedent, 
sparking memories of colonialism, the lasting repercussions of which 
remain devastating to the life, liberty, and culture of the region and its 
ecology. It is more resented since it is seen as emanating from a principal 
ally of the Israelis as well as a superpower that cannot readily be 
compelled to withdraw. A continuing policy of categorical support for 
Israeli occupation, ambitions, and oppression of the Palestinian people, 
coupled with an overriding focus on controlling energy resources, opens a 
serious credibility gap between the American decision-makers and the 
Muslim and Arab peoples. Present concerted international measures [taken 
against Iraq] stand in clear contrast to actions taken against Israeli 
aggressions.285 
 
This was a watershed moment in the organization's history. It chose to declare its 
independence and stay true to its idealistic values rather than succumb to the risk of 
losing foreign funding. This public pronouncement, while financially devastating, 
increased its standing in the Muslim American community and furthered its quest for 
internal legitimacy. 
Taking this position reassured ISNA’s membership that the organization would 
not sell its values based on funding. The short-term result was a decrease in funding, and 
the organization teetered on the brink of insolvency; the theme of its 1991 Annual 
Convention, Will the Community Survive? reflected the serious concerns of its leaders.286 
ISNA was blacklisted by Saudi funders, and the Saudi government made it more difficult 
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for individuals to make donations to the organization.287 Of all the organizations that 
opposed this war, ISNA was the only one to pay this price. This price came in large part 
because of its national stature, but also because there was probably a higher expectation 
by the Saudis for support from ISNA leaders. However, in the long run, Muslim 
Americans received a clear and public message that ISNA was not an extension of an 
overseas movement or government. Ultimately, the Gulf War pushed Muslim American 
organizations away from overseas funding.288 
As we discussed in the previous chapter, this period is also highlighted the fact 
that ISNA was no longer the only Muslim American organization.289 Muslim Americans 
were under greater scrutiny and were subjected to Islamophobia, hate crimes, and 
prejudice.290 As Muqtedar Khan states, “America has yet to free itself from the tyranny of 
prejudice.”291 Muslim Americans sought to dispel the notion that, as GhaneaBassiri puts 
it, they were part of “an ‘external Islam’ and an ‘external America.’”292 
In his hope to revive the organization, Abdalla Idris Ali, the ISNA president, 
urged unity quoting the Quranic surah: “So fear Allah and mend the relationships 
between yourselves: obey Allah and His messenger if you do believe.”293 
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The spirit of this beautiful verse is reflected in the evolution of the Islamic 
Society of North America (ISNA) where Muslims coming from diverse 
cultural backgrounds have melded into one in their urge to direct the 
power of Islam for making a better America. . . . The seed that was planted 
over three decades ago has sprouted many strong trees that are serving the 
cause of Islam and Muslims not only in North America but overseas as 
well.”294 
 
ISNA leadership recognized that it was no longer the only Muslim American 
national organization. Organizations such as the Council on American Islamic Relations 
(CAIR), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), American Muslim Council (AMC), 
Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and Muslim American Society (MAS) were just 
a few of the national organizations assuming aspects of ISNA’s previous work. In 
addition, grassroots and regional Muslim American nonprofits helped fill the void while 
ISNA floundered, and Muslim American institutions were being established across 
America through grassroots activism. As Karen Leonard states, “American Muslim 
institutions and organizations map themselves onto the American landscape in interesting 
ways.”295 
In light of this new Muslim American institutional landscape, ISNA’s president 
echoed a new vision for ISNA — unity through cooperation and collaboration. ISNA 
would become a platform rather than an umbrella with a new and evolving role that 
depended on the organization's survival and rehabilitation. National and international 
events influenced this new direction, as did the new leader of the organization, Dr. Syeed. 
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The most important consequence of ISNA’s troubles and national events of the 
time was realizing that it needed to reorganize successfully in order to serve Islam in 
America. By design and necessity, this reorganization resulted in a strong executive 
officer at the ISNA headquarters.296 In 1993, ISNA announced that Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed 
would take on the role of secretary general. Commenting on the appointment of the new 
secretary general, ISNA President Abdalla Idris Ali said, “It was significant that the 
transformation would bode well for ISNA and inaugurate a new era at ISNA that stresses 
greater cooperation and service. I am convinced that Sayyid Syeed is one of the few who 
can revitalize ISNA at this critical juncture in its development.”297 
Secretary General Sayyid M. Syeed was uniquely qualified to serve in a leading 
role during a period of revival, rebuilding, and rebranding.298 He was a trusted insider 
who commanded respect among diverse factions. He was a freedom fighter bearing the 
physical scars of his service and the leader of the Muslim Student Association when 
ISNA was established; he was also the leader of a worldwide Islamic student movement, 
a scholar, and a politically astute and charismatic leader and speaker. 
Syeed was faced with a growing polarization within the Muslim American 
community. Muqtedar Khan notes how there is a growing polarization between “Muslim 
Democrats” and “Muslim Isolationists.”299 Muslim democrats focus on American 
democracy while isolationists on American foreign policy. He argues the latter are a 
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minority but have a bigger influence in Muslim American organizations. Syeed had the 
unique ability to be a Muslim Democrat while being perceived, because of his personal 
Islamist-like history, to be an isolationist. Although he was a cultural pluralist, he was 
acceptable to the activists. His children married Muslim Americans of Egyptian, Syrian, 
Yemeni, and Caucasian ethnicity. His youngest children were named Jesus and Moses. 
Therefore, his personal legitimacy and the fact that ISNA was nearly defunct meant that 
Syeed enjoyed greater flexibility than previous secretaries general. 
ISNA as a Religious Nonprofit Organization — Reframing Roles, Responsibilities, 
and Leadership 
Syeed’s position was strengthened by the facts that his position was not an interim 
one and that the organization was largely defunct. His position as secretary general 
paralleled that of a chief executive officer and made him spokesperson for the 
organization. This relative stability in his leadership role allowed Syeed to utilize both 
systemic and episodic forms of power, rather than only an episodic form. The Majlis Ash-
Shura had the roles of policy-making and oversight. Syeed saw the roles of the Majlis 
Ash-Shura and the executive council as similar to those of the United States Congress 
while the secretary general was the commander-in-chief and his directors the cabinet. 
This perspective gave the position immense power. 
In Syeed's view, the organization’s past weakness was that the position of 
Secretary General was weak and driven by factional interests over institutional interests. 
Moreover, although members of the majlis and executive council were elected to their 
positions, they were volunteers. After each board meeting, they went back to their private 
lives where they had other priorities. If ISNA were to succeed, the secretary general's 
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position needed boldness, decisiveness, and power. Syeed's perspective came not only 
from the fact that he became secretary general at a time of crisis but also from his 
reputation and history, which I provide in the appendix.300 
His experience with organizations such as Kashmiri American Council (KAC), 
American Muslim Council (AMC), and International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) 
enabled him to seek immediate funds from a core of Kashmiri, Pakistani, and Arab 
donors. He states he would recite a famous South Asian poem: "ashiq ka janaza hai zara 
dhoom say nikal." Translated it means: “If it is the funeral of a beloved let us do it in 
style.” He argued that if ISNA should cease, its closure should come from the belief that 
it is no longer needed, not from a lack of trying. 
He knew that for ISNA to succeed, it must have trained professionals, must 
implement successful programs, must be entrepreneurial, and must project its leadership 
in the interfaith and Muslim American community. He also needed a group of 
professionals who were committed to him as secretary general and the organization 
instead of factional interests. In the past, the emphasis was on hiring people who believed 
in the mission with the view that they could learn on the job. Syeed knew that 
employment and personnel policies differ between religious and secular nonprofits,301 
and he believed that he needed the best practices of nonprofits, businesses, and 
technology. 
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Syeed also looked outside the traditional factions that provided the organization's 
staff and volunteers. Although previous employees were from within the Islamic 
movement, the new generation of managers consisted of committed Muslims who had 
previously not been a part of the larger movement. Trained in management and program 
development in American colleges and universities, they had the skills required, although 
not the extensive Islamic knowledge of their predecessors. He reached out to his contacts 
in the Muslim community and academic institutions seeking Muslim professionals. 
Doing so also assured increasing the number of cultural pluralists at ISNA's headquarters 
where power was centralized. Not one of his initial recruits was part of the Muslim 
Student Association, the Muslim Youth of North America, or a regional Muslim 
organization. 
In the 1990s, the majority of people on Syeed's staff were thirty years old or 
younger, and they held degrees in business administration, nonprofit management, public 
affairs, philanthropy, and information technology. In Syeed's initial days as secretary 
general, recruitment was very difficult. He helped stabilize the organization by promising 
immigration sponsorship for American-trained, foreign-born staff members. Opportunely, 
the Immigration Act of 1990, which became effective in 1991, significantly increased the 
number of employment-based visas.302 By 1998, three of the five directors were people 
ISNA sponsored for H1 B1 visas so that they could work in the United States. Two of the 
four immigrant professionals had their permanent residence sponsored by ISNA. The 
process to sponsor an employee’s permanent residence can take years, and these staff 
members were required to remain with ISNA for at least five years. A number of ISNA 
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employees who serve the organization today received their permanent residence through 
ISNA sponsorship. In the next decade, ISNA majlis prohibited immigration sponsorship 
for employees. 
Lack of resources pushed Syeed toward innovative programs like the ISNA 
Fellowship in Nonprofit Management and Governance (Fellowship) in partnership with 
the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy. The program recruited professionals for a 
yearlong graduate program during which students took courses at Indiana University in 
nonprofit and philanthropic studies while interning for ISNA. Fellowships included 
tuition scholarships and a monthly stipend.303 This program resolved two issues: It 
provided needed human resources, and it served the Muslim American community. 
The community needed trained Muslim nonprofit professionals at the grassroots 
level for the ever-growing Muslim American nonprofit sector. Furthermore, ISNA got 
vital human resources through the internship program. Finally, this program brought the 
organization greater legitimacy. ISNA’s partnership with a major university and a leader 
in the study of philanthropy enhanced the organization's legitimacy as a leading Muslim 
organization. This partnership was also an attempt to gain a form of pragmatic legitimacy 
known as influence legitimacy. Influence legitimacy occurs when constituents view the 
organization as being responsive to their issues (for example, human resource needs of 
grassroots Muslim nonprofits).304 
This program was also another attempt to engage a more diverse audience in 
ISNA’s inner workings. In this way, the organization could reduce the influence of 
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factions by broadening its base, thereby making its centralized organization more 
powerful. More than half the program's recruits where women. Program participants 
included immigrants and native Muslim Americans. African-American, Caucasian, and 
second-generation immigrants were part of this program. Finally, this program included 
primarily cultural pluralists. 
Syeed sought to implement both prongs of diversity in the organization. Through 
the first prong, he first relied on a bonding type of social capital to increase the number of 
underrepresented members. This approach simply brings diverse groups of people 
together, as discussed in chapter one. The second prong included creating mission-
relevant activities to bridge social capital and sustain diversity through the fellowship 
program.305 
Similarly, ISNA first sought to engage underutilized populations (for example, 
women, cultural pluralists, second-generation immigrants, Caucasians, and African-
Americans) by recruiting them into the program (the discrimination and fairness 
approach). Syeed hoped to reach out to new populations through these new recruits (the 
access and legitimacy approach). All of these fellows were given an opportunity to be a 
part of the organization's staff, which enabled them to foster change in the organization 
(the learning and effectiveness path).306 
The success of the program is attributed to the fact that all graduates of the 
program went on to serve Muslim organizations at some level. In 2005, three of the five 
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heads of ISNA departments were former ISNA fellows. In 2012, former ISNA fellows 
led the Convention, Programs, Interfaith, and Community Outreach departments, and a 
fourth graduate is responsible for annual fund and planned giving within the ISNA 
Development Foundation. A $500,000 donation from a former MSA member who 
returned to Saudi Arabia to run the family business made this program possible. Between 
1999 and 2001, the program trained ten professionals. Six of these people went on to 
work for ISNA, and two went on to work for regional and local organizations and 
remained involved with Islamic organizations. The program was suspended in 2002 
because of lack of funds but was revived in 2007 as the HRH Prince Talal Bin Waleed- 
ISNA Fellowship through a donation from the Kingdom Foundation. 
Syeed benefitted from the fact that ISNA was nearly defunct when he became 
secretary general and, thus, many factions had disengaged or left. This turn of events left 
him free to recruit a diverse group of trained professionals and to further centralize power 
within ISNA's headquarters. Consequently, the organization's base became more diverse, 
which allowed him to look beyond traditional factions for support in efforts to revive the 
organization. This helped him seek legitimacy through building an effective, innovative, 
and sustainable organization. 
Legitimacy through Effectiveness and Centralization 
ISNA’s programs during this period had two aims. First, to develop a sustainable 
financial base for the organization; second, to give staff leading roles in the programs so 
that they would be located at ISNA's headquarters, thus centralizing these activities. 
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Developing a Sustainable Financial Base 
The organization sought financial stability three ways — by increasing its 
American donor base, by reducing deficits through spending controls and prudent 
budgeting, and by delivering revenue-based programs. Achieving these objectives was 
made easier by the hiring professionals trained in business, nonprofit management, 
philanthropy, and technology. This change in hiring practice suggests that the 
organization began using best practices to spur its success. 
To diversify its member and donor base in America, in 1996 ISNA launched the 
Founders Luncheon Coordinating Committee, its Planned Giving program, an electronic 
funds transfer program, an electronic database to track membership, dual membership 
programs and an endowment. The Founders Luncheon Coordinating Committee (IFCC), 
was, in essence, a development committee made up of some of the largest institutional 
donors and people identified as major donor prospects. At that time, the IFCC primarily 
consisted of Muslim American physicians. The IFCC members solicited support from 
friends who attended the convention or were involved with Islamic work at the grassroots 
level. This committee remains the cornerstone of ISNA's development program at the 
time of this writing.  
This committee played two useful functions in ISNA's pursuit to engage people 
beyond the traditional insiders. First, it connected wealthy Muslim Americans to 
structured fundraising activities while creating a stronger link between grassroots leaders 
and ISNA. Second, these IFCC members were largely cultural pluralists who were 
grassroots leaders in their local and regional Muslim American organizations. Despite the 
financial success IFCC brought to ISNA its main failure was that it did not engage the 
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ISNA majlis. Development committees are generally a board of directors that engages 
board members in fundraising.307 Within ISNA, the majlis was not engaged with raising 
funds for the organization in a formal structured manner. 
In terms of ISNA's second goal — to reduce its deficit — although more than a 
thousand people had given money to ISNA, its annual donor base remained below two 
hundred and fifty donors. In 1998, the organization developed an Excel database to keep 
better track of donations. In 2000, ISNA expanded this database so that membership, 
development, conferences, and subscriptions were integrated. By 2012, the organization 
had moved to the industry's leading fundraising data base, Raisers Edge.308 
The Planned Giving program launched in 1996 educated Muslim Americans 
about ways to donate, including Islamic wills and trusts. Planned giving experts gave 
presentations at ISNA's annual conventions. Between 1997 and 1998, financial planners 
met with more than one hundred families whose combined estates were valued at more 
than $250 million. ISNA was included as a beneficiary in the majority of these estates. 
Most of these people were relatively young, and those estates have continued to grow 
over time. 
In 1996, the organization established an endowment fund. Soon afterward, the 
ISNA Majlis Ash-Shura mandated that ten percent of all undesignated funds raised in the 
United States and forty percent of all undesignated funds raised overseas would be placed 
in the endowment fund.309 The fund was required to be invested through the North 
                                                          
307 Howe, Fisher, The Board Member’s Guide to Fund Raising (Jossey-Bass 1991) p. 6 
308 Interview with Ahmed ElHattab,  
309 ISNA Annual Report (1996) p. 5 
124 
 
American Islamic Trust (NAIT). In 2000, more than $400,000 was taken out of the 
endowment fund and used to pay off the remaining debt on an NAIT loan that ISNA had 
received to cover debt it accumulated between 1981 and 1992.310 In 2001, $865,078 
remained in the endowment fund.311 In 1993, the organization established the ISNA 
Development Foundation (IDF) with the vision of setting up an independent organization 
focused on raising revenue for the ISNA by way of fundraising, investment, and business 
ventures. ISNA appointed a board in 1998, but the organization was never able to operate 
independently and remained a department within ISNA. 
In 1996, the organization launched a dual membership program.312 The program 
allowed affiliated grassroots organizations to charge their membership an additional ten 
dollars per year and then pay that amount to ISNA. In that way, all members would be 
affiliated with both their grassroots Islamic organizations and ISNA. The membership 
numbers rose from over five thousand in 1996313 to nearly thirteen thousand in 2001.314 
This increase diversified ISNA’s membership pool, which became an important pillar in 
the organization's governance model.  
By identifying themselves as ISNA members, these new members were 
embracing a bonding form of social capital. Once they became members, they had an 
opportunity to participate in ISNA elections, receive Islamic Horizons, and take part in 
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ISNA events. These new members were largely cultural pluralists who opposed funding 
from foreign governments and supported engagement with the U.S. government and 
interfaith world.315 
Related to ISNA's third goal — to deliver revenue-based programs — were its 
annual conventions, which had been consistently a central focus in its programming 
endeavors. However, the conventions, managed by volunteers, repeatedly resulted in 
deficits. During this period, ISNA managed the event and worked to make the convention 
financially viable. By the end of this period, nearly half the organization's revenue came 
from its annual conventions. Moreover, the conventions secured a substantial surplus for 
ISNA by increasing the number of attendees and exhibit space and by attracting major 
sponsorships. 
The 1993 Annual Convention revenue was $155,129, slightly more than twenty-
eight percent of all revenues.316 In 2001, revenue generated from the convention 
approached one million dollars, nearly forty percent of all revenues.317 These percentages 
become even more meaningful when we consider that total organizational revenue went 
from just under $850,000 in 1993 to more than $2.6 million in 2001. The annual 
conventions remain a driving force in the organization's financial success. 
As we have seen, the Islamic Horizons magazine was subject to the organization's 
financial challenges, and ISNA's final big thrust for financial stability was aimed at 
making the magazine a viable enterprise. The first step was to look at the staffing model 
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of the program. Under Syeed, the magazine's only staff member was its manager, Omar 
Bin Abdullah. Abdullah had served as Syeed’s assistant in Virginia when he directed 
IIIT. Abdullah managed the magazine’s content and advertising himself through direction 
by Syeed, which controlled costs but also continued a model of centralized power. A 
graphic designer was hired on contract to assist Abdullah. 
The magazine's mandate was to break even, or strive to break even, which 
resulted in a strategic investment toward increasing circulation and advertising dollars. 
Islamic Horizons clearly benefitted by the successes of the conventions. The idea was 
that if ISNA could reach thirty-five thousand people through an annual event, it had the 
ability to reach greater numbers through its publication. This attracted greater advertising 
revenue for the magazine. As a result, by 1995 readers had to browse through as many as 
six pages of advertising before reaching the magazine's table of contents, and nearly 
every page had some kind of advertisement. 
Interestingly, the magazine also benefitted from the growing number of eligible 
men and women seeking spouses. Muslim Americans were located across the country, 
making matchmaking difficult. Religious norms forbade dating, which also made 
searching for a spouse an uphill task. The “Matrimonial” pages became an important 
resource for these people and their families. These classified listings slowly became an 
important revenue-generating tool for the magazine. It became important enough to be 
included by Edward Curtis in his sourcebook on Muslim Americans.318 The magazine's 
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revenue grew from $13,840 in 1993319 to $179,778 in 2001320. Again, financial stability 
helped the organization sustain this magazine; it also helped the organization move 
toward being inevitable part of Muslim American life, which is a requirement for 
cognitive legitimacy. 
Interfaith outreach and political outreach were key priorities for Syeed. To 
become the representative of Muslim Americans, ISNA had to attain external legitimacy 
in the larger interfaith world. Despite the importance of this interfaith work, Syeed was 
cognizant of the organization's financial situation. Unlike in the past when priorities 
could be carried out without much thought to cost, Syeed sought a more moderate 
approach. His interfaith programs started mostly as local initiatives in Indiana largely 
because of the organization's fiscal reality. The location of the ISNA headquarters in 
Plainfield made it a great resource for Indiana’s interfaith community and local academic 
institutions. Conversely, they were a resource for ISNA because it could not afford an 
extensive outreach of interfaith activities in New York and Washington, DC. Holding 
these interfaith dialogues and events in Indiana allowed the secretary general to engage in 
such activities at a very small cost. Syeed also did not think ISNA leaders had a deep 
commitment to or understanding of the local interfaith community. Spending precious 
resources may have opened an unnecessary debate about whether ISNA should be 
engaged in interfaith work.321 This interfaith outreach included convention invitations to 
interfaith leaders to ISNA’s annual conventions — for example, to leaders of faith groups 
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such as the National Council of Churches, Bread for the World, and the Council of 
Catholic Bishops. 
Centralization of Programs 
ISNA moved away from granting funds to the regions and allowing local 
grassroots organizations or leaders to deliver its programs. Instead, the primary program 
organizers were staff, which allowed the organization to centralize its services. The 
programs included conferences and events, Islamic Horizons, interfaith outreach, and 
political outreach. 
In addition, the annual conventions were organized differently. In the past, 
volunteers determined the site, negotiated the contract, awarded the contracts, designed 
the program, and worked with other volunteers to implement the event. Syeed redefined 
these roles. His office selected the cities, negotiated the contracts, awarded the contracts, 
and established the budget. The Conventions Department developed and issued a detailed 
policy that outlined the roles and responsibilities of the volunteers. During the period 
1995–2002, neither Majlis Ash-Shura nor the executive council selected where the 
convention was held. The ISNA Majlis Ash-Shura established a volunteer Convention 
Program Committee (CPC). Members of ISNA staff were ex officio and vocal members 
of that committee. Syeed was actively involved in selecting the theme for the 
conventions, and the CPC then designed the programs. The ISNA staff implemented the 
conventions. Volunteers in the local grassroots community helped during the actual 
events. The role of the chair of the conventions was redefined so that he was the liaison 
between the staff and the volunteer steering committee. Eventually, the chair's role was 
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further redefined to include mainly managing security and trouble-shooting the 
convention. 
In 2000, the Convention Program Committee (CPC) and majlis made a significant 
change in the way the program was developed. The CPC requested proposals from the 
grassroots Muslim community.322 The Convention Program Committee designed the 
main sessions. Each ninety-minute time slot could have one main session and as many as 
fifteen parallel sessions, and the committee sought grassroots input for the parallel 
sessions. As a result, the grassroots community and fellow Muslim American 
organizations became involved with shaping the convention programs. These changes 
came in part because of a concern that ISNA was increasingly disconnected from the 
grassroots community323 and needed to become more engaged with them. However, the 
changes were also ISNA leaders’ attempts for greater control. By 2000, certain members 
of the majlis were concerned about the power exerted by the secretary general’s office. 
Now that the organization had survived and was considered a success there was a push 
for greater majlis control. Despite this tension at the end of this period, Syeed played a 
very strong role in determining themes, program content, location, and speakers for the 
conventions. 
ISNA's financial stability and effective programs in and of themselves did not 
secure its legitimacy as the representative of Muslim Americans, although they did 
provide a platform for doing so. Legitimacy required acceptance internally and externally 
that ISNA could uniquely serve that purpose.  
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Legitimacy through Branding and Ritualization 
Branding and selective ritualization of its program also enabled ISNA to attain 
cognitive legitimacy. ISNA sought to brand itself as a successful organization that could 
serve Muslim Americans in their quest to integrate faith and practice. At the same time, 
ISNA offered to interact with the American interfaith initiatives and the political sphere 
as a key interlocutor for the Muslim American community. ISNA had already assured 
Muslim Americans of its independence through its stand against American intervention 
in the Gulf War. In light of that opposition, ISNA needed to show politicians and the 
interfaith community that it could legitimately partner with them on issues involving 
Muslim Americans. Doing so required an effective internal and external communications 
strategy and the ability to deliver equally effective programs. The keys to its success were 
its events (including the annual conventions), the Islamic Horizons magazine, and its 
outreach to interfaith and political leaders. 
Legitimacy through Branding and Ritualization — Events 
All religious organizations, including Muslim American organizations, have long 
recognized that events are potentially successful strategies. American religious 
organizations used conventions to bring churches together. In fact, according to Evelyn 
Brooks Higginbotham, among black Baptists, the term convention has almost the same 
meaning as denomination.324 Curtis argues that conventions were rituals of the Nation of 
Islam and an essential part of its religious identity.325 The Federation of Islamic 
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Associations (FIA) used this mechanism to convene Muslim Americans.326 FIA held 
annual conventions and meetings in partnership with local grassroots communities to 
help establish Islam in America.327 
Syeed repeatedly referred to ISNA's conventions as a “mini hajj.”328 Central to his 
vision of establishing an Islamic identity was the ritualization of the annual conventions. 
Annual conventions are very different from a denomination. Conventions require a 
people to show up voluntarily without religious compulsion. A mini hajj and convention 
involve the de-centering of central authority. This reinforced ISNA’s core values of 
pluralism and the voluntaristic nature of the American religious experience.  
However, a mini-hajj must draw large numbers of Muslim Americans and be well 
organized and sustainable. A small event would fail to result in the spiritual and 
emotional experience that a pilgrimage like the hajj would.  
The conventions had been held in cities such as Indianapolis, Louisville, 
Columbus, Kansas City, and Dayton. The notion was that by holding the conventions in 
different cities, the organization would influence different parts of the country. However, 
most of these cities had relatively small Muslim populations.329 To make the event a 
success in terms of generating revenue, it needed a large audience. Therefore, during this 
decade (1993–2001), the annual conventions were held in Chicago until 2002, with two 
exceptions when it was held in Columbus, Ohio, and St. Louis, Missouri. 
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Chicago was a larger city than Columbus and St. Louis were and offered a greater 
potential for both volunteers and attendees. Because convention sites in Chicago are 
expensive, the 1997 event was moved to the Chicago Hilton and Towers,330 which 
offered significant financial concessions for the event. In fact, there was a larger 
attendance than expected at the 1997 Convention in Chicago, where more than twenty-
one thousand Muslim Americans were in attendance.331 The sheer numbers resulted in 
the Chicago Fire Marshall becoming involved.332 We can imagine the effect on attendees 
from small communities dealing with the crowded and almost suffocating halls during the 
convention. The event was branded as the largest gathering of Muslims in North 
America. Syeed immediately called the event a “mini-hajj.” The organization built upon 
this success and continues to host the largest Muslim gathering in North America. 
The ability to host the largest Muslim gathering in North America grants 
advantages. Within the Muslim community, ISNA clearly outpaced fellow Muslim 
organizations in its ability to assemble so many people. The convention would become an 
important vehicle for other Muslim organizations, leaders, and businesses, and ISNA had 
the great advantage of being in charge of this important stage. Muslim American 
organizations and individuals sought to collaborate with ISNA in order to gain access to 
the limelight the platform provided.  
The convention helped fulfill the organization's quest for legitimacy as the leader 
of Muslim Americans. The fact that the organization did not represent all of the Muslim 
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American community, particularly a large number of African-American Muslims, did not 
deter the leaders of ISNA to declare success. Externally, interfaith organizations and 
politicians did not understand the deep diversity that existed among Muslim Americans. 
They saw ISNA as the organization that hosted the largest Muslim American event and 
published the largest Muslim American publication. 
The conventions also helped the organization’s quest for diversity. Social capital 
was created among the hundreds of volunteers and thousands of participants who were a 
part these events. This social capital was then translated into mission-relevant activities 
(programs) that helped bridge and sustain diversity.333 It is important to note that these 
events were more successful in bridging social capital with ethnic immigrants and 
ideological groups than with African-American Muslims. Although African-American 
Muslims participated as volunteers and attendees, their number was minimal. This was 
mainly because the ISNA Annual Convention and Imam Warith Deen Muhammad’s 
organization’s annual convention were both held during Labor Day weekend every year. 
The conventions were important branding tools for Muslim Americans and ISNA. 
Their themes reflected the need to change stereotypes about Muslims at a time of 
increasing prejudice, hatred, and violence against Muslim Americans. The following 
convention themes illustrate ISNA's attempt to change its narrative about Muslim 
Americans and Islam. 
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1993 Muslims for a Better America 
1994 
Our Youth, Our Family, Our 
Future 
1995 Islam: Our Choice 
 1996 Muslims for Peace and Justice 
1997 Muslims for Moral Excellence 
1998 Muslims for Human Dignity 
1999 Islam: Guidance for Humanity 
2000 Islam: Faith & Civilization 
2001 Strength through Diversity 
The themes from 1993 to 1995 were largely inward-looking and focused on 
helping the organization gain greater success with its constituent groups by emphasizing 
the need for identity and the fact that ISNA could make a positive contribution to the 
lives of Muslim Americans. The themes for 1993 and 1996 through 2001 sought to 
influence narratives about Islam and Muslims. Externally, they endeavored to redefine 
Muslims and Islam to politicians, media, and interfaith organizations. Internally, they 
sought to provide guidance to a deeper Muslim American identity. 
Beyond the utilitarian advantages they gave the organization, the conventions 
played an important role in furthering the cause of Islam in America. The convention 
toward the end of this period featured more than two hundred speakers. These speakers 
shared best practices, community models, spiritual advice, and lectures on religion. The 
conventions featured babysitting for children, a children's program for elementary and 
middle school children, and a programmatic track for high school students, college 
students, and adults. It was a powerful tool to shape the identities of Muslim Americans 
who attended primarily to network, learn about their faith, and engage with their 
community. For Muslim entrepreneurs and causes alike, the convention was a great way 
to amplify their mission, cause, or product. For friends, the conventions became an 
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annual meeting location. In fact, for some people the word “ISNA” represented an event 
not an organization. 
The convention gave ISNA legitimacy in a number of ways. Self-interest among 
individuals and competing institutions (including CAIR, MPAC, AMC, AMA, MAS, and 
ICNA) sought to be a part of this large gathering brought the organization pragmatic 
legitimacy. Convention themes and programming gave the organization moral 
legitimacy. The themes helped to shine a positive light on Islam and Muslims. Finally, 
the conventions made the organization a necessary organization. That is, in the short-
term, if the event were to disappear, no other entity would be able to fill the vacuum. 
The success of the annual convention prompted the grassroots Muslim community 
to seek greater involvement with ISNA. Nearly every community wanted an event like 
the convention in its city. Although ISNA could not hold its annual conventions in small 
communities, it was open to holding regional events in them. During this period, these 
regional events used ISNA’s brand and ability to arrange for speakers. These regional 
events were organized independently in large part, but they helped ISNA’s brand grow. 
Events remained ISNA’s primary vehicle for delivering services. It sought to meet 
grassroots needs through specialized conferences. In 1999, ISNA organized the 
Education Forum, which brought together more than four hundred educators from more 
than one hundred full-time Islamic schools from nearly thirty different states. This event 
has become the largest gathering of Islamic school educators in North America. 
The Community Development Conference was hosted concurrently with the 
Education Forum. The Community Development Conference brought together more than 
one hundred grassroots Muslim organizations from more than thirty states in order to 
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train them on areas of nonprofit management. This event continued for a few years but 
was eventually discontinued. This program was part Syeed’s vision that members of the 
majlis did not share and is an example of how some innovations are not sustained due to 
conflicts over the proper balance of power within ISNA. 
ISNA also hosted conferences such as Islam in America, Islam in American 
Prisons, and Islam Amongst Latino Americans. Islam in American prisons brought 
together prison officials from across the country who sought to contribute and share ideas 
regarding the growing population of Muslim Americans in prisons. The other events were 
mainly academic conferences that were unable to find a strong academic institutional 
partner. Also, the board was skeptical of these events, and they were discontinued in the 
following decade. However, these conferences were part of Syeed's efforts to brand 
Muslim Americans and understand key constituencies. 
ISNA also held training conferences on domestic violence, counseling, conflict 
resolution, Zakat, Fiqh of Minorities, moon-sighting, Islamic banking, and the Internet. 
The conferences with the potential to attract financial sponsors and with the ability to 
raise revenue were held at hotels. However, most of these events were held at the ISNA 
headquarters in Plainfield. 
All these events sought to further the organization's internal and external 
legitimacy, to engage a larger and more diverse group of Muslim Americans, and to 
ritualize the events in order to sustain ISNA as part of Muslim Americans' Islamic 
identity. These events were also an attempt to provide service and direction to Muslim 
Americans. 
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Legitimacy through Branding and Ritualization: Islamic Horizons Magazine 
Publications play an important role among religious, advocacy, and nonprofit 
organizations.334 Publications such as the Christian Advocate and Christian Science 
Monitor were important publications in American Christianity. The Muslim American 
community had a relatively long history of publications disseminating information about 
Islam, Muslims, and practice. For example, Alexander Russell Webb used publications in 
his quest to propagate Islam.335 Edward Curtis outlines how important publications were 
in gaining religious legitimacy and identity within the Nation of Islam.336 
Syeed’s first act was to revive the Islamic Horizons magazine.337 Rather than just 
mailing the magazine to its subscribers and members of ISNA, he acquired a larger 
mailing list. The magazine was an important mouthpiece for the organization. Confining 
the organization to a small group of members, donors, and subscribers would limit the 
growth of the organization, and publishing the largest Muslim American publication 
helped ISNA’s brand as an influential organization and helped it achieve cognitive 
legitimacy. The organization continued to sell subscriptions, but even if a subscriber 
failed to pay for it, the magazine was still delivered! This decision was explained as 
follows: 
                                                          
334 DiMaggio, Paul, “Nonprofit Organizations and the Intersectoral Division of Labor in the Arts” in The 
Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook. Ed. Walter W. Powell and Richard Steinberg (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 2006). P. 442-443 
335 Abd-Allah Umar F. A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander Russell Webb (Oxford 
University Press 2006) p. 162 
336 See generally Curtis IV, Edward E., Black Muslim Religion in the Nation of Islam (University of North 
Carolina Press 2006) 
337 Interview with Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed, May 1, 2011 
138 
 
It was decided to mail the Islamic Horizons to everyone whose name was 
on our mailing list. The praise we received was flattering and 
overwhelming but these words were not transformed into action. Only a 
few of the readers undertook the effort of becoming subscribers. . . . This 
placed a great financial burden on ISNA. We will continue to strive to 
convert these readers into paying subscribers. We are confident that the 
new Islamic Horizons will regain the confidences of its readers and 
advertisers and will emerge as a news source from the Muslims of North 
America. We are also confident that by regaining the confidence of our 
advertisers, Islamic Horizons will emerge as a tool for promoting Muslim 
commerce. Thus . . . [Islamic Horizons]will develop eventually into a 
source of revenue for ISNA.338 
 
The magazine's format was changed to become a newsmagazine in response to 
the concern of leaders, members, and donors that there was an anti-Muslim bias in the 
general American media. The organization revealed this change to its constituents in its 
1994 Annual Report: 
Islamic Horizons emerged in a new light . . . ISNA decided to revitalize 
the magazine and turn it into an effective communication tool, not only for 
Muslims but to serve as our outreach to our non-Muslim compatriots. We 
decided to transform it into a newsmagazine where news and events could 
be viewed from the Muslim perspective. Not only the format was changed 
but there was also an increase our print order to 25,000. Accordingly a 
decision was reached to publish it regularly as a bimonthly publication, 
and eventually as monthly publication with a print order of at least 
100,000.339 
 
Although some had envisioned a Muslim Newsweek, Syeed set his sights on the 
Disciple, a national magazine published by the Disciples of Christ, and the Christian 
Science Monitor. Within months of becoming secretary general, Syeed reached out to 
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Robert Friedly, the editor of the Disciple, for advice. Friedly suggested economies of 
scale and even introduced ISNA to the Disciple’s printer.340 
Another significant change was Islamic Horizon's “Letters to Editors” section. 
Prior to 1994, this section was a vibrant and active part of the magazine. People with 
diverse views were permitted to air their views about the organization, the magazine, and 
national and international issues. Such openness was not consistent with an attempt to 
have a carefully crafted message or branding. The organization was already walking a 
fine line while trying to meet very diverse audiences: its constituents, interfaith 
organizations, the media, and politicians. 
As were the convention themes, the magazine was a great opportunity to drive the 
internal narrative and rebrand Muslims and Islam externally. Libraries, interfaith 
organizations, political leaders, and media outlets were added to the mailing list. As one 
surprised recipient expressed: 
I want to express appreciation to you for being on your mailing list for 
Islamic Horizons. I am amazed at how much you have done for the 
magazine since you began to develop it not too long ago. . . . I teach a 
Christian Sunday school class and we spent five weeks studying Islam 
recently, reading passages from the Qur’an as well as the Bible. . . . One of 
the resources we used was your editorial about the Muslim commitment to 
peace and justice. The class members were very impressed with it. I think 
the overall understanding of the class was that the two faiths have more in 
common than not.341 
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This mailing strategy was so extensive that ISNA routinely received requests to 
be removed from the mailing list.342 
Islamic Horizons sought to educate America about Islam and the Muslim world. 
Having “brought together” an audience of Muslim Americans who received Islamic 
Horizons, the organization presented mission-relevant articles to sustain diversity and 
help develop a cultural pluralist Muslim American identity that was comfortable with 
both its American and its global roots. Malaysia343 and the building of Petronas 
Towers344 were examples of a functional Muslim country. The story of Pakistan’s 
creation345 and later the defense of Pakistan’s decision to conduct a nuclear test346 in 
response to India's were important to ISNA’s Pakistani-American constituency. Islamic 
Horizons also served the organization's goal to educate fellow Americans about these 
critical issues from a Muslim perspective. The story about the suffering of Muslims in 
Chechnya347 needed to be heard in America. Moreover, because the American media 
mostly seemed uninterested, the success in Tajikistan348 and the authoritarianism in 
Uzbekistan349 needed to be brought up. The past glory of Hyderabad needed to be shared 
with fellow Americans, and doing so would help connect ISNA with the affluent 
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Hyderabadi-American community.350 Such great success stories of the Muslim past 
needed to be shared to help reframe the conversation about Islam and Muslims. Cover 
stories about the hijab (head scarves for Muslim women)351, Ramadan (Muslim holy 
month when Muslims fast from sunup to sundown),352 and Hajj (annual religious 
pilgrimage)353 sought to demystify Islam. The cover story about Jerusalem sought to 
identify and advocate for the theological and historical connection with the city and 
Islam.354 This issue helped reassure the large number of Muslim Americans who were 
frustrated by the lack of progress of Muslim American organizations on the issue of 
Palestine. 
The magazine furthered the organization's quest for legitimacy by establishing 
Islam in American history. In 1994, a new book entitled The Melungeons: The 
Resurrection of a Proud People was published by Mercer University Press. ISNA 
reached out to its author, Brent Kennedy, to provide an article about the story of the 
Melungeons for Islamic Horizons. The article traces Islam's journey to America as a 
result of the Spanish Inquisition. 
Perhaps Nancy Hanks, the mother of Abraham Lincoln, was Melungeon. 
It somehow seems fitting that one of America’s greatest Presidents should 
be of mixed race and probably Muslim heritage. But who are the 
Melungeons? Historical records document that from 1492 through the 
early 1600’s, an estimated 500,000 Jews and Muslims were exiled from 
Spain and Portugal through a religious witch-hunt known as — the 
                                                          
350 Islamic Horizons (December 1998) 
351 Islamic Horizons (December 1994) 
352 Islamic Horizons (January 1997)–this theme was repeated several times during 1993 - 2001 
353 Islamic Horizons (March 1996)–this theme was repeated several times during 1993 - 2001 
354 Islamic Horizons (January 2001) 
142 
 
Spanish Inquisition. The Spanish Inquisition, horrible as it was, 
accomplished something of great historical value for Islam.355 
 
This story connects Islam to so many diverse American narratives. Muslims came 
to America as early as 1492 to escape religious persecution and were, therefore, pioneers 
in the efforts to build America. Melungeons intermarried with Native Americas. This one 
story helped ISNA leaders to illustrate the shared narratives between Muslim Americans 
with fellow Americans whose identity was informed by the Mayflower, religious 
persecution, slavery and oppression, and Native Americans.  
In 1998, the magazine dedicated articles to Muhammad Ali356 and to Muslims in 
the National Basketball Associations (NBA)357. In 1999, ISNA featured the unveiling of 
the Malcolm X stamp for its cover page for Black Heritage month.358 This issue featured 
a whole section on “Islam and the Emancipation of America.”359 This section included 
seven different articles that generally traced African-American history and slavery and 
then connected this history to Islam through leaders like Malcolm X. This issue also 
intertwined the civil rights struggle with Islam. More broadly, it connected the African-
American struggle with Islam. 
If you recognize the name: Malcolm-Jamal Warner, Kareem Abdul 
Jabbar, Jamal Wilkes, Muhammad Ali, Ahmad Jamal, the singer Kashif, 
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the sports commentator Ahmad Rashad. . . . The Islamic influence among 
African-Americans is an acknowledged fact and growing. These names 
only reflect the phenomenal growth, saturation and permanency of the 
Islamic movement in America. . . . What is little known, however, is about 
Islam or its true relationship to the African-American thrust for freedom 
and equality.360 
 
ISNA understood that winning the new struggle against prejudice required 
connecting it to the struggles of the past. But perhaps most importantly, this historical 
connection to African American Islam gave new generations of Muslim Americans born 
of immigrant families a connection between their identity and America that went further 
than their parents and grandparents. 
Islamic Horizons was another strategic tool and program of the organization. The 
magazines themes from 1994 through 2001 sought to achieve the following goals: brand 
Islam and Muslims for an external audience, build a bridge between the Muslim world 
and America, reframe the narrative within the Muslim community in America, advocate 
on behalf of Muslim issues, amplify the Muslim American perspective on issues of 
national and international concerns, and finally, identify key issues and solutions that 
affected Muslim Americans. Islamic Horizons succeeded in achieving cognitive 
legitimacy for the organization by expanding its readership to include Muslims and non-
Muslims and by making it the most circulated Muslim American publication. Because 
legitimacy, diversity, and the organization's mission could not be achieved simply by 
sending the magazine to members and subscribers, Islamic Horizons extended ISNA 
beyond the faithful following. 
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Legitimacy through Branding — Political and Interfaith Outreach 
ISNA sought to further its mission to serve Muslim Americans through greater 
engagement with political leaders. Referring to the close relationship that Christian 
evangelical preacher Billy Graham developed with U.S. presidents from the time of 
Eisenhower to the time of Clinton, Syeed told his staff that the mission of ISNA was to 
become “the Muslim Reverend Billy Graham." He went on to say, "ISNA should serve as 
the conscience of our government and provide the government a partner to dialogue with 
rather than one to fight with.”361 
ISNA sought to work with the administration. Syeed was appointed to the White 
House Commission on Race. Ahmed ElHattab, acting secretary general, met with 
President Clinton in 1992, Syeed met with President Clinton on at least two occasions, 
and ISNA leaders attended numerous functions at the White House and other federal 
agencies on behalf of the organization. 
In 1998, ISNA sought to educate political leaders about Muslim Americans and 
ISNA. ISNA issued invitations to the White House, members of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, and state governors to either attend the convention or to send 
proclamations or letters to the attendees of that year's convention. Syeed realized that 
most would not attend; however, the invitation would educate these individuals and their 
staff about ISNA and its ability to convene the largest Muslim American gathering in the 
country. Most would send letters or proclamations responding to the invitation. These 
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documents were collected and re-printed in the convention's event program. These efforts 
bolstered ISNA as a national leader internally. 
ISNA understood its convening role. It never sought to displace Muslim 
American organizations that focused on politics, advocacy, or civil rights. ISNA gave 
space in its magazine and events to organizations such as the Muslim Public Affairs 
Council (MPAC), Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), American Muslim 
Alliance (AMA), American Muslim Council (AMC), and American Muslim Taskforce 
(AMT). Syeed’s vision of being a “Muslim Rev. Bill Graham” required that ISNA not be 
overtly partisan. These organizations could play the antagonist and endorsers, whereas 
ISNA would open its platform to all sides of the political debate. 
However, Muslim Americans lacked political unity. According to a 2001 poll, 
twenty-three percent of Muslims identified themselves as Republicans, forty percent as 
Democrats, and twenty-eight percent as independents.362 The number of Democrats was 
bolstered because at least one-third of the Muslim American population was African-
American. Pakistani Americans tended to identify themselves as Republicans because 
they perceived President Reagan and President Bush as being supportive of Pakistan. 
In 1996, five national Muslim organizations met with Clinton and Dole's 
campaign staff members to determine which candidate they would endorse in the 
presidential election.363 The organizations were not able to agree upon whom to endorse. 
Two organizations endorsed Clinton, one organization endorsed Dole, whereas the 
remaining two abstained. ISNA was invited to participate in both party conventions. The 
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reality was that although these five organizations chose to focus on politics, they lacked 
the grassroots connections and national reach of an organization like ISNA. 
In 2000, Muslim American organizations again tried to establish a Muslim 
American voting bloc by establishing the informal American Muslim Taskforce on Civil 
Rights and Elections (AMT).364 AMT included a broader group of organizations as well 
as ISNA. AMT endorsed Texas Governor George W. Bush rather than Vice President Al 
Gore in the 2000 presidential election despite strong overtures by the Democrats. For 
example, President Clinton had reached out to ISNA by sending video messages to the 
convention.365 In addition, the Democratic candidates' wives, Tipper Gore and Hadassah 
Lieberman, campaigned at the ISNA Annual Convention that year.366 Moreover, 
Representative David Bonier, a surrogate for Gore, had a close relationship with the 
Muslim community and was a regular speaker at ISNA's conventions. 
In contrast, the Bush campaign did not have a major or visible representation at 
the 2000 Annual Convention. The support for Governor Bush was based upon a belief of 
shared values. Many Muslim Americans identified with Republicans on social issues and 
fiscal conservatism. There was also deep concern about the Clinton administration's use 
of “secret evidence” laws to prosecute Muslims for issues related to terrorism. In the 
presidential debates, Governor Bush mentioned that he found these laws objectionable. 
Furthermore, Vice President Gore's running mate, Senator Joe Lieberman, was seen as a 
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strong supporter of Israel. Muslim Americans felt that American foreign policy already 
favored Israel and that adding Lieberman would make that policy even more one-sided. 
Governor Bush’s narrow victory over Vice President Gore was hailed as Muslim 
America’s first political success. According to a poll, sixty-nine percent of Muslim 
Americans indicated that the AMT endorsement was important in their decision-
making.367 Florida had a large Muslim American population, and in the tight election, 
that endorsement made a huge difference. 
AMT’s endorsement of Bush created a rift between the immigrant organizations 
and African-American Muslims. A third of the Muslim American population are African-
Americans, who tend to vote for Democratic candidates. African-American Muslims 
were concerned when they heard organizations like ISNA trumpeting, “Muslim 
Americans endorse Governor Bush.” After all, they were Muslim Americans as well and 
did not agree with that endorsement. This situation exemplifies how external legitimacy 
can hurt internal legitimacy. 
Interfaith outreach was also an important element of the organization's efforts 
during its second decade. Interfaith activities were already taking place within the 
Muslim community at the grassroots level.368 The Muslim Student Association and later 
ISNA’s vision of such relationships were within the framework of dawah.369 Dawah is 
the inviting of non-Muslims to Islam. Therefore, ISNA inherited a missionary perspective 
on interfaith relations. However, the grassroots Muslims had already moved past this 
                                                          
367 GhaneaBassiri, Kambiz A History of Islam in America (Cambridge University Press 2010) p. 348 
368 Smith, p 163 
369 Poston, Larry A., “Da’wa in the West” in The Muslims of America ed. Yvonne Haddad (Oxford 
University Press 1991) p. 131-133 
148 
 
vision of interfaith relationships. Although they continued missionary work, they also 
sought to educate their neighbors about Islam and Muslims. Syeed rejected the 
missionary vision of interfaith relationships as being too narrow and sought a broader 
definition of interfaith relationships. However, constrained by ISNA’s elected leaders and 
budgetary issues, he focused on developing interfaith relationships through local 
partnerships and through his relationships with national interfaith organizations. 
Again, this interfaith work helped ISNA achieve both internal and external 
legitimacy. Internally, grassroots Muslim Americans wanted ISNA to develop alliances 
that would create a strong defense against Islamophobia. Externally, ISNA sought to be 
the bridge to Muslim Americans.  
This interfaith program of cooperation benefitted from the fact that the ISNA's 
headquarters were based in Plainfield, Indiana, located near Indianapolis. If they were 
located in a larger city, ISNA would have to compete with many local Islamic centers. 
Because the headquarters' design included offices, a library, and a mosque, ISNA was 
able to take advantage of the unique local interfaith and academic communities. 
The ISNA Headquarters, as usual, received not only Muslim scholars from 
across the North America and overseas, but also several non-Muslim 
scholars, leaders and activities seeking Muslim contribution. Besides this 
the Headquarters routinely received student groups from area schools and 
colleges who sought an introduction to Islam and Islam in America.370 
 
The 1997 Annual Convention featured an interfaith luncheon.371 The local 
Chicago community, seeking to use the convention for its efforts, proposed and organized 
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the luncheon with the assistance of the ISNA staff at the convention. Syeed states that at 
these initial interfaith luncheons, some leaders misunderstood interfaith work and were so 
hostile toward it that the luncheons were invitation-only and were held in closed rooms, 
and were not even mentioned in the organization's publications or reports.372 
After the first few luncheons, the interfaith luncheon eventually became an 
important feature of the conventions and was eventually organized by the staff. This 
important organizational facet was mentioned in the 1997 Annual Report: 
In keeping with our commitment to introduce Islam to mainstream 
America to build bridges among religious communities, ISNA pursued a 
vigorous interfaith program. Such interfaith activities included the 
Midwest Islamic Catholic Dialogue held in collaboration with the Council 
of Catholic Bishops of America. . . . One such interfaith effort was the 
ISNA Secretary General’s address to the Faith in Action Seminar at 
Christian Theological Seminary and the Interfaith Alliance of Indianapolis 
dinner and program. . . . ISNA also hosted the meeting of the local chapter 
of National Association of Church Business Administrators.373  
 
Local relationships resulted in international invitations bolstering ISNA's quest 
for both internal and external legitimacy. In 2001, ISNA announced that the United States 
Conference on Catholic Bishops had formed a subcommittee on interreligious dialogue. It 
pointed to its annual hosting of the Midwest Muslim-Catholic Dialogue and meetings 
with leaders at the Vatican. 
ISNA has actively pursued a policy of seeking international recognition 
for Muslims as an effective American minority. Towards this end, ISNA 
has participated in events such as the Vatican Religious Assembly in 
Rome, the Parliament of World Religions in Cape Town, the White House 
Initiative on Race.374 
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ISNA sought a deeper connection with the academic world, from speaking at 
local conferences, to seeking institutions, to jointly hosting ISNA’s conferences. 
Our contact with academic institutions continue to grow — providing 
better representation of Islam and Muslims in academia. Such contacts 
have included events like the fall, 1998 Butler University Seminar on the 
teaching of the Qur’an, and addresses by ISNA’s President and Executives 
at various universities. Our contacts with academia led to the hosting of 
the Third Islam in America conference by Ohio State University. . . . Last 
year, the University of Indianapolis cooperated in the same conference and 
published its proceedings. One of the achievements of our program of 
cooperation with American academia is the ISNA Fellowship Program 
recently launched in collaboration with the Indiana University Center of 
Philanthropy.375 
 
This work became such an important focus that Syeed hired a Christian, Carey W. 
Craig, in 2000 and named him special assistant to the secretary general.376 Craig became 
Syeed’s chief of staff and coordinated the headquarters' operations, particularly interfaith 
and political outreach. Elevating a non-Muslim to such a high position resulted in great 
friction among certain members of the staff, local community, and national leadership. 
The increasing hostility resulted in Craig resigning from the organization on September 
10, 2001. Craig and Syeed remain close friends. Craig went on to serve Indiana 
Governors Frank O’Bannon and Joe Kernan. Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels retained 
Craig for both his terms as governor and, by 2012, had appointed him as the deputy 
director of the Governor’s Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. 
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Implications of Centralization — Institutional Stability and Hampering Diversity 
Centralization of power at ISNA's headquarters had both positive and negative 
consequences on the organization's quest for legitimacy. Financial stability created a 
period of growth for the organization. This stability also helped it to further its quest for 
cognitive legitimacy and to reach out to Muslim Americans who were not part of the 
three founding groups. However, this centralization hurt ISNA’s efforts to bridge 
diversity with HSAAMs, activists, and other African-American Muslims. 
The following chart illustrates the organization's financial stability and growth 
between 1993 and 2000. 
 
With the exception of 1995, ISNA never spent more than it was able to generate. 
The 1995 deficit was due a mandate from the majis that ten percent of donations from the 
United States and forty percent of donations from overseas were to be placed in an 
endowment fund. ISNA’s success as a religious nonprofit organization gave it greater 
legitimacy internally and set it up for external legitimacy. 
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The annual reports during this period reflect how each unit was meeting a matrix 
of success that emphasized financial sustainability. Every program during this period 
needed to be self-sufficient. Therefore, a program for training imams on domestic 
violence was expected to pay for itself. This was fine for a successful suburban mosque 
with adequate financial resources but was almost impossible for urban communities that 
struggled financially. This financial reality frustrated the organization's quest for diversity 
because the largest proportion of African-American mosques were located in urban 
centers.377 
To avoid the cost of holding the events at a hotel, many training programs took 
place at ISNA's headquarters and, therefore, in the Midwest. This location limited the 
number of participants from the East and West coasts, again frustrating ISNA's quest for 
geographic diversity. 
Furthermore, Syeed's quest for legitimacy through success of centralization may 
have hurt his goal to be a more diverse organization. He sought the affirmative action 
approach by ensuring that leaders from different groups (including HSAAMs and Warrith 
Deen Muhammad) were elected to the leadership. However, Syeed’s intention was to 
have diverse voices within the organization. He looked beyond the ISNA insiders who 
populated the ISNA majlis and executive council. Muslim American grassroots had 
produced effective leaders, and these leaders included people of both genders and of 
various ethnic origins. Syeed failed to create sustainable investments with the African-
American Muslim community beyond the affirmative action approach to help build upon 
work accomplished in the past. 
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From 1993 through 2001, no African-American Muslims were members of the 
senior staff. In fact, during this period, only one African-American was employed at 
ISNA's headquarters. In addition, ISNA recruited one member of the African-American 
Muslim community through the ISNA Fellowship program but was not able to retain him 
as an employee. 
However, ISNA sought to bridge this divide by strengthening its external 
relationships with groups such as the Shura Council of North America (SCNA). SCNA 
consisted of ISNA, ICNA (primarily South Asians affiliated with Jamaat-e-Islami of 
Pakistan and India), Imam Jamil Al-Amin (HSAAM), and Imam WD Muhammad. 
Including these different voices met ISNA's first prong to attaining diversity — that is, 
bringing together diverse voices and using the affirmative action approach in order to 
achieve social capital. However, ISNA did not invest sufficient resources to achieve the 
second prong — that is, it did not develop programs needed to build upon the affirmative 
action approach. 
Syeed also offered scholarships to schools affiliated with Imam Muhammad and 
the Nation of Islam for the Education Forum. Again, this was an attempt to bridge social 
capital by bringing these groups into the same event with fellow Muslim American 
educators. From 2000 through 2001, nearly fifty educators from these two groups 
attended the Education Forum. After attending a few forums, they thanked ISNA for its 
hospitality but stated that the issues being discussed did not relate to the concerns that 
they faced in their schools. No one from ISNA followed up to determine what issues 
would have made these events more inclusive, which illustrates its failure to go beyond 
the affirmative action approach in sustaining diversity. 
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ISNA also sought to elect African-American Muslim leaders to its Majlis Ash-
Shura. Siraj Wahhaj, an African-American imam from New York and popular speaker at 
the ISNA Conventions, was elected vice president of ISNA for two terms. Imam WD 
Muhammad was elected to serve on the Majlis Ash-Shura of ISNA. More importantly, 
when reviewing the names of ISNA’s Majlis Ash-Shura, we can see that only two people 
shared a common ethnicity. Such elections, although important, again reflect only an 
affirmative action approach. 
ISNA also sought to include African-American Muslims in its programs. It was 
agreed that leaders from ISNA would speak at the Imam Muhammad Convention, and 
vice versa. Representatives of Imam Muhammad were appointed to the ISNA Convention 
Program Committee but never attended those meetings.378 
Discussions with Imam WD Muhammad pointed to the fact that, although he was 
a spiritual leader, he did not have a formal organization. However, he sought ISNA’s 
assistance in establishing a formal institution, and Ahmed Elhattab was appointed as an 
advisor to Imam WD Muhammad. In 2001, they travelled together to the Middle East 
hoping to leverage ISNA’s contacts to raise funds for WD Muhammad’s organization. 
The trip was deemed successful with various pledges made to further Imam WD 
Muhammad; however, none of the pledges were ever fulfilled. It is unlikely that anyone 
from ISNA followed up after September 11, 2001, to explain the situation to Imam W D 
Muhammad. This event further cemented the narrative among some African-American 
Muslims that immigrants sought to use them to further their own goals. 
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Another important overture was to reach out to Farrakhan and the Nation of 
Islam. Many within ISNA considered believers of the Nation of Islam to be heretical and 
non-Muslims. By the late 1990s, Farrakhan started making overtures to ISNA. He hired a 
Sunni Imam, Shaikh Tijani, as an advisor. Ahmed ElHattab was assigned to serve as 
liaison between Farrakhan and ISNA.379 Farrakhan then announced that the Nation of 
Islam would fast during the month of Ramadan rather than during December. Finally, 
severely ill, he reached out to ISNA to share that he had converted to sunni Islam but 
needed the organization's help to ensure that his community would make the transition.380 
On February 27, 2000, Farrakhan announced that his conversion and that the Nation of 
Islam’s formal acceptance that there was only one God and that Muhammad was his final 
messenger.381 Despite these conversations at the level of leadership, however, no 
programs were developed to take this engagement to the next step. 
Ample evidence shows that from 1993 to 2001, ISNA leaders sought to engage 
with diverse groups of Muslim Americans. Muslim Americans have sought greater unity 
within the community. However, it is clear that by the end of 2001, the divisions had not 
been healed. In fact, the AMT endorsement, ISNA’s failure to complete the pledges to 
Imam W. D. Muhammad’s initiatives, and not having leaders like Bagby as part of the 
staff leadership at ISNA's headquarter hurt those efforts. Bagby is critical of Syeed’s 
inability or unwillingness to effectively engage with this issue.382 Much of the control 
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during this period was at the staff level. Not having more diverse voices at that level hurt 
ISNA’s efforts to connect with the diversity within the Muslim American community. A 
common complaint was that too many conversations at ISNA's headquarters were in 
Urdu, thereby excluding non-Urdu speakers.383 ISNA was successful in recruiting and 
engaging more grassroots leaders who enhanced gender- and age-based identities. ISNA 
was also successful in providing the organization with new voices that articulated a more 
cultural pluralist perspective. However, ISNA failed to build upon relationships with the 
two founding groups (HSAAM and activists) that had left the organization or African-
American Muslims in general. 
Conclusion 
The branding of ISNA was of vital importance during this period. However, this 
branding was broader than just organizational identity. The organization sought to help 
frame an American-Muslim identity. As we have already seen, the community had a 
divided political identity. Islamic Horizons sought to broadly define Muslim identity 
during this period. A broad analysis of the magazine suggests that ISNA and Islamic 
Horizons saw an identity that married various points of views. Islamic Horizons 
published articles against gay marriage and President Clinton’s policy in favor of gays in 
the military. ISNA sought out and hosted the annual convention of the Prohibitionist 
Party to support the prohibition of alcohol. Islamic Horizons largely spoke favorably of 
the Contract with America and was critical of the nation's inability to live within its 
means. ISNA also argued against a policy that would result in lowering taxes. It was in 
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favor of anti-tobacco and anti-gun measures. It also endorsed nuclear disarmament and 
was cautiously supportive of school prayer, charter schools, and school voucher 
programs. It opposed secret-evidence prosecutions but supported affirmative action, civil 
rights, and hate crime legislation. ISNA and Islamic Horizons sought to highlight a 
Muslim American community that was engaged with issues at the heart of the American 
political debate. They fought against the stereotype that Muslim Americans were 
concerned with only American foreign policy. By the end of 2001, ISNA had established 
its brand as an influential Muslim American organization. It was financially stable and 
viable. It had developed relationships with interfaith organizations and political leaders. 
In its first decade, ISNA failed to take advantage of revival of Islamic activism in 
the aftermath of the Iranian revolution. The second decade was marked by hard work and 
choices that helped build a stable and viable institution. In September 2001, ISNA elected 
the organization's first female vice president. Dr. Ingrid Mattson was a Canadian born 
convert and a scholar of Islam. Mattson's election signified a clear challenge to 
Islamaphobic stereotypes. 
By the time of Mattson's election, ISNA had achieved internal and external 
cognitive legitimacy. It was perceived as the leading and most influential Muslim 
American organization in the United States. By centralizing power at the ISNA 
headquarters, it was better able to deliver programs and create financial stability. 
Furthermore, it had partially succeeded in its quest for diversity by broadening its base 
from the three founding groups, which it did by engaging with more women, with 
grassroots leaders, and with young second-generation Muslim Americans who would 
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bring about internal change. However, ISNA failed to build upon and sustain 
relationships with the African-American Muslim community. 
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Chapter Four — Navigating Islamophobia through Legitimacy, Diversity, and 
Decentralization (2001–2008) 
September 11, 2001, marked a new era in American history. On the morning of 
that day, terrorists hijacked four airplanes, and while Americans watched in horror, the 
terrorists crashed two of the planes into the Twin Towers in New York City. A third 
plane crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a fourth plane, en route to 
Washington, D.C., was forced down when passengers tried to overtake the plane. More 
than three thousand people were killed that day, including people on the planes and in the 
buildings that were hit. 
At the time of these attacks, ISNA's outgoing president, Muzammil Siddiqi, was 
in Washington, D.C., with leaders of various Muslim American organizations.384 As part 
of the American Muslims Political Coordinating Council (AMPCC), they were in 
Washington to meet with the George W. Bush administration to raise concerns about the 
government's increasing hostility toward Islam and Muslims. Major Muslim American 
organizations had endorsed President Bush in his close election with Vice President Al 
Gore and polls suggested that their vote had made a difference in states like Florida 
where the results had been close.385 They felt that President Bush “owed them” for his 
victory and were seeking reaffirmation of assurances and promises made during the Bush 
campaign about his support on Muslim American issues. However, because of the 
terrorist attacks, this meeting never took place.  
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There was little immediate information about the terrorists on the morning of the 
attacks. However, ISNA quickly worked with fellow Muslim American organizations and 
released a statement.386 Within hours, national Muslim American leaders organized a 
united press release condemning the attacks and requesting quick apprehension of the 
perpetrators, while also urging restraint on the part of the media until the hijackers could 
be identified.387 
The national organizations' ability to coordinate such a united and timely press 
release and public statement condemning terrorism was a remarkable achievement and 
speaks to the partnerships and collaborations that were initiated by ISNA. ISNA’s search 
for representative status had moved in a new direction in the last decade. Unity would be 
attained through collaborative relationships. Just as striking was the willingness of these 
organizations to be listed in alphabetical order in the press release. Perhaps the call for 
unity was too urgent to negotiate the order of the listings. This unity was not 
unprecedented in the Muslim American community. Previous partnerships included the 
Bosnian crisis and the Gulf War. However, these previous incidents of unity were over 
foreign policy, not instances within the United States. 
ISNA’s statement read as follows: “ISNA condemns these senseless acts of 
terrorism against innocent civilians, which will only be counterproductive to any agenda 
the perpetrators may have had in mind. No political cause could ever be assisted by such 
immoral acts.” 
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This simple statement was very different from the one after the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, because the two statements reflected different times and different 
leaders. In 1993 under the leadership of an activist leader, ISNA published a cover story 
alleging that those attacks were entrapment by the United States government. By 2001 
cultural pluralists had prevailed over activists and set the right public tone during the 
initial hours after the terrorist attacks. 
A new narrative and focus took priority, as shown in Kambiz GhaneaBassiri's 
following argument: 
[N]ational Muslim organizations, which were predominantly led by 
Islamist activists, began to function less as intermediaries between the 
United States and Muslim causes abroad and more as intermediaries 
between American Muslims and their local and national governments and 
the media. Put differently, they went from being Islamist activists in 
America to being American Muslim activists.388 
 
For the time being, ISNA’s mainstreamed cultural pluralist identity and narrative 
ruled. As I argue in previous chapters, activists had largely left ISNA, and cultural 
pluralists had succeeded as the leaders prior to September, 11, 2001. GhaneaBassiri’s 
term "activist" encompasses both these groups, whereas I use the term "activist" in a 
more limited manner. I would amend GhaneaBassiri and suggest that the activists who 
remained no longer challenged the transformation to a cultural pluralist identity. As 
GhaneaBassiri himself points out, “Islamic Horizons . . . had begun ‘to envision itself as 
a vehicle of Americanization. Even as it warned its readers against succumbing to ‘anti-
Islamic’ Western influences, Islamic Horizons encouraged themselves as full-fledged 
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Americans, and to invest, both on a personal and a political level, in their adopted 
country.”389 
Leaders of Muslim American organizations understood their pivotal role in 
helping their constituents weather the onslaught of Islamophobia that accompanies tragic 
events, such as those in 1993 and 2001. The events of September 11, 2001, resulted in a 
new paradigm for Muslim Americans and their institutions. As GhaneaBassiri states, “. . . 
9/11 tested the mettle of American Muslim institutions at both the local and national 
level. These institutions played a fundamental role in helping American Muslims weather 
the backlash of 9/11.”390 
The importance of a Muslim American Billy Graham was no longer a 
hypothetical question. Like the rest of the nation, Muslim Americans were afraid. Their 
fear was not from foreign terrorists but from the backlash of the American population. 
Fear brought about greater unity and silenced narratives that were seen as inflammatory. 
This unity and silencing of opposing narratives gave ISNA an opportunity to sustain its 
mainstreamed cultural pluralist identity. The terrorist attacks refocused ISNA’s efforts on 
combating an anti-Muslim and Islamophobic narrative.391 The public image of Islam and 
Muslim Americans became ISNA’s central priority, eclipsing all other initiatives, as 
shown in Syeed's statement to the membership: 
Although we often hear how Muslims in North America are living in a 
momentous era, at a crossroads in the history of Islam, the past year has 
only clarified and amplified the reality that the future of Islam both in this 
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continent and around the world is intimately tied to the success Muslims in 
North America have in promoting a moderate and positive understanding 
of Islam.392 (emphasis added) 
 
Syeed was clarifying that this was not a new direction. Cultural pluralists had 
been a part of ISNA for a long time. However, going forward, they were clearly the voice 
of the organization. He was also warning activists that their international goals would 
only succeed if a cultural pluralist Muslim American vision of Islam in America 
succeeded. 
This period of ISNA’s history was framed by three major themes. First, ISNA had 
achieved cognitive legitimacy both internally and externally prior to 2001. Cognitive 
legitimacy is the strongest form of legitimacy and is attained when an institution is seen 
as part of the fabric of society. An organization that attains cognitive legitimacy does not 
exist because it provides a specific benefit (pragmatic legitimacy) or espouses an 
accepted value (moral legitimacy); instead, it exists because it is considered an inevitable 
institution. ISNA had passed those tests by hosting the largest gathering of Muslim 
Americans, publishing the largest Muslim American magazine, and creating collaborative 
relationships in the interfaith world. Its cognitive legitimacy was reinforced by Muslim 
Americans' fear of Islamophobia and by its push for a moderate Islamic identity. 
Therefore, its cognitive legitimacy was reinforced by pragmatic legitimacy (fear of 
Islamophobia) and moral legitimacy (moderate Islamic identity). 
ISNA had established an American-Muslim identity that could serve as a Muslim 
American Billy Graham. This identity was strengthened through pragmatic and moral 
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legitimacy. This identity could embrace government while disagreeing with it. ISNA 
used this legitimacy to create alliances, fight Islamophobia, and help raise the Muslim 
American community's voice on policy. ISNA used its cognitive legitimacy to steer 
Muslim Americans away from a compassionate conservative agenda to a civil rights-
based, social justice agenda. Muslim American identity would place a stronger emphasis 
on social justice as a core principle. Social justice had long been important to Muslim 
Americans. However, it also was important to display this value publicly. This 
established cognitive legitimacy is the proper context in which to understand the other 
two themes of this period. 
Second, because of the high-stakes events on September 11, 2001, the 
organization’s past success as a nonprofit had established an important Muslim American 
institution — something worth being a part of and fighting for. Paradoxically, this reality, 
coupled with the leaderships’ continued distrust of a powerful chief executive resulted in 
power being removed from the secretary general and being dispersed among the majlis 
and the executive council. This dispersal of power created dysfunction and impeded 
innovation. Finally, ISNA’s quest for diversity continued to rely on an affirmative-action 
approach with African-Americans, but its primary concerns regarding diversity shifted to 
gender- and youth-based issues. This realignment was due to its recognition of gender 
rather than racism as being part of the Islamophobic narrative. In addition, American-
born children of immigrants would be more effective in fighting against an Islamophobic 
narrative that argued Islam was “foreign” to America. The Second Gulf War and 
sectarian violence also required ISNA to focus on the Sunni-Shiite divide. 
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This chapter is divided into four sections. First, the driving national issues of this 
period were the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the Global War 
on Terrorism and the Islamophobia that followed those attacks. These events made the 
relationship between the American government and ISNA a complicated and necessity-
driven one. 
Second, ISNA’s cognitive legitimacy was reinforced by moral and pragmatic 
legitimacy because of the post-September 2001 Islamophobia. This legitimacy was 
initially gained through effective programs and fiscal responsibility resulting from 
centralized leadership at the staff level. In the past, factions had little reason to fight over 
a declining ISNA. However, ISNA’s attainment of cognitive legitimacy and its programs 
and direction now gave people a reason to reengage, which created both obstacles and 
opportunities for the organization. 
Third, the reassertion of board control dispersed power within ISNA. ISNA’s 
leaders, like many fellow Americans, have long been suspicious of a centralized and 
powerful chief executive. However, not having an empowered chief executive can be 
troublesome for nonprofits, and this was the case for ISNA as it faced the consequences 
of reframing the roles of the secretary general and the various factions within its board. 
Finally, Islamophobia also framed ISNA’s quest for diversity. The need for unity 
allowed ISNA to use the affirmative-action approach with HSAAMs and activists. 
However, the organization's need for a new public image and a new generation of 
spokespersons resulted in a greater emphasis on women and second-generation 
immigrants. After all, Islamophobia was pushing the message that Muslim Americans 
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were misogynists, and foreign and the quest for diversity was influenced by this 
narrative. 
Setting the Stage 
This period is marked by a number of important events. The period begins with 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and ends with the 2008 election of Barack 
Husain Obama as the first African-American president. Punctuating these events were the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the Global War on Terrorism, and a sustained Islamophobia. 
Muslim American institutions were forced to realize that a mainstreamed identity was no 
longer a luxury. Rather, it had become a necessity to navigate a post-September 2001 
America. 
Immediately after the attacks of 9/11/2001, President Bush went to a mosque in 
Washington, D.C., and sought to differentiate between Muslim Americans, Islam, and the 
terrorists.393 ISNA’s immediate past-president, Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi, was invited to the 
White House Prayer at the National Cathedral to mourn the deaths of innocent 
civilians.394 These were the administration's attempts to respond to the unprecedented 
attacks. Also, possibly recalling the internment of Japanese Americans during World War 
II, the government may have wanted to avoid repeating this kind of fear-based history.  
The administration and interfaith organizations realized the necessity of building a 
relationship with Muslim Americans and their organizations,395 and participants in the 
African-American Civil Rights Movement embraced the fight against Islamophobia. This 
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outreach is a broad testament to an American identity of pluralistic inclusion. Attacks 
upon Muslim Americans were perceived by many Civil Rights leaders as attacks on 
American identity.  
Despite this outreach to Muslim Americans by the US Government, interfaith 
organizations and civil rights organizations, the instances of prejudice, Islamophobia, and 
hate crimes continued to rise. It became politically expedient by some politicians to 
attack Muslim American organizations as extremists.396 Polling showed that many 
Americans viewed Muslims and Islam negatively. This tension between prejudice and 
acceptance of pluralism was not uniquely focused on Muslim Americans. It simply 
incorporated Muslim Americans into a deeper narrative of race relations and prejudice in 
America. 
Striving for greater unity and trying to shun discord during this period, ISNA 
signed an agreement between Shia and Sunnis in America.397 ISNA also met with newly 
elected Pope Benedict XVI and in 2007 became a signatory to "A Common Word 
Between Us and You."398 More than three hundred Christian scholars and organizations 
and one hundred and thirty-eight Muslim scholars and organizations signed this 
document in an effort to create better relationships between the two faiths. The crowning 
achievement of ISNA during this period was the "Shoulder to Shoulder Campaign."399 
This campaign brought interfaith groups together to defend Muslim Americans. The 
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campaign, funded by the Open Society Institute, was in response to the controversy of the 
proposed building of an Islamic cultural and recreation center near Ground Zero. 
Fear Strengthening Institutional Legitimacy 
In chapter three, I noted that ISNA had attained cognitive legitimacy through the 
effective implementation of power. Its annual convention was labeled as the largest 
gathering of Muslim Americans. Tipper Gore and Hadassah Lieberman (wives of the 
Democratic candidates for president and vice president, respectively) and Muslim 
American emissaries of the Bush Republican campaign visited its 2000 event. As scholar 
John Esposito noted in a promotional video about the event, “ISNA has arrived!”400 In 
addition, ISNA's publication, Islamic Horizons, was the most circulated Muslim 
American publication. ISNA’s legitimacy was strengthened by the stability that resulted 
from fiscal responsibility because an organization that is perceived as viable and stable is 
more likely to attain cognitive legitimacy.401 
This legitimacy and stability presented both opportunities and challenges for the 
organization. Being perceived as the most influential and largest Muslim American 
organization raised ISNA to the status of being the representative force of Muslim 
Americans in the eyes of government and interfaith partners. Even those who understood 
the complicated and diverse Muslim American landscape wanted an organization of 
ISNA’s stature at the table. After all, could a group of Muslim Americans be truly 
representative if the largest Muslim American organization — in terms of its convention, 
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magazine circulation, membership, and affiliated organizations — was missing from the 
coalition? 
Another important element in ISNA's legitimacy was the extent of its interfaith 
outreach over the past decade. Such external legitimacy helped ISNA respond to the 
Muslim American community's fear of Islamophobia. In 2002, the newly elected ISNA 
president, Shaikh Muhammad Nur Abdullah, explained the importance of this work: 
The tragedy [of 9/11] revealed who we really were inside. Those who 
were good drew upon that good to help others, while others exploited the 
event for their own selfish reasons. One example of this outpouring of 
goodwill and sympathy was the almost immediate arrival of people 
visiting our headquarters in Plainfield, IN and bearing bouquets to express 
their support and solidarity with ISNA and Muslim Americans.402 
 
This local reaction was a far cry from the Committee of Concerned Citizens of 
Hendricks County. But more broadly, this decade of work ensured that the organization 
was ready for a new phase in organizational and American history. 
Since September 11, the epoch making interfaith outreach ISNA has done 
for years has come to fruition. Today, ISNA has an established reputation 
as a Muslim organization dedicated to promoting interfaith understanding 
has been widely recognized and appreciated. The Secretary General was 
given a lifetime achievement award at the Kentucky festival of faiths for 
promoting interfaith understanding.403 
 
On January 15, 2002, Syeed was invited to attend Indiana Governor Frank 
O’Bannon’s State of the State address and was honored by the governor, who noted, 
“Your [ISNA and Syeed] work to educate Americans about the Muslim faith in the wake 
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of the September 11 terror attacks, along with your life’s work to encourage tolerance 
and racial healing has marked you as a great leader in Indiana.”404 
Interfaith outreach became the primary activity for ISNA because of its internal 
and external legitimacy. No longer was this interfaith effort secondary in the work at the 
ISNA headquarters; therefore, a recognized national leader within the interfaith 
community was needed to take on the program. 
Considering the importance that ISNA and Muslim Americans attached to 
interfaith engagement, the ISNA Secretary General Dr. Sayyid 
Muhammad Syeed relinquished his position as Secretary General to serve 
as the first National Director of the IOICA [ISNA National Office of 
Interfaith and Community Alliances]. As National Director . . . Syeed will 
build on the relationships ISNA has already developed with diverse 
interfaith, religious and social service organizations to engage American 
Muslim communities in addressing the spiritual and ethical challenges of 
the twenty-first century. . . . Syeed . . . has been actively involved in 
fostering understanding among the world’s religions and has developed 
significant interfaith alliances at different levels in the US, Canada and 
internationally.405 (emphasis added) 
 
ISNA’s leaders were embracing Syeed’s efforts in the interfaith arena. No one 
questioned that Syeed had the credentials to articulate the importance of this office to the 
organization. However, the preceding quotations also highlight the leaders' attempts to 
mask an underlying reality that this change also indicated the organization's inability to 
deal with the internal and external power bases as I explain in the next section. ISNA’s 
greatest programmatic success during this period was the establishment of an office in 
Washington, D.C., as stated here: 
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ISNA has decided to establish an Office of Interfaith and Community 
Alliances (IOICA) in the nations capital. Interfaith activity has been the 
cornerstone of ISNA activities, and has been wholeheartedly endorsed by 
ISNA affiliates and other Islamic organizations across the US and Canada. 
The . . . office . . . is in response to the emerging realities and new 
opportunities for ISNA to build greater strength in fulfilling its mission. 
The IOICA will further work to increase good relations and understanding 
between Muslim Americans and their government agencies and 
Congressional representatives.406 (emphasis added) 
 
This was a powerful statement bearing on a number of important realities in the 
new ISNA. First, it was a declaration that the leadership affirmed Syeed’s vision of being 
a Muslim Billy Graham. To foster good relationships between Muslim Americans and the 
government was an important aspect of that vision. Second, the statement highlights 
emerging realities and opportunities. It is important to note that this statement came 
during the Bush administration at the height of the War on Terrorism. Muslim Americans 
did not view President Bush in a positive light. However, the statement is an 
acknowledgement of the administration's willingness to partner and dialogue with 
Muslim American organizations. President Bush received little credit for his personal 
attempts to engage with Muslim Americans despite his initial visit to a mosque after 
September 11, 2001, his invitation to ISNA's president to the National Prayer after 
September 11, and the sustained interactions between the administration and the ISNA 
office in Washington, D.C.407 
The organization was also acknowledging Syeed’s past interfaith activities. Prior 
to this, activities like the interfaith banquet had not even shown up on the annual 
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convention programs, but were now seen as part of an important long-term narrative. The 
realities created by the September 11 attacks made it imperative to acknowledge and own 
activities that Syeed had pursued without board approval. A post-September 11 reality 
helped embed the interfaith outreach program in the organization. The new reality 
allowed him to use discipline, influence, and domination and to embed them into the 
organization's past narrative and current priorities. As I previously noted, discipline in the 
form of power helps organizations form new ideas, influence helps organizations 
translate those ideas into programs, and domination helps organizations institutionalize 
programs quickly into their operations.408 This use of power represents a balanced 
approach that applies the various forms of power in a way that makes both staff and 
board leadership willing to accept the final outcome and that ensures the long-term 
continuity of the program. 
The Washington, D.C., office during this period sustained and furthered ISNA’s 
internal and external legitimacy through its connections with major interfaith 
organizations. This was especially evident when President-elect Obama was attacked for 
inviting Dr. Mattson to the National Prayer Breakfast prior to his inauguration in 2009.409 
At that time, a broad coalition of organizations (including Common Cause, the National 
Council of Churches, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Union for Reformed 
Judaism, the Interfaith Alliance, American Baptist Churches, the Arab American 
Institute, the Hartford Seminary, the Georgetown University faculty, and the Foundation 
                                                          
408 Dover, Graham and Thomas B. Lawrence, “The Role of Power in Nonprofit Innovation” Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly (41(6) 2012) p. 993 
409 ISNA Annual Report (2008) p. 13 
173 
 
of Ethnic Understanding) stood up to defend ISNA and urged President-elect Obama to 
continue to dialogue with ISNA.410 
Through the Washington, D.C., office, Dr. Mattson, Vice President Imam Magid 
and Dr. Syeed aggressively reached out to media and interfaith institutions to push for an 
accurate portrayal of Islam and Muslims. During this period, ISNA remained consistent 
in its condemnation of terrorism and helped cosponsor a fatwa against terrorism by the 
Fiqh Council of North America.411 ISNA swiftly responded to acts of terrorism in the 
United Kingdom and other parts of the world. At the same time, it continued to speak out 
against torture, civil liberty violations, and Guantanamo Bay. ISNA was especially 
fortunate to have a spokesperson like Dr. Ingrid Mattson to articulate clearly its moderate 
view points. As a scholar of Islam, a trainer of Imams, and a Muslim convert, she was 
able to engage the national media and interfaith organizations with great credibility. 
Despite its challenges, ISNA’s work for the Muslim American community did not 
diminish during this time. Many of the projects developed after 1994 continued, but 
ISNA’s most urgent focus was on reaching out to its interfaith partners and developing 
partnerships with government and law enforcement entities. ISNA worked with the 
political left on social justice issues, such as opposition to nuclear proliferation and 
torture and matters that affected uninsured and homeless populations; it joined the 
political right on social issues such as marriage, alcohol, and tobacco. 
ISNA leaders' efforts to sustain its legitimacy created significant changes in its 
programs. For example, fear of Islamophobia led it to discontinue its Group Tax 
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Exemption program. ISNA, although not a national denomination, was able to offer its 
group tax exemptions under the IRS code 501(c)(3) without applying to the Internal 
Revenue Service. In doing so, it had offered more than three hundred Islamic centers and 
schools group tax exemptions. However, after September 11, fear arose that ISNA might 
be held accountable for an affiliated organization's possible misconduct, especially after 
the 2002 raids of Islamic charities in Virginia. These affiliated organizations were largely 
independent, and ISNA had little supervision over them. ISNA announced this change to 
the membership: 
Due to recent events, the ISNA Executive Council as well as many 
affiliated communities agreed to discontinue with the IRS Group Tax 
Exemption Program for affiliates. ISNA is assisting communities to apply 
for and receive their own 501(c)(3) tax exemption status from the Internal 
Revenue Service. The affiliation program will continue to create a link 
between ISNA and the communities.412 
 
The IRS tax exemption program was the core element of the ISNA affiliations' 
program. As noted in chapter two, the Muslim Communities Association (MCA) had 
failed to continue and therefore deprived ISNA of a valuable link with the grassroots 
Muslim American community. The IRS group tax exemptions were the remaining formal 
link between ISNA and the grassroots communities, so by discontinuing this program, 
another formal link was severed. 
Only one formal link remained between ISNA and these affiliated organizations. 
That is, many of these communities had placed their congregational properties (Islamic 
centers, schools, and similar real estate) in trust with ISNA’s constituent organization, the 
North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). These communities saw NAIT as an arm of 
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ISNA. In fact, the perceived close relationship between ISNA and NAIT was the reason 
many of these communities had placed their properties in trust with NAIT in the first 
place. However, by this time, though ISNA and NAIT were tied together constitutionally, 
they had drifted apart. Local congregations did not know of this rift and left their by-laws 
(which stated that they were affiliated with ISNA) unchanged.  
However, the discontinuation of the group exemption resulted in a less focused 
affiliations program. Moreover, group tax exemptions had required ISNA and its 
affiliates to maintain communication throughout the year, so without this legal necessity, 
less urgency was placed on these relationships. Despite the importance of this program to 
ISNA’s leaders' strategic plan, it was because ISNA’s leaders sought to protect ISNA’s 
external legitimacy that they sought to make this change. They believed that ISNA’s 
legitimacy from hosting successful events and publish a successful magazine would 
sustain the relationship with the affiliated organizations. 
ISNA’s legitimacy was important when responding to challenges to the Muslim 
community. When Muslim American charities were raided in March 2002, ISNA worked 
with the organization, Independent Sector, and Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill to call for 
greater transparency among charities as well as government. This outreach resulted in 
Assistant Secretary of Treasury Juan Zarate attending the 2002 Annual Convention and 
regional conferences.413 ISNA worked with the Treasury Department to obtain a “best 
practices for charities” document and organized a community response to the document. 
ISNA responded to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee’s investigation on Muslim 
charities, including ISNA, by hiring Foley and Lardner, a national legal and public 
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relations firm to advocate on its behalf. The committee later concluded, privately, that it 
had found no wrongdoing by ISNA.414 
ISNA’s internal and external legitimacy was important for Muslim Americans in 
the aftermath of September 11 because it could immediately provide a credible, moderate 
national voice for the Muslim community. Also, ISNA’s legitimacy formalized its 
commitment to being the Muslim American Billy Graham. In chapter three, we saw how 
there was little reason for factions to fight over the organization's identity or direction 
because of the organization's decline. However, since that time, institutional stability, 
financial solvency, and cognitive legitimacy had created new reason for the 
organizational factions to reappear. 
 
Role Reversal and Power Shift 
Research suggests that executive directors are responsible for the critical events in 
their organizations and hold a place of “psychological centrality.”415 Boards traditionally 
play a governance role, whereas the chief executive implements the organization's vision. 
Boards have four primary functions: to determine a vision, to hire a chief executive, to 
raise funds, and to provide fiduciary oversight (including budgeting).416 The chief 
executive officer's role is to implement the vision by hiring staff and developing 
programs. 
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Within ISNA, the secretary general had performed the role of chief executive 
officer. However, the realignment in power within ISNA resulted in the following 
changes. First, the board leadership took an active role in articulating the organization's 
mission, similar to the way boards for other nonprofit organizations function. Second, 
Syeed was asked to step down from the position of secretary general to serve in the 
Washington, D.C. office to further interfaith relationships, after which the secretary 
general's role was redefined. However, as we will see, the change created greater 
instability, which made it difficult for the organization to retain a permanent secretary 
general. This instability is best illustrated through the failure of an important new 
program, the ISNA Leadership Development Center, and a return to budget deficits. 
Sheikh Muhammad Nur Abdullah, former president of ISNA, notes that the key 
people in power at this stage were the two ISNA vice presidents: Dr. Ingrid Mattson and 
Dr. Syed Imtiaz Ahmad.417 Ahmad was a former president who succeeded Ahmad Zaki 
Hammad. Both sought stronger roles for the board and committees and a return to the 
organization's collaborative values.418 They pushed for a decentralized and open 
decision-making process that incorporated the majlis. Although these were important 
values, they created a vacuum in leadership at the staff level. 
The internal and external legitimacy spurred the need for greater soul-searching 
and a formal redefining of the organization. Over the past decade, this had been done by 
the secretary general. However, the organization's leadership sought to reassert a formal 
strategic planning process that would guide the direction of the organization's programs, 
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which was in keeping with the practices of most nonprofit boards. The fact that the board 
sought this role is not remarkable in and of itself. Instead, the remarkable thing is that 
such a role in strategic planning was absent for more than a decade. 
In 2003, after surveying more than one hundred ISNA leaders and donors, ISNA’s 
leaders convened a Strategic Planning Committee meeting of more than sixty Muslim 
American leaders in Kansas City.419 The results were a new mission statement and six 
priorities for the next decade. “ISNA is an association of Muslim organizations and 
individuals that provides a common platform for presenting Islam, supporting Muslim 
communities, developing educational, social and outreach programs and fostering good 
relations with other religious communities, and civic and services organizations.” ISNA’s 
new role was to be a visionary leader for Muslim Americans rather than a provider of 
direct services. It would supply tools and knowledge for grassroots organizations that 
would then provide direct services. It was now a collaborative organization rather than a 
representative organization. Its six new strategic priorities were as follows:420 
• Imam Training and Leadership Development 
• Youth Involvement 
• A Sound Financial Base 
• The Public Image of Islam 
• Interfaith and Coalition Building 
• Community Development 
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ISNA’s new vision statement was “To be an exemplary and unifying Islamic 
organization in North America that contributes to the betterment of the Muslim 
community and society at large.”421 It remained faithful to its Islamic identity rather than 
to a Muslim identity. The organization's leaders sought to define it in terms of Islamic 
theology rather than Muslim American practice. A "Muslim" organization would have 
signified an association of Muslim Americans unified under a specific message. 
However, an “Islamic” organization held a similar status to an archdiocese or other 
similar national religious organizations. Despite this being an important goal, as we have 
seen, Islamophobia and the need to sustain its legitimacy trumped the organization's 
strategic objectives when ISNA discontinued its Group Tax Exemption program. 
Like the two other founding groups, cultural pluralists consisted of religiously 
pious individuals. Despite their focus on social justice and their interactions within the 
interfaith community, they refused to abandon the conviction that ISNA’s fundamental 
role was to reconcile faith and practice in the United States. Therefore, despite its ability 
to influence public policy and fight Islamophobia, ISNA's top two strategies were to 
influence its religious congregations and the new generation of Muslim American youth. 
ISNA’s leaders were unwilling to diminish ISNA’s role to simply being a public policy 
or civil rights organization like the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) or the 
Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR), although it engaged in these activities 
because of religious convictions, moral leadership and the desire of the Muslim American 
community for it to be engaged in these areas. 
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In addition, the organization’s leaders sought to exert greater control over its 
operations by the board. Syeed had been a successful and powerful secretary general, but 
he did not always agree with the board's decisions, and as the person running the office, 
he could slow down things that, in his opinion, were not beneficial to the organization. 
Historically, ISNA’s leaders distrusted strong chief executives.422 This distrust 
was based primarily on two factors: the dysfunction in the Muslim world caused by 
strong dictatorial rulers and the impact of Ahmad Zaki Hammad's leadership style on the 
organization when he was president. However, distrust of a powerful, centralized chief 
executive is not unique to Muslim Americans, and in fact, this distrust has helped frame 
American political discourse. 
The board’s disagreements with Syeed were due to both this distrust and his 
perceived administrative and strategic weakness.423 In their interviews, Bagby, Fareed 
and Unus were critical of Syeed’s management style. 
Moreover, Syeed’s centralization of power had removed many of ISNA's elected 
leaders from its inner workings. Several of his successful programs and innovations were 
the result of his entrepreneurial ability to make key decisions at the staff level. His 
implementation of the annual conventions and Islamic Horizons owed its success to this 
centralization. Although excluding ISNA's leaders at this level made it easier for Syeed to 
make critical decisions, by doing so, he failed to help them understand the reasons for the 
programs' success. That is, they thought success came because of the organization's 
mission and values rather than from successful project management. It was only a matter 
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of time before the leaders would seek to re-exert their influence. As Machiavelli states, 
“For he who innovates will have enemies of all those who are well off under the old order 
of things, and only lukewarm supporters in those who might be better off under the 
new.”424 
The ISNA’s leaders suspicion of a centralized and powerful chief executive 
coupled with their lack of understanding for the reasons behind the organization's success 
led them to the conclusion that power needs to reside at the board level rather than with 
the secretary general. Iqbal Unus states that the leaders believed that leaving power in the 
hands of one person can have troublesome implications, especially in regard to hiring 
staff.425 Syeed’s perceived administrative weakness gave the leaders an excuse to take 
power away from him. A few administrative and strategic mistakes furthered this 
perspective. 
One of his mistakes was not effectively responding to a female employee's charge 
of sexual harassment by another employee. Although an internal investigation by the 
majlis and a later investigation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) showed no wrongdoing, the majlis criticized Syeed's handling of the incident 
and held him responsible in a public document.426 Another strategic mistake was ISNA 
joining the Alliance for Marriage in its opposition to gay marriage. Muslim Americans 
are largely conservative and Syeed sought relationships with social conservatives. After 
9/11/2001, gay activists opposed to the Alliance for Marriage tried to discredit the 
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organization by pointing out that a “terrorist” supporting organization like ISNA was 
represented on the board. The use of Islamophobia was a helpful tool in forcing ISNA to 
withdraw from this organization.427 This controversial alliance was seen as a strategic 
mistake. By 2013, ISNA would be allied with those who used Islamophobia as a tool and 
came out in opposition to discrimination against the gay community.428 
Syeed’s perceived administrative and strategic weaknesses helped confirm the 
leadership's distrust of a centralized powerful chief executive officer. They failed to 
understand the success such leadership brought to the organization because they were not 
involved in implementing the successful programs. Also, this shift in perspective did not 
reflect an understanding of the important role a powerful chief executive officer can play 
when supervised by appropriate board oversight. As Graham Dover and Thomas 
Lawrence point out, “[O]rganizations in which some forms of power are under- or over-
developed may be unable to complete the whole organizational learning cycle.”429 
In the past, the secretaries general, as the chief administrative officers, had the 
ability to manage their staff. However, a series of incidents made it clear that the ISNA 
secretary general did not have the power to hire or fire employees. In 1998, the Personnel 
Committee took over hiring of all director-level positions. Furthermore, in 2002, when 
Syeed sought to fire a staff member who was well connected with ISNA leadership his 
decision was overturned. In 2004, the secretary general was stripped of the ability to hire 
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any employees other than temporary and secretarial staff. From 2002 to 2010, only three 
staff members were laid off and only one staff member was fired. All three staff members 
lacked connections with the leadership, and one staff member was fired because he 
violated his employment agreement. Despite the clear violation of trust, there was 
considerable debate about whether that staff member should be fired because of his 
connections at the leadership level. The distrust of a powerful secretary general coupled 
with a failure to implement a balanced power structure affected the secretary general’s 
ability to manage his staff. 
The secretary general’s inability to hire and fire his employees resulted in a 
dysfunctional ISNA.430 Staff members created alliances with ISNA leaders that they 
perceived would ensure stability in employment, thus limiting the organization’s ability 
to sustain innovation or establish effective financial controls. These alliances with key 
leaders and the secretary general's inability to discipline employees made that position 
ineffective. 
In 2005, after serving as secretary general for more than twelve years, Dr. Sayyid 
Syeed was asked to step down as secretary general and to relocate in Washington, D.C., 
to establish ISNA’s National Office of Interfaith and Community Alliances. His tenure as 
secretary general had resulted in fiscal restraint, budget surpluses, a growing endowment, 
and a national reputation as Muslim Americans’ most influential organization. ISNA’s 
board then selected Dr. Muneer Fareed, a former Imam, Islamic scholar, and entrepreneur 
as its new secretary general.431 
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The period between 2005 and 2013 saw two permanent secretaries general (Dr. 
Muneer Fareed and Safaa Zarzour) and three interim secretaries general or administrators 
(Ahmed ElHattab, Dr. Iqbal Unus, and Habibe Ali as the chief operating officer). This 
constant reframing of the position of secretary general and a more dispersed power 
structure created a period of instability. In 2002, the position of secretary general was 
essentially the organization's chief executive officer and spokesperson. By 2005, with the 
election of Dr. Ingrid Mattson, the spokesperson role was assumed by the president of the 
board, and the administrative role of the secretary general was unclear. During ISNA's 
2012 strategic planning retreat, the position of secretary general was reframed as chief 
operating officer, and the elected president took on the role of chief executive officer and 
spokesperson.432  
Since 2005, ISNA has had budget deficits every year taking it back to its fiscal 
situation during the early 1980s and 1990s. In 2008, Dr. Muneer Fareed stepped down as 
secretary general, which left a leadership vacuum in the ISNA headquarters.433 Although 
Fareed strongly believed in the organization's mission, he was frustrated by the new 
definition of his position and states that he was never told that his position would be so 
different from the one advertised.434 He was especially frustrated that two key programs 
established after September 11 (the ISNA Leadership Development Center and the 
Interfaith Office in Washington, D.C.) did not fall under his oversight. The Washington, 
D.C., office eventually came under the oversight of two future presidents, Imam 
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Mohamad Hagmagid and Dr. Ingrid Mattson, whereas the Leadership Development 
Center was established as an independent organization within ISNA's headquarters, and 
did not even fall under the oversight of the majlis and the executive council. 
Power and politics are inevitable within a nonprofit organization435 and can have 
both a positive and a negative impact on a nonprofit organization.436 In ISNA, the power 
of innovation helped it achieve cognitive legitimacy. That legitimacy spurred greater 
engagement among the organization's leaders. However, as we will see, they failed to 
provide oversight for what is generally considered a core responsibility — the budget. 
Instead, they micromanaged issues related to staffing and programming. Thus the 
attainment of legitimacy resulted in a dispersal of power. This dispersal of power made it 
difficult for ISNA to effectively exercise the power needed to bring about a complete 
innovation cycle by creating and sustaining successful programs. Mary Kay Gugerty and 
Aseem Prakash suggest that “accountability is not normatively ‘good’ in and of itself, 
that is, more ‘accountability’ (or more rules and procedures) is not necessarily better.”437 
In 2008, Ahmed Elhattab replaced Fareed as the interim secretary general.438 In 
January 2010, Safaa Zarzour followed ElHattab and remained in the position for three 
years.439 When Zarzour stepped down at the end of 2012, he was initially replaced by the 
chief operating officer, Habibe Ali, the first woman in an administrative leadership 
                                                          
435 Dover and Lawrence, p 992 
436 Dover and Lawrence, p. 996 
437 Gugerty, Mary Kay and Aseem Prakash, “Voluntary regulation of NGO’s and nonprofits: an 
introduction to the club framework” Voluntary Regulation of NGO’s and Nonprofits: An Accountability 
Club Framework ed. Mary Kay Gugerty and Aseem Prakash (Cambridge University Press 2010) p. 7 
438 ISNA Annual Report (2008) p. 4 
439 ISNA Annual Report (2009) p. 7 
186 
 
position at ISNA's headquarters, and then by Dr. Iqbal Unus who served as a volunteer 
interim secretary general.440 The organization has sought to hire both a secretary general 
and an assistant secretary general. On both occasions a committee was established, 
positions were advertised, and candidates were selected and interviewed. However, the 
committee was unable to arrive at a consensus on an assistant secretary general. One of 
the candidates, a long-time staff member, has been a finalist for the top job on three 
occasions.441 As of 2014, Dr. Iqbal Unus continued to serve as a volunteer Interim 
secretary general and was commuting from Virginia. 
These leadership changes affected the organization’s finances. It is vital for 
innovative nonprofit organizations to achieve a balance between creativity and stability 
resulting in fiscal success.442 Past success in innovation (gaining legitimacy through 
successful programs) can hurt organizations when power is dispersed as this past success 
may push the organization towards complacency and inertia.443 Because ISNA had 
successfully achieved legitimacy, its leaders sought to retain what they believed was an 
ideal situation, but without understanding how that legitimacy were achieved. Key to 
Syeed's success was the ability to maintain fiscal discipline. He based his vision of a 
sustainable ISNA on the annual conventions and the magazine. 
Dr. Syeed’s departure at the end of 2005 brought back a pattern of the past — 
uncontrolled spending that created annual deficits for the organizations. As we have seen, 
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when power is dispersed, an organization's ability to establish controls over its operations 
is affected. Although Dr. Syeed’s model of strong centralized power increased 
innovation, those innovations were fiscally sustainable. When this power was 
redistributed in favor of the board, by the time President Barack Obama was inaugurated, 
the organization had a deficit of nearly one million dollars. (See the following chart, 
which shows the organization's financial condition from 2001 to 2008.)444 
 
Year Donations Total Revenues Expenses Deficit/Surplus 
Accumulated 
Deficit Endowment 
# of 
staff 
2001 1403301 2671105 2497113 173992 0 865078 
 2002 1327242 2622014 2200944 421070 0 1076078 18 
2003 1575263 3173298 2855057 318241 0 1226078 20 
2004 1802038 3421251 3016648 404603 0 2939868* 22 
2005 **1415946 2959191 3064526 -105335 -19744 1532056 31 
2006 1578199 2917069 3169641 -295443 -315187 1754031 36 
2007 1987699 3661516 3735122 -73606 -421269 2128966 37 
2008 1726678 3272096 3717855 -445759 -992028 1872230 36 
*Donation from a Saudi donor for an ISNA Youth Camp to be built at the ISNA HQ in 
Plainfield 
**From this point, donations are listed as domestic contributions and no listing for overseas 
contributions. 
Beginning in 2003, the board implemented programs such as the ISNA 
Leadership Development Center (ILDC), and these programs required greater strategic 
investments. (I discuss the ILDC a little later in this chapter.) However, there was not a 
balance between the growth of these programs and a growth in funding. Although 
donations continued to rise because of ISNA's cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy, proper 
oversight of the budget was missing. Dr. Muneer Fareed attributes this increased giving 
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to “sentimental giving.”445 He defined sentimental giving as giving to the organization 
because they had always done so or knew someone in leadership. He explained how 
people who had never given to ISNA started to do so because they knew him and wanted 
to support him. As in the past, the board made no attempt to control spending. Public 
finance expert Woods Bowman states, “Deficits are dangerous, so operating revenue 
should usually equal or exceed operating expenses. . . . Constructing a budget that 
includes a surplus is an insurance policy against a deficit and allows the organization to 
remain nimble and responsive to constituents.”446  
It is clear that something went wrong in the budgeting process after Syeed was no 
longer in charge. Bowman suggests that budgets are both control documents and also a 
tool for analysis and planning.447 Although ISNA did a great job raising revenue through 
its programs and fundraising — for example, since 2005, ISNA fundraising and program 
revenue showed an annual increase — the sharp increases in expenditures in 
programming, drove its budget deficits. Consequently, it is logical to assume that the 
majlis and the executive council failed to use the budget as a tool for planning and 
analysis. 
Bowman states, “The board is a critical component of what accountants call the 
control environment, which reflects top management’s awareness and commitment to the 
importance of controls throughout the organization, and encompasses management 
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integrity, ethical values, and operating philosophy.”448 Boards are charged with three 
fiduciary duties. The duty of care requires them to be diligent in their oversight of the 
organization, especially its finances and investments. These recurring deficits illustrate a 
failure of oversight by the majlis. Dr. Muneer Fareed expressed astonishment on realizing 
that reports being presented to the majlis were largely copies of previous reports. His 
opinion was that the organizational governance was very immature. The staff simply was 
following formalities by copying old reports to present to the majlis and the majlis simply 
either didn’t read or notice the same reports being recycled.449 
A review of ISNA’s finances shows that budget deficits were the norm when 
Syeed was not the secretary general. This budget deficit and dysfunctional power 
structure is best illustrated through the implementation and failure of a new program 
established by ISNA after its strategic planning — the ISNA Leadership Center (ILDC). 
By 2003, the organization's vision of community development changed. The 
Community Development department organized training programs for Muslim American 
community-based organization, intellectual conferences highlighting important questions 
for Islam in America, and regional conferences. This department was seen as one of 
Syeed's major initiatives because he was able to engage many communities at a relatively 
low cost. Syeed established the Community Development department to create greater 
engagement with grassroots communities and to manage the organization affiliations 
program. The department trained more than one thousand participants annually in 
nonprofit management, conflict resolution, domestic violence prevention, counseling, and 
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similar community issues.450 These training events involved twenty contact hours in a 
weekend. However, the majlis wanted a deeper engagement on issues of community 
development. In fact, at the strategic planning retreat mentioned earlier, the lack of 
domestically trained imams and community leaders was identified was a leading 
challenge. Under the new strategic plan, a bolder and more aggressive vision of 
community building was sought.  
In 2004, the Community Development department was discontinued along with 
its training programs. Programs that were perceived as successful, such as the Education 
Forum and regional conferences, became programs of the Convention and Marketing 
department. The academic conferences were discontinued as the purview of academia 
rather than of an organization like ISNA. As I have stated earlier, because board members 
weren't involved in innovations like the Community Development department, they did 
not fully understand the mechanisms of its programs. 
One of the programs that Syeed discontinued when he became secretary general 
was the Islamic Teaching Center (ITC). ITC was instrumental in engaging with leaders of 
the African-American Muslim community. ITC was established to meet a specific need 
of the community — Imam W D Muhammad had requested assistance with training his 
imams about Sunni Islam. By 1991, Syeed considered this need had been met, and the 
WD Muhammad community had moved beyond the training that ITC provided. 
However, this program was seen as an important one, and disappointment arose among 
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ISNA’s leaders when it was discontinued. However, the strategic planning in 2003 gave 
the ITC concept new life.451 
ISNA's reorganization of community development also lacked input at the staff 
level. In the new realignment of power, the majlis micromanaged program development 
and delivery with little scrutiny at the staff level. ISNA announced the creation of the 
new organization in 2004. 
During the Strategic Planning Retreat in March 2003, imam training and 
leadership development were identified as the most vital and pressing 
needs of the American Muslim community. ISNA responded by founding 
the . . . ILDC . . ., a revitalization and renewal of . . . ITC . . . ILDC is 
designed to foster well-rounded and capable imams, chaplains, and 
community leaders within North American Muslim community.452 
(emphasis added) 
 
There was no question that Muslim American communities were facing the 
challenge of recruiting imams who understood Muslim Americans. A large majority of 
imams in ISNA-affiliated mosques were imported from overseas. But the fact that this 
need was identified in 2003 as the most vital and pressing need of Muslim Americans 
shows that this strategic plan was designed and developed largely by ISNA insiders. At a 
time when Muslim charities had been raided, Islamophobia was evermore prevalent, and 
civil liberty violations through the PATRIOT Act were a growing concern of Muslim 
Americans, it is unlikely that a representative sample of Muslim Americans or even 
ISNA members would have selected recruiting imams as their top concern. ISNA’s vice 
president for the United States, Dr. Ingrid Mattson, was the director of the Muslim 
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chaplaincy program at Hartford Seminary, and the vice president for Canada, Dr. Syed 
Imtiaz Ahmed, was the last ISNA president to preside over a functioning ITC. ISNA’s 
leaders sought to rise above the short-term fear caused by Islamophobia and look for 
long-term solutions for the community, particularly because the financial security and 
institutional legitimacy provided the luxury for that broader reflection. 
ISNA hired Dr. Louay Safi, president of the American Muslim Social Scientists 
(AMSS), a majlis member, and a task force leader, as the first executive director of the 
ILDC.453 Contrary to established ISNA policies (largely designed to take power away 
from the secretary general, as noted earlier), an ILDC Planning Committee hired Dr. Safi, 
not the ISNA Personnel Committee, because Mattson and Ahmed argued that the ILDC 
was a separate organization. The dispersed power structure allowed a contradictory 
application of policies. As one secretary general expressed, the development of 
procedures doesn’t necessarily suggest an organization is following proper 
governance.454 These procedures have to be followed by an engaged staff and board 
leadership. However, ISNA institutional funds, facilities, and administrative functions 
were used to establish the ILDC. The ILDC remained part of ISNA’s budget and 
operated as a department until it was discontinued in 2010. 
The ILDC had an ambitious program that included a training facility at ISNA's 
headquarters in Plainfield, Indiana, along with the following programs: 
• A three-week Summer Leadership Institute 
• Local training programs, conferences, and workshops 
• Print, audio, video, and electronic support materials 
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• Certification of Leadership Training Programs 
 
Despite this ambitious agenda, the ISNA Leadership Development Center did not 
succeed in meeting its primary objectives listed above. However, it established a more 
effective procedure for endorsing chaplains in the military and in prisons in the United 
States. The ILDC also produced a number of publications. In February 2009, the ILDC 
announced a Compassionate Leadership training program in a book published by Safi. 
The ILDC also tackled issues related to Muslim American women in mosques. 
Gender diversity, as we see in the next section, was important to ISNA during this period. 
The ILDC was able to engage effectively with the media when the Asra Nomani crisis 
occurred. Asra Nomani, a West Virginia-based journalist who was with Daniel Pearl at 
the time of his disappearance in Pakistan, raised a concern about the treatment of Muslim 
women in mosques. In 2003, Asra Nomani walked through the main entrance of a 
mosque to pray in Morganstown, West Virginia.455 The entrance was designated for men 
only, whereas a separate entrance was designated for women. When asked to leave, she 
refused, and the incident became a national story. ISNA responded by having Dr. Safi 
engage in work with various mosque leaders, which resulted in an ILDC publication 
entitled Women Friendly Mosques and Community Centers: Working Together to 
Reclaim Our Heritage. At times of crisis, ISNA always sought to return to its values, and 
during this national crisis, it sought to reaffirm its belief on the issue of gender equity. 
Muslim women are working to be fully included in the masjid, at every 
level. They want to participate in governance as well as the development 
of educational programs. . . . Now is the time for community leaders to 
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seize the opportunity to create vibrant mosques and Islamic centers that 
honor the contributions of both men and women. . . . There is no one in the 
constituents that our institutions serve — especially our women and youth 
— will ever have to find themselves asking the question: “what are we 
fighting to be a part of anyway?!” By transforming women’s access and 
participation in the masjid, we will show by example the liberation and 
gender harmony that Islam for all!456 
 
The publication drew upon the experiences of women during the time of the 
Prophet Muhammad when women participated in the mosque and conversed with him as 
their imam. But most important, the ILDC was raising the alarm that if Islamic centers 
and mosques did not change, they would lose vital parts of the community. Moreover, 
this engagement illustrates the kind of programs Syeed sought to implement. Engaging 
Safi to develop the publication and engage with mosque leaders did not cost as much as 
trying to initiate a three-week training program with fourteen faculty members for 
twenty-five participants — many of them through the assistance of a scholarship. 
Therefore, Safi’s engagement gave the organization the public relations success it needed 
without a high cost to its budget. 
ISNA also released another publication that resulted from a survey of participants 
at the 2005 ISNA Annual Convention. The publication warned Islamic center leaders that 
its congregants felt that their centers lacked best practices and educational value and were 
not inclusive in terms of women and youth. In addition, only one-third of the participants 
of the survey said that governance of their Islamic centers was satisfactory.457 Safi’s 
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academic training with surveys helped ISNA better understand the dissatisfaction with 
the leadership of Islamic centers. 
Despite these important contributions, the ILDC failed to achieve its goals. There 
was extensive acknowledgement among the ISNA leadership that the ILDC had failed, 
but no one was willing to make that admission.458 ILDC was perceived to have failed to 
accomplish its articulated goals—which included training imams and community 
leaders—proportional to the budgetary investment made by the organization. At the time 
Safi left ISNA there was no road-map or plan that could help ILDC continue on a course 
to achieve the goals outlined in the strategic plan. 
Safi had come to the director's role from within the leadership ranks of ISNA. He 
had an activist background and had key supporters within the majlis. It wasn’t until a 
Texas newspaper released the information that Safi was under investigation by the U.S. 
Department of Defense that the organization looked into how Safi was operating the 
ILDC. The newspaper report divulged that trips ISNA had assumed were part of his work 
with the ILDC were, in fact, being done as a contractor for the Department of Defense.459 
Although the news report framed Safi in terms of the larger Islamophobic narrative, it 
raised enough issues for ISNA’s leaders to look deeper into the situation. For these and 
undisclosed reasons, ISNA fired Safi and closed the ILDC in 2010.460461 The ILDC’s 
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ultimate failure was further attributed to the fact that no attempt was made to continue the 
project. Moreover, despite being key priorities of the organization, no attempt was made 
to bring back either the Community Development department or the ILDC by the end of 
this period. 
Diversity Driven by Islamophobia and Institutional Legitimacy 
ISNA had been successful in an affirmative-action approach to diversity. ISNA 
found it advantageous to implement diversity at the majlis and the executive council 
levels. As William Brown states, “The primary way to include underrepresented 
individuals is through recruitment. . . . [I]f the board is concerned with minority or 
categorical composition, using systemic recruitment strategies could help identify 
potential members.”462 ISNA’s leaders had been successful in maintaining ethnic and 
racial diversity through recruitment of its board. African-Americans had served in its 
majlis and once also as vice president, but ISNA had greater difficulty attracting more of 
African-Americans as members, donors, and participants in its programs.463 
The terrorist attacks of 2001 redirected ISNA’s quest for diversity. As we have 
seen, ISNA has had different approaches to diversity. However, September 11, 2001, 
made it clear that Muslim Americans needed to counter an Islamophobic narrative. The 
narrative comprised three themes: Islam degraded women; Islam promoted violence; and 
Islam was a foreign religion.464 Missing from this narrative was the notion that Islam was 
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a racist religion; therefore, ISNA’s refocused quest for diversity was influenced largely 
by an effort to counter the anti-Muslim narrative. To offset the idea that Islam was an 
immigrant and foreign religion, it had used the history of African-American Islam. 
ISNA’s immigrant leaders had children who were born in America, and these children 
embraced their American identity. ISNA's response to the “foreign religion” narrative 
was to focus on the many Muslim American children born to immigrants in the United 
States. This approach built upon the larger immigrant narrative within the United States. 
That is, other than Native Americans, all other Americans had connections to an 
immigrant past.  
The attacks on Muslim Americans created greater unity among the various 
Muslim American groups helped ISNA to bridge diversity. Divisions existed among 
cultural pluralists, HSAAMs, and activists; however, Islamophobia required that they 
work together and present a unified front. Although ISNA did not go beyond the 
affirmative-action approach to African-Americans, it sought to go further on issues of 
gender and youth 
To counter the Islamophobia portrayal of Islam as being against women, ISNA 
brought more women into its leadership positions, staff, and volunteer force. Also, as we 
have seen, the ILDC dealt with the issue of gender by releasing important position 
statements and publications to help the grassroots Muslim community become more 
inclusive. 
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In 2001, ISNA’s leadership nominated and its membership elected the first 
woman vice president, Dr. Ingrid Mattson.465 Mattson was the third American-born 
convert to Islam to be elected to the position of vice president of ISNA. Although women 
had served on the majlis, this was the first time a woman was elevated to such a high 
position. American-born Ameena Jandali and Khadajee Haffajee, who was originally 
from South Africa and living in Canada, had been repeatedly been elected to the majlis in 
the past. In addition, the majlis had appointed women to serve on the boards of leading 
constituent organizations, such as Muslim Youth of North America (MYNA) and the 
Council of Islamic Schools of North America (CISNA).  
Mattson’s election was remarkable in that she was unopposed for the position. In 
fact, she ran unopposed and served twice as vice president and twice as president. Many 
credit ISNA’s membership for electing Mattson. However, the ISNA Election Committee 
consisting largely of insiders and ISNA Secretary General Syeed, nominated Mattson. 
Mattson represented a desire among leaders and members to elect a female to its 
leadership. It is significant that her election took place prior to the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001. 
ISNA approached gender diversity in an affirmative-action manner but then 
moved to incorporating gender diversity at the staff and programmatic levels. Among 
MSAs and MYNAs across the country, women were already in positions of leadership, 
but they hit roadblocks when they reached the level of community leadership. However, 
ISNA's bold and direct position on gender equality paved the way to creating greater 
acceptance of women in Muslim American institutions. 
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On the other hand, not everyone believed ISNA was going far enough. ISNA’s 
approach was to take a balanced position to ensure that it led in a way that didn’t 
compromise its values or make it an outlier in the Muslim American community. Critics 
such as Asra Nomani, Irshad Manji, and Amina Wadud criticized ISNA and Mattson for 
not embracing a more revolutionary approach to gender equality. They also criticized 
ISNA for not endorsing female imams and female-led prayer, and in fact, when Amina 
Wadud and Pamela Taylor, an ISNA staff member, delivered a Friday sermon and led a 
mixed prayer, ISNA was among the organizations that did not support those actions. The 
ILDC even went further by sending a statement saying that such acts were opposed to the 
Islamic theological tradition and, therefore, were not orthodox Islam. Not all ISNA 
leaders shared this belief, but they refused to voice such an opinion because it was 
outside the mainstream of belief within ISNA. Mattson, a religious scholar, opposed 
female imams and was criticized by feminists for these conservative religious, yet 
mainstream, theological positions. 
Mattson’s election helped make ISNA relatively immune to attacks about gender 
bias. In addition, the U.S. government was seeking a Muslim partner at the time, and 
Mattson, in addition to being a woman, was an American-born Muslim convert, she was 
highly educated and articulate, and she was reassuring to people who were afraid of the 
growing Muslim American population. 
Mattson's conservative theological beliefs made her a great intermediary for 
ISNA’s leaders, who, again, sought to retain its values while boldly approaching a 
community problem. ISNA’s leaders endorsed gender equality but wanted women who 
shared their theological values. Therefore, someone like Mattson was a good foil for the 
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feminist narrative of Manji and Nomani that many community leaders opposed. Mattson, 
in effect, helped ISNA reframe feminism by drawing from the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad and illustrating the important role women had played in Islam's history. 
ISNA took a similar approach in terms of second generation Muslim Americans. 
Young people had always been represented on the ISNA majlis. The president of MSA 
and the chair of MYNA, both youth, were members of the ISNA majlis because of the 
organization's constitution. However, ISNA sought to recruit a new generation of young 
Muslim American leaders to serve on the majlis and the executive council.466 The 
executive council included regional representatives who were mainly under the age of 
forty. In addition, ISNA’s Election Committee nominated young leaders to the ballot, and 
in each election between 2001 and 2012, the membership consistently sought to elect the 
youngest members on the ballot. The organization's committees also recruited many 
young people to serve in leadership roles, and ISNA made another bold statement by 
elevating young grassroots leaders to the national stage. 
ISNA went even further and established a Youth Department that helped to 
institutionalize the notion of youth inclusiveness in the organization's infrastructure in 
2004.467 These young Muslim Americans, who were born in America, countered the idea 
that Islam and Muslims were foreign to America. 
ISNA developed, implemented, and institutionalized its innovative Youth 
Department through the appropriate use of force. That is, supported by its strategic plan, 
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in which youth involvement was one of its six priorities, ISNA used the discipline form 
of force to help members identify new patterns and insights. The development of these 
new insights were “learned” by the organization through intuition. ISNA’s leaders then 
interpreted these insights by connecting the new ideas to existing ways of thinking by 
institutionalization this new program by establishing a new department. It successfully 
used the influence of its leaders to establish a new program. ISNA’s leaders used the 
force and domination forms of power inherent within the majlis’s power to establish a 
department and institutionalize it within ISNA. 
ISNA’s 2003 strategic plan also called for greater engagement with youth. ISNA 
had two youth wings — the Muslim Student Associations of the United States & Canada 
(MSA) and the Muslim Youth of North America (MYNA). MSA was the national 
organization of Muslim American college students, whereas MYNA was the program for 
children between the ages of twelve and eighteen. The MSA president and the MYNA 
chair were members of the ISNA majlis. Both organizations held their annual 
conventions during ISNA's annual conventions. Both organizations developed their own 
programs (using the ISNA speaker pool), arranged for volunteers to run their events, and 
raised funds to supplement their activities. 
The MSA was established in 1963 in Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, and moved its 
offices to Washington, D.C., in the early 1990s. It was largely an independent 
organization with its own governing board elected by its membership. The MSA was able 
to sustain its role on college campuses. However, because of the diverse group of Muslim 
American students it encountered on college campuses and because aligning its identity 
with only one national organization would prevent it from diversifying its membership, 
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during the 1990s, it sought to become fully independent of ISNA. Because of its 
independence and the fact that it had young college students to call upon, it was able to 
sustain itself throughout ISNA’s period of instability. 
The MYNA was formed in the 1980s and operated as a program of ISNA, and its 
alumni often went on to lead MSA chapters. However, ISNA’s financial instability and 
the vacuum left when its alumni base became involved in careers and other activities 
resulted in a decline in MYNA activities. Syeed did not include youth in his priorities 
during the 1990s, and by 2003, MYNA essentially consisted of the activities at ISNA's 
annual conventions and its regional conferences and chapters across the country. 
As I said earlier, ISNA's 2003 strategic plan identified youth as one of the six 
priority of ISNA (in fact, it was the second highest priority). At that time, the ISNA 
majlis created a youth coordinator position, which was initially housed in the Community 
Development department. After that department's discontinuation in 2004, the youth 
program became the Youth Department. 
In 2003, prior to the establishment of the Youth Department, ISNA hired a youth 
coordinator, Taneeza Islam, to oversee its youth activities and to help create a framework 
for this work at its headquarters.468 Islam was unique to the ISNA staff in a number of 
ways. She was a second-generation Muslim American, and by hiring someone who could 
understand their experiences, ISNA reaffirmed its commitment to youth. Also, at the 
time, she was the first Bengali American hired to the staff. Islam had not been involved 
with MYNA, MSA, or ISNA prior to being hired and came from outside ISNA's 
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traditional factions. Finally, Islam became the second female to lead a department at 
ISNA's headquarters. 
The Youth Department's initial tasks were to take over the ISNA internship 
program, become an advisor to MYNA, organize youth aspects of the national and 
regional conferences, and reach out to interfaith partners such as the Boy Scouts of 
America and the Interfaith Youth Core.469 Islam also organized a MYNA conference 
under the theme “Painting Our Future With Colors of the Past” in the hope of 
reenergizing the MYNA alumni base. She also coordinated a series of national Islamic 
entertainment events in four cities across the country. Islam’s role was to help initiate the 
revival and to develop a framework for MYNA. In 2004, Islam left ISNA to attend law 
school. 
The organization selected Taslima Khaled as the new Youth Coordinator in 2004. 
Khaled was a first-generation Bengali American immigrant.470 She had a degree in 
childhood education and had raised two sons who were both in college at the time. She 
brought a different skill set to the organization than Islam brought. The expectation was 
that Khaled would create greater stability in MYNA, and as a parent, she would 
understand what young Muslim Americans were going through. Khaled was a long-time 
ISNA member and participant in ISNA's annual conventions. She reached out to various 
MYNA alumni and started working in conjunction with a committee called “the MYNA 
working group.” The majlis also established an interim youth committee to advise and 
direct the activities of the youth program. 
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In 2005, the organization announced the establishment of the Youth Department 
under the headline, “ISNA’s Fountain of Youth Restored.” 
In addition to creating new youth programs, the Youth Department is 
working with the Muslim Youth of North America (MYNA). Started in 
1985, MYNA was a vibrant wing of ISNA run completely by elected 
Muslim youth leaders too young for MSA that offered local youth 
activities, national conferences and camps. After ten years of prosperity, 
MYNA began a decline that saw the national leadership dissipate and 
national association dwindle. Today, small groups in various cities still 
carry the MYNA name but are in no way organized by or affiliated with 
MYNA as a national organization.471 
 
MYNA's twentieth anniversary occurred in 2005, so it was only fitting that a 
department was created that year to focus on the revival of the organization. In 2005, 
Khaled resigned from ISNA and returned to her university position in Minnesota. 
In 2005, ISNA hired Iyad Alnachef as the new Youth Director.472 Alnachef was a 
Syrian American who immigrated to the United States to pursue his education. He had 
academic training in youth development and was also a former schoolteacher in an 
Islamic school. Alnachef was hired through the recommendation of the newly formed 
majlis Youth Committee, whereas the previous two directors had been hired by Syeed in 
consultation with the Personnel Committee. Alnachef instituted a more active majlis 
Youth Committee. During the previous few years, there was friction between the young 
MYNA advisors and the majlis because of the MYNA's leaders push for greater 
independence, similar to that of MSA. However, in 2005, the majlis resolved that MYNA 
would be a program of ISNA and that a new board of advisors (called the National Board 
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of Advisors) would be selected by the ISNA majlis. The National Board of Advisors 
included a mix of people from ISNA's leadership and the younger interim Youth 
Committee.473 This compromise accomplished two goals: It assured ISNA leaders that 
MYNA would remain an ISNA program, and it gave the new young leaders an 
opportunity to provide a direction for MYNA. 
The Youth Committee selected the first set of leaders for MYNA. The goal of the 
Youth Department was to consolidate MYNA activity at the grassroots level under the 
umbrella of MYNA. MYNA’s leading priorities were defined as follows:474 
• Provide a platform for expression. 
• Foster an engaging North American Muslim Culture. 
• Promote Islamic principles grounded in the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
• Spark youth involvement in community development and dialogue. 
• Establish a diverse, supportive network for youth and the greater community. 
 
Alnachef remained director of the department between 2005 and 2013. During 
this period, he successfully consolidated MYNA at the grassroots and regional levels, 
developed an institutionalized process for managing national and local elections, and 
organized youth camps across the United States.  
Finally, ISNA also recruited a series of American-born Muslims to work and lead 
departments. Taneeza Islam for Youth, Fawad Siddiqui and later Deana Othman for 
Islamic Horizons, Sarah Thompson for communications, Urooj Qureshi for convention 
programs, and Nida Saleem within the ISNA Development Foundation are just a few 
examples of this growing trend. In fact, the majority of the people hired after September 
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11, 2001, were born in America. Having these individuals at the heart of ISNA’s 
operation brought the perspective of youth to ISNA’s activities.  
The election of Dr. Ihsan Bagby as a member of the majlis was an important step 
in the organization's continued attempts to include African-Americans. Bagby was an 
ideal candidate to further ISNA’s efforts toward greater diversity and inclusiveness for a 
number of reasons.475 He had previously served as an acting ISNA secretary general. He 
knew firsthand about the organization's opportunities, limitations, and dysfunctions, and 
he knew how to successfully navigate its bureaucracy. In addition, he had personal 
relationships with many of the ISNA leaders and could use his personal influence to 
enhance relationships between African-American Muslims and ISNA. Furthermore, he 
was the secretary general of the Muslim Alliance in North America (MANA). MANA 
was a HSAAM organization that sought to energize the grassroots Muslim communities 
through greater focus on social justice. MANA was also an important vehicle for creating 
an institutional identity for HSAAMs that could help them negotiate a national role 
among Muslim American organizations. Finally, Bagby was a scholar of mosques in 
America, and he had a unique insight about diversity issues occurring at the grassroots 
level. 
In 2010, ISNA expanded its efforts on diversity by hosting its first Diversity 
Forum in Detroit, Michigan.476 This event was slated to become a national event seeking 
to bring a diverse group of leaders and scholars together to discuss the challenges and 
opportunities of diversity among Muslim Americans. This forum was yet another attempt 
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to go beyond the affirmative-action approach to diversity and to build a deeper 
framework. This project was championed by Bagby and the new secretary general, Safaa 
Zarzour. It was held for two years with some positive results. Whether the organization 
can institutionalize and embed this conference into the organizational framework remains 
yet to be seen. Zarzour stepped down in 2012, and Bagby’s term as a majlis member 
ended the same year. 
In 2012, Zarzour also sought to further enhance the organization's approach to 
diversity by pushing a proposal to hire Bagby as a part-time director of a mosques related 
program. His vision was to institutionalize diversity as a pillar of community 
development and mosque management. This proposal focused strongly on systemizing 
ISNA's attempts to further the cause of diversity within the organization. However, with 
Zarzour stepping down as secretary general, this project has moved forward with the 
hosting of a “Mosque Forum” rather than a full-fledged department as he envisioned. 
Conclusion 
By the time of the September 2001 terrorists attacks in the United States, ISNA 
had benefitted from achieving cognitive legitimacy. This cognitive legitimacy and the 
organization's stability as a nonprofit organization allowed it to increase its mainstreamed 
cultural pluralist identity. 
The September 2001 attacks and the ensuing state of heightened Islamophobia 
created an opportunity for ISNA to consolidate its gains from the previous decades. Due 
to fear and necessity, Muslim Americans initially united around a cultural pluralist 
identity. This initial unity gave ISNA the opportunity to sustain its role as the most 
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influential and leading Muslim American nonprofit organization. By the time President 
Obama declared in his inauguration speech that “We are a nation of Christians and 
Muslims, Hindus and Jews,” ISNA was able to secure a front row seat to history. 
ISNA continued on its quest for diversity. It aggressively brought new blood into 
the organization. The organization created innovative programs to include a greater 
number of younger, American-born Muslims in all aspects of the organization's structure. 
It also promoted greater gender equality. It used both the affirmative-action approach and 
a strong programmatic approach to advocate for greater inclusiveness of women and 
youth in Muslim organizations. 
ISNA’s pursuit of diversity during this period has focused on the idea of bringing 
Muslim Americans under ISNA’s umbrella through an open membership. This was also 
the strategy pursued by FIA prior to ISNA. More recently, a new approach to diversity is 
being pursued by other Muslim American organizations. This new strategy was expressed 
by Dr. Ihsan Bagby as first establishing homogenous organizations that can represent 
certain Muslim American groups and then, having established an organization, to reach 
out to others “as equals.” 
For example, MAS largely included Arab-speaking Muslim Americans who have 
an affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood; ICNA largely included South Asians who have 
an affinity for the Jamaat-e-Islam; MANA largely consists of HSAAMs.477 In 2002, 
ICNA and MAS established a partnership that brands their annual conferences as joint 
events (even though one is held in December and the other in May). In 2014, ten Muslim 
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and ICNA have publicly distanced themselves from those international organizations. 
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American organizations came together and formed the U.S. Council of Muslim 
Organizations (USCMO). This new council includes ICNA, MAS, and MANA, along 
with Mosque Cares (W. D. Muhammad’s community) and CAIR. Missing from this 
council are ISNA and the Muslim Public Affairs Council; both organizations are largely 
cultural pluralist organizations. This new strategy and Council may challenge ISNA’s 
role as the most influential Muslim American organization. 
ISNA’s leaders also sought to consolidate power at the majlis level and to reduce 
the role and influence of staff in the organization. This blurring of roles between the staff 
and the board created dysfunction in some instances. The shift of power from the 
secretary general to the board and a more episodic use of power by certain leaders did not 
allow the organization to make gains in new, innovative programs such as the ILDC, the 
Community Development department, or the Diversity Forum. This change in its power 
structure created a new challenge for the organization. Cognitive legitimacy and 
Islamophobia made the organization successful. This past success can be attributed to a 
centralized chief executive officer and successful nonprofit organization. However, 
during this period, ISNA failed to achieve success as a nonprofit organization, which was 
the basis for the legitimacy.  
The organization's dysfunction is reflected in the decade-long stagnation of its 
annual conventions in terms of number of attendees and revenue, despite its being the 
largest Muslim American gathering in America as illustrated in the revenue charts that I 
present in this chapter. In contrast, the annual conventions of ICNA and MAS are 
showing considerable growth moving from hotels to larger convention centers. In 
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addition, organizations like MAS have outpaced ISNA in terms of contributions.478 In 
2010, ISNA received nearly $1.8 million in contributions compared to MAS raising more 
than $4 million. In addition, while ISNA received $81,610 in revenue through 
membership, MAS received more than $300,000 in membership revenue. MAS and 
ISNA received approximately the same amount of revenue from their annual conference. 
MAS’s total revenues for the year were over $6 million compared to ISNA’s nearly $3.6 
million. Just as important, over the past few years, MAS has consistently maintained an 
annual surplus of more than $500,000. 
ISNA, in terms of membership and conference attendance, is stagnant at best and 
in decline at worse due to its inability to effectively manage the distribution of power 
needed to establish effective nonprofit management and governance. It is yet to be known 
whether the organization can sustain its legitimacy and institutional success without 
strong leadership at the staff level and without best practices at the budgeting level.  
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Chapter Five — Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I presented a case study of the Islamic Society of North 
America (ISNA), the largest Muslim American organization in North America, in order 
to examine Muslim American institution building, management and governance. By 
means of this account, I challenged misconceptions about ISNA and dispelled a number 
of myths about Muslim Americans and their institutions. In addition, I provided nonprofit 
research relating to issues of diversity, legitimacy, power, and nonprofit governance and 
management. I also investigated the experiences of Muslim Americans as they attempted 
to translate faith into practice within the framework of the American religious experience.  
This dissertation analyzes the development of the Islamic Society of North 
America (ISNA), a Muslim American religious association, from the Iranian 
Revolution to the inauguration of our nation’s first African-American president. This 
case study of ISNA, the largest Muslim American organization in North America, 
examines the organization’s institution-building and governance as a way to illustrate 
Muslim American civic and religious participation. Using nonprofit research and theory 
related to issues of diversity, legitimacy, power, and nonprofit governance and 
management, I challenge misconceptions about ISNA and dispel a number of myths 
about Muslim Americans and their institutions. In addition, I investigate the experiences 
of Muslim Americans as they attempted to translate faith into practice within the 
framework of the American religious and civic experience. I arrive at three main 
conclusions. First, due to their incredible diversity, Muslim Americans are largely 
cultural pluralists. They draw from each other and our national culture to develop their 
religious identity and values. Second, a nonprofit association that embraces the values of 
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a liberal democracy by establishing itself as an open organization will include members 
that may damage the organization’s reputation. I argue that ISNA’s values should be 
assessed in light of its programs and actions rather than the views of a small portion of its 
membership. Reviewing the organization’s actions and programs helps us discover a 
religious association that is centered on American civic and religious values. Third, 
ISNA’s leaders were unable to balance their desire for an open, consensus-based 
organization with a strong nonprofit management power structure. Effective nonprofit 
associations need their boards, volunteers and staff to have well-defined roles and 
authority. ISNA’s leaders failed to adopt such a management and governance structure 
because of their suspicion of an empowered chief executive officer. 
This dissertation illustrates that due to their incredible diversity, Muslim 
Americans are largely cultural pluralists. They draw from each other and our national 
culture to develop their religious identity and values. Religious identity does remain 
constant or uniform. Instead it is shaped by the interactions between the diverse groups 
that comprise Muslim America.  
There was a consistent drive towards Muslim American national unity and 
consensus that required compromise. At the grassroots level, Muslim Americans practice 
faith, convene social gatherings, organize interfaith and political events in diverse 
Muslim American settings. Numerical realities make it difficult for there to be a 
Pakistani-mosque, a Bengali mosque, a Syrian Mosque. Similarly, ideological purity is 
difficult to achieve at the local mosque. Muslim American institutional faith and practice 
requires compromise and consensus building. 
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At the national level, ISNA has elected some important leaders that helped in its 
quest for external legitimacy. However, these leaders express the desire of ISNA’s 
membership for a diverse, broad-based leadership. These leaders were elected — not 
selected. Furthermore, these leaders were embraced at the national conventions of other 
Muslim American organizations as important speakers. 
At the national level organizations are seeking ways in which they can present a 
united front (externally) and an umma (internally). As I have noted, Muslim American 
organizations have used two major approaches to bridge diversity. The first approach, 
followed by the FIA and ISNA, sought to establish a national organization and then to 
bring Muslim Americans from different persuasions under the organization's umbrella 
has been the focus of this dissertation. The second, more recent, approach was to 
establish institutions that are largely (though not completely) homogenous based on a 
specific type of Muslim American diversity. Having established a homogenous 
organization to then partner with another Muslim American to develop national unity. As 
I noted in chapter four, in 2014 the US Council of Muslim Organizations (USMO) was 
established. This Council consists of ten organizations but does not include ISNA. This 
organization seeks to institutionalize the second strategy. Although this organization falls 
outside of the scope of this dissertation, it illustrates the challenges ISNA faces in the 
future of maintaining its legitimacy if it doesn’t resolve the issues related to nonprofit 
governance and management. 
The two preceding strategies adopt the affirmative-action approach to diversity. 
Organizations such as ISNA and FIA found it difficult to accomplish the second prong of 
diversity, which requires developing mission-relevant joint activities that will bridge 
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social capital among diverse participants. Only time will tell whether the USMO will be 
able to implement the second prong of diversity. 
However, whether the strategy adopted by ISNA and FIA will succeed or not is 
unclear at this point. Both organizations had mixed results because of issues related to 
legitimacy, power, and nonprofit effectiveness. FIA failed to secure legitimacy in the 
eyes of ISNA's founders because of its secular past and focus on a political identity. On 
the other hand, ISNA failed in its attempts to implement the second prong because of its 
inability to disperse power effectively within the organization. ISNA’s fiscal and 
budgetary crisis coupled with the lack of clarity over the role of the chief executive 
officer (secretary general) and board did not provide the organization with the stability it 
needed to implement a well-designed, sustainable, and effective program that could 
bridge social capital among diverse constituents. Luckily, for national organizations, 
local and regional organizations have been comparably better able to implement both 
prongs of achieving diversity. Muslim Americans have embraced their diverse identity 
and work towards achieving unity. 
This consistent quest to bridge diversity has drawn these disparate groups 
together. National conventions have adopted the ISNA model of mixed gatherings, 
female speakers, Muslim entertainment and political and interfaith speakers. In fact the 
majority of the speakers at the national conventions of organizations like MAS, ICNA, 
CAIR tend to be the same speakers that speak at the ISNA Annual Convention. The 
exhibit halls of these conventions have the same businesses and nonprofit organizations. 
Each organization may have a distinct identity they have been drawn together through a 
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consensus based cultural pluralist identity. National recognition requires that each of 
these entities strive towards such an identity to attain cognitive legitimacy. 
Like ISNA's founders, Muslim Americans in general are not a single, monolithic 
group. Their diversity goes beyond race, ethnicity, national origin, and sectarianism. 
Muslim Americans have commonalities and differences based on their ideology, their 
definition of a Muslim American identity, their politics, their personal histories, and their 
understanding of the role of Muslim organizations in America. Many Muslim American 
scholars have tried to label and cluster Muslim American organizations in terms of the 
dominant ethnicity or ideology, not recognizing the deeper nuances that exist. 
In fact, my own attempt to use labels like activists, cultural pluralists, or 
HSAAMs is only one effort to highlight the nuances in Muslim American diversity. The 
reality is that the diversity goes much deeper than one study can illustrate. Immigrant-
native; conservative-secular; moderate-Islamist labels are too simplistic and do not 
accurately describe a community of individuals. 
Organizations I have labeled as HSAAM, such as the Muslim Alliance in North 
America (MANA), include immigrants like Dr. Altaf Hussain. Dr. Hussain, a cultural 
pluralist, serves on both MANA and ISNA boards and has served as vice president and 
president of MSA. Organizations labeled as immigrant activists, such as the Islamic 
Circle of North America (ICNA) and the Muslim American Society (MAS), include, 
among others, cultural pluralists and African-Americans. ISNA’s board has included 
African-Americans such as Ihsan Bagby, Siraaj Wahhaj, Umar AlKhattab, WD 
Muhammad, and Caucasian-Americans such as John Sullivan and Ingrid Mattson. The 
religious identity of Muslim Americans has not remained static, and this move toward a 
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consensus identity that embraces diversity has resulted in a cultural pluralist Muslim 
American identity. 
Second, a nonprofit association that embraces the values of a liberal democracy 
by establishing itself as an open organization will include members that may damage the 
organization’s reputation. I argue that ISNA’s values should be assessed in light of its 
programs and actions rather than the views of a small portion of its membership. 
Reviewing the organization’s actions and programs helps us discover a religious 
association that is centered on American civic and religious values. 
As I state in chapter one, I adopt David Craig’s approach to institutional values. 
Values are more than aspirational but are an “articulated limb that has a specific structure 
related to its operations and purposes.” ISNA’s values should be examined through its 
policies, programs and public positions. 
As I noted, the election of ISNA leaders like Dr. Ingrid Mattson challenged the 
external notion that Muslims were misogynists. Bagby and Siraj Wahaj (along with 
second-generation Muslim American immigrants) challenged the notion that Islam was a 
foreign religion. However, when examining the external benefits to these leaders we must 
not lose sight of the fact that these leaders were elected — not selected. ISNA had 
developed a process that allowed these leaders to rise to national prominence. ISNA’s 
members embraced these leaders as representative of their religious identity. 
In addition, as I note in chapter two, ISNA's public stands against terrorism, 
dictatorships, and Iran's taking of hostages challenged the notion that Islam was opposed 
to peace. ISNA’s positions favoring Muslim Americans' participation in the military and 
elections disputed the idea that Muslim Americans were unpatriotic. Also, the fact that 
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these positions were all taken prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, gave 
the organization even greater legitimacy both internally and externally. 
Muslim Americans have long recognized their diversity and sought to bridge this 
diversity through a broad Muslim American religious identity. ISNA, in particular, has 
recognized that the Muslim American community comprises many disparate Muslim 
American individuals and has embraced that diversity through an open membership 
process. Therefore, there is only one class of individual membership, and any self-
defined Muslim American over the age of eighteen can become an ISNA member simply 
by completing a form and paying a fee. This embrace of values of a liberal democracy 
opens up the organization to Muslim Americans of all ideologies, ethnicities and 
nationalities. 
This dissertation challenges the notion that Islamists affiliated with global 
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami established institutions 
like ISNA. By all means, individuals in these groups were part of ISNA at its inception. 
However, from the very beginning, ISNA’s founders brought diverse groups of Muslim 
Americans under its umbrella, and its founders included, among others, activists, cultural 
pluralists, and HSAAMs who were seeking a representative Muslim American 
organization. 
Furthermore, this dissertation opposes the belief that all mainstream 
“establishment” Muslim American immigrants were Islamist activists.479 ISNA’s 
                                                          
479 As we noted in chapter one, I define “establishment” Muslim American’s as sunni Muslim American’s 
who embrace Islamic institutions as central to an Islamic identity. They also adhere to a more traditional 
form of Islam. The Nation of Islam, secular Muslim groups and Shiite groups are not included in this term. 
Organizations like ISNA, Islamic Circle of North America, Council of American Islamic Relations, 
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founders included individuals who, although religiously devout, had no interaction with 
Islamist organizations in their native lands. For example, ISNA’s founders included 
cultural pluralists who were also devout Muslims seeking to live their faith as Muslim 
Americans. As I note in the appendix, people like Dr. Iqbal Unus became involved with 
ISNA because of their personal need to continue congregational religious practice while 
in the United States as a student. MSA and later ISNA gave him a unique opportunity to 
be involved in an Islamic institution that was open, pluralistic, democratic, and diverse. 
ISNA leaders and members were drawn together by events like the Iranian Revolution, 
Gulf War I, and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
Third, ISNA’s leaders were unable to balance their desire for an open, consensus-
based organization with a strong nonprofit management power structure. Effective 
nonprofit associations need their boards, volunteers and staff to have well-defined roles 
and authority. ISNA’s leaders failed to adopt such a management and governance 
structure because of their suspicion of an empowered chief executive officer. 
As we have seen in this dissertation, ISNA’s greatest challenge is nonprofit 
governance. The challenges that impede ISNA are not because of its core values. ISNA 
has fought for values that fall broadly within the mainstream of American society and 
specifically within the Muslim American community. ISNA’s challenges are issues of 
nonprofit management and governance. To further its core values of democracy, 
pluralism, diversity, and individualism, ISNA needs to implement a system that disperses 
power effectively within the organization. As its chief executive officer, the secretary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Muslim American Society, Muslim Public Affairs Council, Muslim Alliance of North America, Islamic 
schools and centers are a few examples that would be included in this group. 
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general must be trusted to manage the organization and staff and to implement the 
organization's mission. It must define clear roles for its board that will ensure appropriate 
oversight, as is done within other successful American nonprofit organizations. 
Embracing those defined roles will lead to a successful and sustainable nonprofit 
organization, and such success as a nonprofit will ensure that ISNA’s core values and 
identity will thrive. 
Its leaders' distrust of an empowered and strong chief executive officer resulted in 
inadequate nonprofit practices. As I show, research for this dissertation shows that chief 
executive officers have a central role in implementing an organization's mission. That is, 
whereas an organization's board hires and fires the chief executive officer, the chief 
executive officer hires staff and implements programs. Dr. Iqbal Unus stated that ISNA 
did not consider an empowered chief executive officer to be a good model. Therefore, 
what resulted was power based on personality. Hammad, Syeed, and Mattson were all 
popular leaders with great personal credibility. As I note in chapter one, they were able to 
implement programs based on their personal credibility, using evangelist leadership 
styles. Consequently, the ability to implement and sustain nonprofit programs and 
practices rested with ISNA's leaders and was not institutionalized throughout the 
organization. 
The lack of clear roles and established practices made both the board and staff 
dysfunctional. The board's dysfunction is best illustrated by its inability to deal with the 
organization's recurring deficits, except when Syeed served as secretary general. In 
addition, ISNA’s inability to hire a permanent secretary general since Syeed’s departure 
in 2005 through 2014 illustrates the frustration and dysfunction at the staff level. The 
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organization's dysfunction is reflected in the decade-long stagnation of its annual 
conventions in terms of number of attendees and revenue, despite its being the largest 
Muslim American gathering in America as illustrated in the charts that I present in the  
chapter four. As I note in chapter four, organizations like ICNA and MAS are resurging 
as nonprofits in comparison to ISNA. 
Without investigating MAS, I cannot state the reasons for their success.480 In 
ISNA’s case, my dissertation shows that ISNA has been unable to implement a system 
that allows its secretary general to be the leader of its staff and its board to have an 
oversight role. Accordingly, the blurring of roles created dysfunction and possible 
stagnation. There is only one exception to this rule — Sayyid Syeed’s appointment to that 
role. 
This dissertation shows how ISNA became a successful nonprofit organization 
during Syeed’s term as secretary general. The organization was able to implement 
affective programs and sustain surplus budgets. After it became an effective nonprofit 
organization during Dr. Sayyid Syeed’s term as secretary general, ISNA achieved 
cognitive legitimacy and had greater success in becoming the national representative 
organization for Muslim Americans. By implementing a successful annual convention, 
publishing Islamic Horizons, and achieving fiscal stability, it was able to achieve 
cognitive legitimacy. ISNA’s success provided the foundation for its legitimacy. 
This legitimacy was strengthened because of its commitment to democracy 
through regular elections and term limits, because of the transparency provided through 
                                                          
480 I will note that as we saw in chapter one research shows that largely homogenous groups, like MAS, 
have fewer challenges in decision-making and program implementation. While more diverse organizations, 
like ISNA, face greater challenges in decision-making and consensus building. 
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its financial audits and publishing of its annual reports, and because of the pluralism 
achieved through its open membership and diversity among its leadership. These values, 
in turn, gave the organization moral legitimacy. Additionally, at a time when Muslim 
Americans needed a public entity to change the Islamophobic narrative, ISNA provided 
them with many of the narratives they needed, which effectively gave the organization 
pragmatic legitimacy. 
Finally, this dissertation illustrates how national events matter. Islamophobia that 
followed the Iranian Revolution, Gulf War I, and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, presented Muslim Americans with both opportunity and challenges. Internally, 
these events provided a greater sense of Islamic identity and activism. In addition, they 
created greater unity among a diverse Muslim American population. However, a 
community under siege is less likely to deal with the real differences that exist within. 
The fear of Islamophobia masked some important fault lines that still need to be 
addressed, and because issues of race, ideology, and religious identity remain less urgent 
when the community is fighting an external challenge to its identity, these fault lines are 
likely to increase over time. 
Externally these events, especially after the attacks on September 11, resulted in 
the United States government, interfaith organizations, and civil rights advocates to 
increase their efforts to interact with Muslim Americans, as noted in chapter four. This 
external outreach created greater legitimacy for ISNA and a greater understanding about 
Islam and Muslims.  
Externally, Islamophobia was a powerful political tool that was used for multiple 
purposes. For example, as we saw in chapter four, the antigay marriage organization, 
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Alliance for Marriage, included a representative of ISNA on its board. However, 
proponents of gay marriage, who were part of a new civil rights movement and political 
left used the Islamophobic narrative to discredit the Alliance for Marriage, which resulted 
in ISNA’s representation to end on the board. When Dr. Ingrid Mattson, ISNA's president 
at the time, was invited to take part in President Obama's 2008 inauguration, the political 
right used Islamophobia to attack President Obama.  
Islamophobia makes it difficult for ISNA and Muslim Americans to determine 
which positions are centered on their religious values and which positions are based on 
political necessity. The problem arises from the fact that, when they feel as though they're 
being attacked, ISNA and Muslim Americans are deprived of the opportunity to define 
their values and religious beliefs. For example, in 2003, ISNA was opposed to gay 
marriages, but now ISNA is part of a coalition working in favor of gay marriage. 
This dissertation examined ISNA through interviews with its secretaries general 
and public reports. Therefore, although my research addresses some essential issues, 
some perspectives and questions are yet to be addressed and could be done through 
additional studies. For example, what are the views of ISNA's elected leaders, members, 
and donors? The answer to this question may be found through the investigation of 
additional oral histories or surveys. Moreover, what are the views of those who choose 
not to be part of ISNA or other Muslim American institutions — for example, Muslim 
Americans who are not affiliated with a national or grassroots Muslim American 
institution that are not affiliated with ISNA? In addition, although ISNA is the largest 
Muslim organization in America, it does not represent the majority of Muslim 
Americans, and a number of other important Muslim American organizations rival 
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ISNA’s work. Further research could examine how their histories and experiences 
compare with ISNA's. However, the unavailability of data may hamper such institutional 
research, particularly because many of these organizations are designated as religious 
organizations and, therefore, are not required to file 990 reports with the Internal 
Revenue Service. Also, unlike ISNA, many do not publish annual reports or audited 
financial statements. Also, fear of Islamophobia makes them suspicious of research into 
their operations. My hope is that, over time, more organizations will embrace ISNA’s 
values of transparency and openness and that further research of such organizations will 
be able to build upon the institutional research provided in this dissertation. 
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APPENDIX 
In this section, I introduce in greater detail the six men that I interviewed for this 
dissertation and also provide more detail about a controversial leader of ISNA, Ahmad 
Zaki Hammad. ISNA has been served by eight men as secretaries general or acting 
secretaries general. I was able to locate and interview six of these individuals. The two 
remaining secretaries general were unavailable for interview, and their perspectives will 
be sorely missed. One of them was the first secretary general, Rabie Hasan Ahmad. He 
served for less than one year in this position. He returned to Sudan and later served as 
ambassador to Rome. He lives in Sudan and was unavailable, though willing to be 
interviewed. The second secretary general was Amer Haleem. Amer Haleem served for 
less than one year. He served under the controversial ISNA President, Ahmad Zaki 
Hammad. He lives in Wisconsin and did not respond to any of my requests for an 
interview. His perspective will be missed because ISNA went through some controversial 
transitions, and he was seen as President Hammad’s supporter. Most of those supporters 
are no longer part of ISNA. However, during both those periods, I was able to interview 
their assistant secretaries general and subsequent acting secretaries general who served 
under those individuals. 
I interviewed the following six men who served in this important role. I note in 
brackets the years that they were employed at ISNA. Collectively, the years of their 
employment shows that there are no periods between 1977 to the present day during 
which I do not have an oral history to help explain what was happening within ISNA. For 
each of these individuals, I identify which founding group I believe they represent 
(activist, HSAAM, or cultural pluralist). These terms are explained in chapter one. 
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Dr. Iqbal Unus (1977 through 1989 and 2013 to 2014) 
I label Unus as a cultural pluralist.481 Dr. Iqbal Unus was born in the city of Agra 
in Colonial India. His family moved to Karachi, Pakistan, on August 14, 1947, upon the 
declaration of Pakistan. He completed his early schooling in a Catholic school and then 
enrolled in the Air Force Academy. He then moved to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to 
study physics at Dhaka University. He received bachelors and masters in physics from 
Dhaka University and graduated in 1967. This was a tumultuous time in East Pakistan, 
with constant student demonstrations. These political differences would eventually lead 
to East Pakistan separating from Pakistan and becoming Bangladesh. Unus returned to 
his family in West Pakistan. Upon his return, he started a search for scholarships in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, or Canada to pursue higher education. He received 
an offer from Georgia Tech that would enroll him into their masters program. 
Unus arrived in the United States in March 1970. He received his Ph.D. in physics 
in 1977. His involvement with the Muslim Student Association of US & Canada (MSA) 
began soon after his arrival in the United States. He was seeking a place to pray and the 
organization arranged regular Friday congregational prayers. It was during this period 
that Unus met Dr. Ihsan Bagby, who would later also serve as acting secretary general of 
ISNA. He was later elected as the chapter president, then the regional representative of 
the MSA, and eventually served as vice president and then president of the national 
organization. 
                                                          
481 The terms of cultural pluralists, activists and HSAAM’s will be described and discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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It was during this period that MSA sought to establish a full-time national office 
to coordinate its work. As part of its leadership, Unus was involved with these 
discussions and helped shape the new ISNA. In 1976, as he was completing his Ph.D., he 
was approached to take up employment at the new MSA offices. The leadership of MSA 
argued, “. . . anyone can become a nuclear physicist but there are only a few people who 
understand our vision and what we need to accomplish.” Unus found this argument 
convincing and became the director of administration on January 3, 1977, in Indianapolis, 
Indiana. Prior to Unus coming to the United States, Unus was not involved in Islamic 
work. His involvement with MSA was born from the necessity to arrange prayer; later he 
was attracted to helping establish a Muslim American identity. 
Unus was also the leader of ISNA that selected the name of the ISNA publication 
Islamic Horizons. Unus went on to become assistant secretary general and then secretary 
general. Unus became ill in 1988 and took a leave of absence in 1989. He attributes his 
illness to tension and stress. His illness was never diagnosed. It is during this period of 
time that ISNA President Hammad announced Unus’s retirement and appointed his own 
secretary general.482 
Unus eventually moved to Virginia with his family to work at the International 
Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). He serves on ISNA’s Majlis Ashura (board) and came 
into the public limelight after September 11, 2001, when his home and offices were 
raided by the FBI in 2002. The press were tipped off prior to the raids and were present at 
all of them. Unus was never implicated in any wrongdoing, and the FBI never publicly 
apologized for the highly public event. In 2013, he volunteered to serve as interim 
                                                          
482 More discussion of this incident and Hammad is included in Chapter 2. 
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secretary general without pay to help with the transition period until a new secretary 
general was hired to lead the organization. 
Dr. Ihsan Bagby (1985 through 1991) 
I label Bagby as an historically Sunni African-American Muslim (HSAAM).483 
Bagby is originally from Ohio. He is of African-American descent and became a Muslim 
through his personal interactions with religious individuals rather than with the Nation of 
Islam. His parents were originally from Anderson, Indiana. His mother was white, and 
his father was black. They left Indiana because state laws did not allow interracial 
marriage. Bagby was exposed to Islam through the prism of the Civil Rights Movement. 
He remembers Malcolm X speaking at his church. While he was not in attendance to 
listen to the speech, he remembers the huge crowd outside his church. Later, he would 
read the biography of Malcolm X, and it drew him closer to the religion of Islam, 
eventually leading to his conversion. 
He states that the book initially influenced him to be involved in social change. 
His conversion to Islam took another couple of years. Bagby became a Muslim during his 
senior year in college. Bagby describes this as not just something that impacted African-
Americans. He shared experiences with white converts like Dr. John Sullivan (a future 
vice president of ISNA) who were affected similarly. Bagby was drafted after college to 
serve in Vietnam. He applied for a deferment as a conscientious objector and was 
approved. 
Upon graduation in 1970, Bagby went to Atlanta, Georgia, to work in the city’s 
planning department. It was there that he met with Unus and helped establish a mosque. 
                                                          
483 HSAAM will be described in more detail later in this chapter. 
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It was during this phase that Bagby met other immigrant Muslims like Unus. Bagby 
describes Unus as being different from some of the others he encountered. He 
experienced discrimination by other immigrant Muslims at the mosque. These immigrant 
Muslim Americans would constantly come to the mosque trying to show the African-
American Muslims the correct form of worship, but often one would contradict the other. 
This experience led him to the conclusion that he needed to learn more about Islam. He 
also realized that Muslims had different understandings of the faith based on experience 
and culture. He enrolled in a doctorate program at the University of Michigan in Near 
Eastern studies with a specialty in Islam law. He became more involved with MSA and 
later ISNA through his university experience. MSA had a strong chapter in Michigan 
along with a publishing house. MSA purchased a house in Ann Arbor and many of the 
MSA leaders also lived in the area. He clearly recalls activists from Egypt and Lebanon 
that he worked with in furthering MSA’s activities in the area. 
Bagby received his Ph.D. in1986, although he was hired as director of the Islamic 
Teaching Center in 1985. A major arm of ISNA, ITC was established to reach out to the 
African-American Muslim community in an effort to educate them and other new 
Muslims about Islam. Bagby was the first nonimmigrant hired to lead the IRC. Bagby 
was appointed as acting secretary general upon Unus’s forced retirement and was later 
replaced by Amer Haleem. Bagby left ISNA in 1991, because of frustration with the 
organizational leadership and particularly its president, Ahmad Zaki Hammad. 
Bagby is a professor at the University of Kentucky and studied Muslim 
Americans and their mosques. Bagby played a unique role in being the Secretary General 
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of the Muslim Alliance in North America (MANA),484 while also serving as an elected 
member of the Majlis Ash-Shura of the ISNA. He recently stepped down as a member of 
the ISNA Majlis Ash-Shura to lead the ISNA Mosque Forum project. 
Ahmed ElHattab (1983 to Present) 
I label ElHattab as an activist. ElHattab was born in Port Said, Egypt, in 1951. 
ElHattab completed his high school education and early college education in Port Said. 
He initially studied electrical engineering, but was greatly involved with the Islamic 
movement in Egypt. He describes dreaming about the opportunity of taking Islam’s 
message to the West. In 1974, while a student in college, he attended a summer program 
in Switzerland. He worked in a factory and lived with a local family. He found other 
Muslim youth at that same time and started organizing study and prayer circles. During 
this time, he saw the impact of sharing Islam with non-Muslims. During a visit to Zurich, 
he met Adel Marzouk, a friend from Egypt who was similarly stimulated by the 
possibilities of Islam in the West. 
This friend drew ElHattab’s attention to the possibility of coming to America to 
serve Islam. Marzouk then moved to America and was teaching Muslim children in 
America about Islam. In 1978, ElHattab came to the United States on a student visa in 
search of Marzouk. He was also seeking to become engaged in Islamic work. ElHattab 
remembers working in a pizzeria in New Jersey while also working at a local mosque. He 
eventually found Marzouk in Plainfield, Indiana. He contacted him by phone and visited 
the MSA offices where Marzouk worked. ElHattab then returned to New Jersey where he 
                                                          
484 MANA is the Muslim Alliance in North America and is an organization of Historically Sunni African 
American Muslims. 
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later met his first wife. His wife was a new convert to Islam. They married in 1980, and 
ElHattab found out about a job at ISNA through Marzouk. 
In 1983, ElHattab joined the organization’s Public Relations and Fundraising 
departments. ElHattab rose swiftly through the ranks of the organization. In 1986, he 
became president of the Muslim Arab Youth of America (MAYA). MAYA was 
established for Arabic-speaking youth. In 1986, ElHattab also joined Indiana University 
as a student in the Communications Department. However, because of the intensity of 
work in a growing organization and the frequent overseas fundraising trips, he was 
unable to complete his education. ElHattab eventually became the fundraising director of 
the organization. After Unus and Bagby, he served as acting secretary general under 
Ahmad Zaki Hammad, and then again after Hammad’s departure. It is during this period 
that he was divorced from his first wife and married his current wife Amira Mashour. 
Mashour was the niece of the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Mustafa 
Mashour. ElHattab remains the longest serving staff member at ISNA.  
In 1994, Dr. Sayyid Syeed was appointed secretary general of ISNA. ElHattab 
was appointed as the executive director of the ISNA Development Foundation (IDF). IDF 
would be responsible for raising funds for ISNA. While incorporated as a separate 
organization, it has acted as a department within ISNA, and ElHattab reports to the 
secretary general. ElHattab would again serve as acting secretary general on two more 
occasions after the departure of Dr. Sayyid Syeed and then again after Dr. Muneer 
Fareed. ElHattab traveled the Islamic world as ISNA’s ambassador. 
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Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed (1994 to 2005 as Secretary General; 2005 to Present as Director of 
the D.C. office) 
 
I consider Sayyid Syeed as both an activist and a cultural pluralist. Dr. Sayyid 
Muhhammad Syeed was born in Kashmir, India. 485 He came from a deeply religious 
family. His family was influential and was part of India and Pakistan’s bid for freedom 
from Great Britain. He remembers how at the age of six his father took him to meet with 
Gandhi. Gandhi took him into his lap as he stressed the importance of Hindu-Muslim 
unity. At that time, those words had little impact on a future Kasmiri freedom fighter. He 
attended Kashmir University and received an MA in English literature and linguistics. 
Upon completing his education, he became a lecturer at the University of Kashmir. Like 
many young Kashmiri men at that time, he was opposed to the idea that Kashmir was a 
part of India. He considered himself to be living under occupation. 
In 1965, India and Pakistan went to war again. Kashmiris opposed to India had 
allied themselves with Pakistan at that time and saw this war as yet another opportunity 
for freedom. As a young lecturer, he became an organizer among Kashmiri separatists. In 
1966, he was identified as a leader of the young group of agitators and was arrested by 
the Indian Army. This arrest was probably made possible by the betrayal of a fellow 
Muslim Kashmari. 
While in captivity, he was tortured and kept in seclusion. He remained in captivity 
until Amnesty International was able to secure his release. One condition of his release 
was that he could not live in Kashmir. As a young idealistic Muslim, he sought to go to 
the province of Uttar Pradesh, which was home to the great Muslim institution, Alligrah 
                                                          
485 Interview with Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed, May 1, 2011–the biographical information comes primarily from 
this interview 
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Muslim University. The state of Muslims in Alligarh was a disappointment to him. He 
had assumed that the place that gave birth to this great Muslim institution would be an 
enlightened one. He had a romanticized vision of Aligarh. In his mind, it was the 
foundation of Muslim activism that resulted in freedom from the British and the 
establishment of Pakistan. 
He was eventually granted permission to leave the country through the efforts of 
Amnesty International. He initially came to the University of Illinois at Urbana. He 
received his masters in South Asian linguistics. He then was admitted to Indiana 
University in Bloomington, where he received his Ph.D. in sociolinguistics in 1984. 
Indiana University and the University of Illinois were important bases for the 
leaders of the Muslim Student Association (MSA). MSA was established at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana. Many of the activities of the MSA took place in Indiana, 
Illinois, and Michigan. As a Muslim student, Syeed became involved with the MSA and 
quickly rose to leadership. He was the president of MSA at the time that ISNA was 
established. 
Upon the establishment of ISNA, he moved to Washington, D.C., to serve as the 
director of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). IIIT was a Muslim think 
tank. IIIT sought to engage modern scholars of Islamic theology to help frame this 
knowledge within a modern and American context. While at IIIT, he helped establish the 
peer reviewed American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS) and helped IIIT 
establish research offices across the world.  
He also served as the secretary general of the Association of American-Muslim 
Social Scientists. He later became the head of the International Islamic Federal of Student 
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Organization (IIFSO). IIFSO had special consultative status with the United States. It is 
also important to note that many of activists in the Muslim world are primarily active 
through their student organizations. He was also the founder of the Kashmiri American 
Council (KAC) and the American Muslim Council (AMC). Both KAC and AMC were 
political advocacy organizations. 
Therefore, by the time Syeed was tapped to serve as secretary general, he had 
some truly unique qualifications. He was a freedom fighter bearing the physical scars of 
his service, was the leader of the Muslim Student Association when ISNA was 
established, became the leader of Islamic student movement worldwide, was a scholar, 
was politically astute, and was a charismatic leader and speaker. He was a trusted insider 
who commanded respect among the diverse community. His children married Muslim 
Americans of Egyptian, Syrian, Yemeni, and Caucasian ethnicity. His youngest children 
were named Jesus and Moses. In 2005, Syeed was appointed as the national director for 
Interfaith and Community Outreach in a newly established office in Washington, .D.C. 
He continues to serve in that role. 
Dr. Muneer Fareed (2006–2008) 
I consider Fareed to be a cultural pluralist. Muneer Goolam Fareed, born in 1956, 
is a Muslim scholar and the former secretary general of ISNA. Muneer Fareed is a South 
African citizen of Indian descent. He studied Arabic Language and Literature at King 
Abdulaziz University, Mecca, and got a theological license in Islamic Studies (Ijazah) 
from the Darul Uloom Deoband in India. Fareed moved to the U.S. in 1989 and obtained 
his Ph.D. in 1994 from the University of Michigan, with his dissertation entitled, "Legal 
Reform in the Muslim world: The Anatomy of a Scholarly Dispute in the 19th and the 
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early 20th centuries on the Usage of Ijtihad as a Legal Tool." He worked as an imam of 
the Islamic Association of Greater Detroit from 1989 to 2000 and was an associate 
professor of Islamic Studies at Wayne State University until 2006. He succeeded Sayyid 
Syeed as the new secretary general of the Islamic Society of North America in late 2006. 
Fareed is also a member of the Fiqh Council of North America. Fareed was the first 
secretary general who came to his position without being involved with the organization 
prior to this opportunity. 
He was known nationally as a scholar but had never engaged with the 
organization. His tenure with the organization was brief. 
Safaa Zarzour (2010–2013) 
I consider Zarzour to be a cultural pluralist. Zarzour was born in Damascus, Syria, 
to a deeply religious family. Zarzour completed his early schooling and enrolled in 
Damascus University to study electrical engineering. He explains that, in Syria at that 
time, if you were from a middle class family, you either became a doctor or an engineer. 
However, the 1980s were very difficult times for young Syrians. President Assad 
was in power, and his regime was very oppressive. A close family member and friend 
was arrested and imprisoned. Zarzour was frustrated with his parents’ willingness to 
accept social order. The corruption and oppression were very difficult for him to accept. 
His friend was arrested because he was deeply religious. Zarzour states that, at that time, 
people who were deeply religious were targeted regardless of whether they were political 
because of the government’s fear of Islamic activists. Zarzour sought to escape Syria and 
applied to a number of Western countries. 
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Zarzour was accepted at Wichita State University to study engineering. He met 
his future wife at the university. She was raised Christian, but started exploring other 
faiths in college. She lived in the same dorm as Zarzour, and their friendship started from 
her questions about religion and faith. They were married a few months later. Zarzour 
was not involved in Islamic organizations. However, a few years later he became a 
member of his local mosque. Through his mosque, he became interested in education. 
In Syria, he could never have dreamed of becoming a teacher, but in the United 
States, this was a respectable and well-paying profession. His wife graduated a year 
earlier than he did and found employment in Arkansas. Zarzour chose to transfer into 
math education, as there was a shortage of math educators in Arkansas at the time. He 
received a degree in math from Arkansas State University. He enrolled in education 
courses in Louisiana and started teaching math at a local high school near the Barksdale 
Air Force Base, where his wife was employed. A couple of years after their marriage, his 
wife converted to Islam, and they decided to apply for teaching jobs at a new Muslim 
school called Universal School in Chicago. Initially, he taught there, but he was 
eventually recognized as a leader and became principal. Zarzour continued his education 
and received a masters degree in education from the University of Illinois and later a J.D. 
from DePaul University School of Law. 
Chicago was the site of Zarzour’s first involvement with Islamic work. He 
became active with local organizations, including the Council on American Islamic 
Relations (CAIR), the Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater Chicago (CIOGC), 
and the ISNA Education Forum. Zarzour became politically active and became the 
administrator of the city of Bridgeview. He became an influential leader in Bridgeview, 
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Chicago, and Illinois politics. He was also a recognized national Muslim leader through 
his involvement with CAIR, the ISNA Education Forum, and as chairman of the Council 
of Islamic Schools of North America (CISNA). Prior to being appointed secretary general 
of ISNA, he served on the Majlis Ash-Shura of ISNA for many years. Zarzour stepped 
down from his position to return to Chicago, where his family continued to live during 
his three years as secretary general at the ISNA headquarters in Plainfield, Indiana. 
During his tenure as secretary general, he elevated a female, Habibe Ali, to the number 
two position in the organization — chief operating officer. He was replaced by Dr. Iqbal 
Unus as interim acting secretary general. A new secretary general is expected to be 
announced in 2014. 
Dr. Ahmad Zaki Hammad — President of ISNA (1987–1990) 
Dr. Ahmad Zaki Hammad is a scholar of Qurannic and Islamic Studies. He is 
considered to have activist roots but later became identified a cultural pluralist. He 
teaches Islamic Civilization and the Primary Disciplines of Quran Commentary, the 
Prophetic Traditions, and the Principles of Islamic Law at the foremost center of Islamic 
and Arabic learning in the Muslim world, AL-Azhar University (Faculty of Languages 
and Translations, Department of English). He is also a member of the Faculty of Shariah, 
Department of Juristic Studies. He received his early Islamic and Arabic training at Al-
Azhar University, Cairo, and was awarded the graduate degree of Alamiyyah from the 
Faculty of Theology. He holds a Ph.D., in Islamic Studies from the University of Chicago 
and is the author of a study on the translation of Abu Hamid al-Ghazalis Al-Mustasfa min 
Ilm al-Usul, The Quintessence of the Science of the Principles of Islamic Law; and also 
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Islamic Law: Understanding Juristic Differences, a Primer on the Science of al-Khulaf al 
Fiqhi in Light of the Shari ah Sources.486 
Hammad was born and raised in Egypt. He lived in the United States until shortly 
after September 11, 2001. The organization that he led upon departure from ISNA, the 
Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI), was established to interpret the Quran. In 1998, the U.S. 
government seized QLI’s $1.4 million in assets as part of a terrorism probe.487 Hammad 
no longer lives in the United States. 
  
                                                          
486 Hammad, Dr. Ahmad Zaki, The Gracious Qur'an : A Modern Phrased Interpretation in English (Lucent 
Interpretations 2007)–taken from dust cover 
487 “Terror Funding Probe Touches Suburban Group” Chicago Tribune (9/8/1998) 
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